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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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EEC AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Sep 79 pp 100-109

[Article: "All in Butter"]

[Text] The butter surplus of the EEC is becoming increasingly threatening and the costs of marketing the surplus increasingly greater. The existing European agricultural system leads to losses in prosperity in the amount of billions.

Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl, widely known for his queer contributions, wants to play Santa Claus for the consumers, but in departure from the rule of the calendar as early as 4 October. For as of that date FRG citizens will receive 70,000 tons of butter from the supplies of the import and storage agencies at the preferential price of about 50 pfennigs per half-pound package below the normal price.

With the discount price the Council of Ministers of the European Community is continuing practices which in past years came under headings such as "Mobu" (dairy butter) and "Christmas butter." New is the tremendous volume of the special sales: In the course of 2 years the amount of cheap butter for sale in the FRG has tripled.

The inventory reduction, which is costing the EEC about DM 175 million in the FRG alone (similar campaigns are under way in the other EEC member nations), is Brussels' answer to what Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl calls the "depressing milk problem." The cows of Europe continue to produce more milk than the consumers are able to use, try as they may.

Altogether, EEC production of cow's milk has increased from about 75 million tons in 1960 to almost 100 million tons this year. The result has been a growing surplus of butter, which has increased even further by a drop in demand since 1975, and for milk protein, above all powdered lowfat milk. At the beginning of August 536,800 tons of butter rested in the perpetual ice of the EEC storage places, 27 percent more than at the end of last year. The stockpile is sufficient to supply the FRG citizens for 16 months.

For lowfat milk powder inventories last year reached another peak: 230,000 tons. Only through massive subsidies from EEC funds was it possible to reduce the powder mountain initially by half.

The chief source of the evil is the from the outset incorrectly conceived European agricultural policy. Based on the reflection that assured supply of the member nations cannot be guaranteed if agricultural income does not participate in the general prosperity, the EEC members decided to control agricultural income through a wide-ranging system of administered prices.

Through intervention prices inside the EEC Brussels guarantees the producers an annually established price level; if the profit per ton drops below a fixed margin, import and storage agencies buy up the surplus. Brussels protects domestic producers against cheap imports by imposing levies similar to customs duties on imports, proportioned so that the difference between low world market and high domestic price is compensated for.

The EEC acts inversely for exports: In order to keep domestic producers competitive in foreign markets the EEC pays the exporters of European agricultural goods the difference between domestic and world market prices in the form of so-called export subsidies.

This system of market regulation, which by now is in existence for about 20 product groups, would be acceptable if the supply would react inelastically to the guaranteed price increases, that is to say agriculture would not produce any surplus amounts. Naturally, the opposite is the case.

Prompted by excessively high standard prices -- between 1974 and 1976 the Council of Ministers established price increases for whole milk of more than 10 percent in some instances -- production in all EEC countries grows increasingly unchecked. In the FRG the import and storage agencies at present pay the dairies DM 802 for each 100 kilograms of butter and DM 326 for lowfat milk powder. These intervention prices for butter and milk powder result through recalculation of the milk intervention price of 57 pfennigs per kilogram.

Because of the excessive price the amount of milk delivered increases with a stagnating or declining consumption. In 1978, for example, the cows of Europe produced an average of four percent more than the year before; in England the increase was six and in Ireland as much as 15 percent.

Similar production jumps are possible though the number of cows has not grown for years. Two-thirds of the growth results from better breeding and increased use of concentrated feed and, lastly, the farmers' consumption of their own products is declining. One of the many misfortunes of the European milk market policy becomes visible here. Because the price of milk is too high the farmers cannot afford to use the lowfat milk for feed, as previously. The milk must therefore be dried in so-called sprinkling towers, the construction of which the EEC also had to finance with subsidies.

The cost of drying (5 to 6 pfennigs per kilogram) is just as high as the fodder value of the powder, so consequently it would be sensible from an economic viewpoint alone to pour out the lowfat milk.

As concentrated feed, with the help of which the milk production per cow continues to grow each year, the farmers of Europe use soybean groats, which must be imported from overseas at one-sixth the cost of comparable European protein products. However, the more protein feed is used the greater the amounts of lowfat milk powder become, in addition to the mountains of butter, and the milk powder can only be used in competition with soybean groats in Europe if the EEC will gradually lower the price through massive contributions and then offer subsidies for the transportation as well.

The result is increasingly greater burdens for the orientation and guarantee funds in Brussels, which must assume responsibility for the removal of the surplus. In 1975, for example, 148,000 tons of butter were stored in the refrigerated warehouses of Europe; this summer it is almost four times more.

The expenditures of the fund for the purchase of surplus butter, subsidy of sales and exportation at dumping prices -- last spring the Soviet Union alone bought 50,000 tons from Euro stocks -- are jolting the EEC budget. This year the milk market alone costs the Brussels fund DM 9.5 billion, next year it will be DM 11.7 billion. Since 1975 the expenditures have grown in annual leaps of about 35 percent.

The citizens of Europe pay for the costs of the milk market surpluses in two ways. First, they pay excessively high milk and butter prices, that is to say a kind of consumer tax. Second, the member nations must finance the removal of the surplus by paying contributions, the costs of which are in no proportion to the desired goal, a guarantee of the farmers' income. Each kilogram of the bread spread, for example, is accompanied by a tax gift from the European consumers of about DM 6.

As long as the EEC nations were not yet able to completely assure their supply from their own production, agricultural income was primarily financed via the politically fixed consumer prices. Now and in the future, however, the burden on the government budgets is growing because the degree of self-sufficiency exceeds 100 percent in increasingly more European agricultural areas. The farmers of Europe at the moment produce about 113 percent of the need for butter; in the FRG, where almost half of the European butter surplus is produced, the degree of self-sufficiency by now amounts to 130 percent. However, putting the stock in the warehouses and removing it is becoming an increasingly heavy burden on EEC funds, because a greater proportion of the production no longer reaches domestic consumers.

For years already leading agricultural economists have warned against the absurdity of aiming for the sociopolitical goal of assuring agricultural income in particular through high prices.

The principle of conducting "Social Policy With the Help of Price Policy," according to agricultural economist Prof Ulrich Koester in Kiel, must of

necessity lead to "negative effects on prosperity" for the total economy. In order to produce 1 liter more milk, for example, concentrated feed costs are required which are greater than the world market price of milk. According to calculations by agricultural economist Prof Rudolf-Ernst Wolffram in Bonn, the sale of one additional kilogram of dairy butter costs the EEC fund an average of DM 3.50. The reason: In order to dispose of one more kilogram a large amount of butter, which would have been sold anyway, must be offered at a discount price.

This system is of dubious advantage even to agriculture itself. The inflated price for the producers, as Koester wrote in his paper "Alternatives in Milk Market Policy," led to it "that in our country factors are furthermore tied down in milk production which would otherwise find a better use."

The price policy of the EEC hinders the development of more favorable business structures. Even now 45 percent of the milk producing farmers are working with fewer than 20 cows, and it is still profitable to hold on to outdated farm sizes. This is the reason why the in itself necessary migration away from farming has been taking place increasingly slower since 1972. The price policy gives "constantly false signals to those who are starting out in the profession" (Koester). Inversely, thanks to the Brussels guarantees the larger enterprises receive windfall revenue which cannot be justified.

All in all, the politically intended redistribution of income at the expense of the consumer (via price) and in favor of agriculture brings losses in prosperity which far exceed the extent of the benefits.

In a model calculation Koester, together with a team of scientists, showed the economic effects of a 3-percent increase in the price of milk. The farmers of Europe derive additional income in the amount of about DM 1.52 billion, but the consumer suffers a loss of between DM 2.2 billion and 2.6 billion because he has to pay higher prices and because the senseless additional production which results from the price increase drives up the expense of the EEC for cheaper exports to third countries. Koester: "In order for the farmers to receive a transfer of DM 1 the non-farmers have to give up DM 1.50 to 1.70. This is an annihilation device for the social product."

The system of guaranteed prices has turned all criteria for a sensible social policy upside down. For the ones who profit from the high prices, which hit above all the poorest consumers, are primarily the highly rationalized large-scale agricultural enterprises.

The results of the constant surplus marketing are fatal also to other agricultural producers outside the EEC, because the already low world market price becomes further suppressed through increased dumping at the expense of the EEC funds. Greater income decreed by Brussels for EEC farmers can thus have the effect that producers in third countries have to pay for this with loss of income.

The less expensive bread spread naturally gives the consumers back only a little of what they have to pay as tax contribution to the EEC budget. The price break campaigns also do not create much room in the stockpiles because consumption does not increase in a lasting manner. According to calculations by Ertl's ministry, last year between 12,000 and 15,000 tons more butter were consumed than normally, but this amount only made up for the decrease in the per capita consumption since 1975.

Below the line Brussels is therefore financing the stagnating butter market at increasingly greater expense and with the result that butter, which usually sold at normal prices, is now being fried away at a social discount. That is to say, the greater release from stock of 70,000 tons makes new stockpiling of almost the same amount probable.

According to a report by the Brussels Commission on the "Situation in the Milk Sector," the Eurocrats anticipate that in 1985 more than half of the European butter consumption must be stimulated through special measures if consumption is not to drop. The consumers can meanwhile choose whether to listen to the campaigns of the fat administrators in favor of increased consumption or to the appeals of the minister for health which implore them to keep away from too much heavy food.

Experts have long fought over what should be done in order to prevent the economically absurd surplus production and the misdirection of resources. As early as 1976 agricultural economists Stefan Tangermann and Ulrich Koester in their analysis "Alternatives in Agricultural Policy" proposed to the Ministry for Nutrition in Bonn that the income guarantee for the farmers should be disconnected from prices and volume and replaced by a system of individually related income transfers. According to that, the real prices would first be lowered, and subsequently the farmer would receive a certificate with a point number indicating how great the loss of his income was, based on the price reduction in the basis year. This amount would be replaced by payment from the government budget.

In the following years the EEC would have to decide what income goals to aim for in agriculture and if necessary raise the equalization of the losses through reevaluation of the certificate points. Since the agricultural income to be achieved in the market is decreasing in relative terms due to the price reduction, the equalization which is to be paid from government funds must increase relatively and absolutely in the course of time. Whoever retires early will, according to Tangermann and Koester, be allowed to take with him some sort of severance payment for the direct subsidies which would have accrued in the future.

The state income guarantee ends at the latest with the retirement of the farm owner. His son receives not one deutschemark and must choose the operating structure and form which guarantees him income, or sell the farm.

This system would have the advantage that the government expenditures would be tied to the person of the farm owner and no longer to prices and crop sizes that may be increased at random.

The views of the agricultural politicians, who are firmly allied with the green lobby, concerning this or a similar system of person-related income subsidies are just as monosyllabic as those of the farming community are icily negative. For the existing system makes it possible for the politicians to shift the consequences of an unsuccessful social policy in part from the treasury to the consumers, a highly valued method in the entire social policy. The farmers' associations like the present agricultural pattern of guaranteed prices so well because it assures agriculture of progress in productivity and safeguards surplus production against price reductions.

To be sure, with the present agricultural system it is no longer possible to finance the EEC. Brussels has already signalled that as of 1981 the revenue would no longer be sufficient to cover the fantastically growing expenditures.

Initially, experts calculate with another four percent additional production for the coming milk farming year. The dynamically growing surplus goes the same way as all reform proposals -- on the shelf, to begin with.

11949

CSO: 3103

COUNTRY'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS DISCUSSED

Vienna BULLETIN in German Aug 79 pp 5-7

/Text/ The United Nations provides the most important forum for discussion and exerts the strongest influence on world opinion regarding disarmament efforts. The First Commission of the UN General Assembly now deals exclusively with questions of disarmament and international security and the Special UN Commission on Disarmament, in which all UN member states are represented, and which had not met for 15 years, was reactivated in June 1978 by a special UN general assembly on disarmament.

This special general assembly had a remarkable result: more than 140 UN member nations were able to reach a consensus about basic principles, a disarmament program and resolutions regarding future worldwide disarmament negotiating mechanisms.

The Geneva disarmament committee (COD) is only loosely connected with the UN and represents the actual negotiating panel which, in the past, worked on some important multilateral conventions as, for example, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Antinuclear Treaty, and an injunction against bacteriological warfare.

Seen from a regional point of view, the Vienna negotiations about the bilateral reduction of fighting forces and arms and corresponding measures in Central Europe (MBFR) are of special significance because an additional reduction of troops and material would help to lessen tensions especially in Central Europe, where the strongest military concentrations of the world oppose each other.

On the pan-European level, neutral countries, and countries which are not pact members, developed the concept of confidence building which is to be expanded through a European conference on military detente suggested by France and now also endorsed by the Warsaw Pact.

The most important arms limitations negotiations are taking place on a bilateral level between the United States and the USSR in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The signing of SALT II in Vienna on 18 June 1979, is to bring about, for the first time, a reduction in the number of nuclear carriers and a certain limitation on further technological development of strategic nuclear arms.

On the worldwide level, Austria is participating actively in UN disarmament efforts, at the UN general assembly, above all at the special general assembly on disarmament (a second special general assembly is planned for 1982) and at the UN disarmament commission.

Austria has always played an exceptional role in efforts to prohibit especially inhumane weapons. There is reason to hope that a worldwide injunction against certain especially cruel weapons will be passed at a special UN conference in September 1979.

Austria is also participating at conferences regarding a number of multilateral arms limitations agreements, like the nuclear limitations agreement and the antibacteriological warfare treaty, among others. Very difficult negotiations are expected at the conference for the revision of the nuclear arms limitations treaty, which is coming up soon.

Austria, together with the other neutral and non-pact nations, is one of the authors of the confidence-inspiring measures which have become part of the final accords of the European Security Conference (SCSE). Based on a 1978 French call for a European disarmament conference and on a similar initiative by the Warsaw Pact states in May 1979, it can be assumed that a pan-European negotiating process expressing the terms of the Helsinki accords will be initiated in the foreseeable future. Austria will play a key role in this, and extensive preparations and the development of original ideas will be necessary to carry it out.

Austria is not participating in the M(B)FR negotiations in Vienna nor in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR. But Austria is paying close attention to the progress made in every phase of these negotiations, and the analyses will influence the position Austria will take in those panels on which it is represented; numerous relationships and interrelationships exist between the various levels (bilateral, regional, worldwide), and it is not possible to pass judgment on one level without having precise information of what is happening on the other levels.

As far as Austria's basic attitude is concerned, the greatest problems of the disarmament policy are based on the fact that disarmament affects the vital interests of a neutral state in the geopolitical position of Austria, but that these interests are often not identical with those of the major powers. Austria cannot assume that our concerns will be considered by others without our having to expound. We must develop our own ideas and fight for them vigorously, if we seriously want to work for our interests. A stronger participation of Austria in the international disarmament effort is unavoidable.

9328

CSO: 3103

FDP DISPLAYS NEW OPTIMISM TOWARD 1980 ELECTIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] Compared to the internal difficulties besetting the major parties, the FDP has lately taken on the look of a harmonious brotherhood. The SPD is meandering toward its Berlin party congress; the FDP has its "Bremen" behind it. And while the CDU continues to be embroiled in the difficult matter of how to handle Strauss, the FDP has only one problem: How Genscher will be able to handle himself. Still, even he now is at peace with his party. After the Bremen party congress (distinctly heated at times) no new battles of the extremes have broken out. In Bonn the coalition is relatively steady, though the Free Democrats are intent on upholding their slight but distinct difference from the SPD. The FDP seems to have achieved that which it used to yearn for: To be a party without great anxieties--if only the sequence of frightening elections were not inevitably approaching.

Calamity in Duesseldorf

As early as the end of this month, at the North Rhine-Westphalian municipal elections, the FDP will confront the greatest challenge. A few years ago the case of Hessen demonstrated how the abysmal loss of municipal elections may damage the FDP as a whole. This time, in the largest of the Laender, the FDP had long and serious difficulties regarding its leader Riemer who is considered something of a problem. Genscher also would have preferred Riemer to have taken an honorable departure--in favor of Count Lambsdorff. But the latter hesitated from taking on the office of Land chairman.

The condition of the Duesseldorf party leadership has raised doubts in the FDP, especially with regard to the municipal elections. Not until lately has the party claimed to have noted a "positive basic attitude" of Free Democrats. For one, it is said, the calamity at the head of the local party has not affected the rank and file. For the other Riemer himself is supposed to have consolidated his position. He now seems to survive thanks to the weakness of his "opponents." In addition Willi Wyer, honorary chairman of the North Rhine-Westphalian party, has returned to active duty in the municipal election campaign (this should not automatically be interpreted as an example to Walter Scheel when the Bundestag election campaign approaches).

The FDP therefore hopes to do reasonably well in Duesseldorf. A week later the election bugle will sound in Bremen. In that Land the FDP resembles nothing so much as a sprinter chasing his own record. It is unlikely that the Free Democrats will be able to hold on to the 13 percent vote they achieved in the Hanseatic city 4 years ago.

These two campaigns will be followed by a brief intermission, and the FDP will have to make the very most of it. It will need to prepare the party program for the 1980 Bundestag election campaign which the Free Democrats intend to run strictly on issues--thereby emphasizing their difference from the expected major clash of personalities between Schmidt and Strauss. Four specialized congresses--on "media policy, the legal state, the defense of privacy against the intrusion of computer data, and care for seniors"--are intended to impress this image on a selected clientele--especially those "on the way up," and--this time--also the marginal groups between FDP and CDU, who reject Strauss.

The Baden-Wuerttemberg elections are scheduled for March; they are the first of the great test elections for next fall's Bundestag campaign. In the southwest the FDP (local chairman Morlok) is faced with disaster. Whom should they pick as their potential coalition partner? The party can hardly ally itself with the SPD, led by Erhard Eppler, if it does not wish to scare off worth while groups of voters. Yet the same holds true for a decision in favor of CDU Minister President Spaeth. The FDP in Baden-Wuerttemberg will therefore be compelled to confine itself to an "undecided clause" decorated with "factual issues." Incidentally, this would amount to a belated rehabilitation for Martin Bangemann who lost his office as general secretary precisely for advocating this attitude. In Stuttgart also the FDP will probably announce its supreme goal to be the destruction of Spaeth's absolute majority. If, against all expectations, it were to succeed in this enterprise, it would--for the sake of credibility--have no choice but to enter a Spaeth CDU Government (exactly the reverse of Bremen).

Next, in April, follow the Saarland elections. Here a Land party congress will decide the coalition issue next November--very probably in favor of the CDU. Cooperation, formerly with Roeder and now with Zeyer, is considered doing very well. An about-turn would not be really credible. In addition, after Roeder's death Saarland FDP chairman Klumpp has been serving as something like an unofficial elder statesman in association with Zeyer who has held office for a much shorter time.

1980--Three Times Different

Totally different is the situation regarding the second great test election in North Rhine-Westphalia on 11 May. Here the FDP will, despite all disagreements about details, announce its willingness to enter a coalition with Minister President Rau. To begin with the Duesseldorf Free Democrats are not in the least attracted by CDU candidate Koeppler. Moreover the Bonn party leadership is likely to make sure that the FDP in the largest Land makes the same coalition choice as will the federal party for the Bundestag elections,

due only 4 months later. In any case the FDP has the somewhat oppressive premonition that it will announce three differing coalition preferences in the crucial year 1980, on the occasion of three successive provincial assembly elections.

The Duesseldorf provincial assembly elections hold the greatest uncertainty for the FDP. A decline below 5 percent is not impossible here. The frequently weak and always colorless leadership has not been able to claim many successes in five provincial assembly sessions, and their reserves were badly eroded even in 1975. However, should the bell toll for the FDP in Duesseldorf, the situation with regard to the Bundestag elections will be exceedingly tough. How will it be possible to staunch the outflow? A change in the coalition preference for Bonn would be an act of desperation quite out of bounds for the FDP, if only because the overwhelming majority of the party and its voter potential would hardly approve a choice favoring Union candidate Strauss. If there were a landslide disastrous for the Free Democrats in North Rhine-Westphalia, the most extreme possibility might be that of foregoing any coalition preference in the federal elections. So far all of this is still firmly pushed into the deepest recesses of FDP thinking. Nevertheless: The period through the Bundestag elections next fall harbors many unknown factors for the FDP also. And when we look closer, we see that the FDP does not, after all, live on a peaceful island. Genscher's anxieties may have been postponed, they have hardly been removed.

11698

CSO: 3103

GOVERNMENT SHOULD DISCUSS ANTI-REFUGEE WEAPONS WITH GDR

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Sep 79 p 12

[Editorial: "A Barbarity"]

[Text] The Federal Government's plenipotentiaries in the border commission would have ample opportunities for beginning talks with the GDR on automatic killer weapons, explosive bodies banned by international law. After all, the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic is directly involved in many cases, for example when refugees wounded by such devices must be cared for by West German physicians. One of the plenipotentiaries appointed by the Federal Government said that "we have long been searching for a legal provision enabling us in such cases to proceed against the GDR." Evidently such a provision has so far not been found. That is the only possible explanation for the fact that the GDR's crimes against human rights at the zone border were not listed on the agenda at this week's Frankfurt session of the border commission. The killer devices at the inner-German border are barbarities which differ not one iota from the electrified barbed wire fences around the national socialist concentration camps. We must not keep silence about this horror. The international human rights convention makes sense only if used by the Federal Government also for an offensive human rights policy.

11698

CSO: 3103

SPD WEIGHS NEW OFFICE TO PROMOTE DETENTE WITH GDR

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] To push ahead with detente, many Social Democrats are considering a new Ministry for Peace and Disarmament.

Hans-Juergen Wischniewski reminded the Chancellor of an embarrassing omission: No sooner had the designated SPD vice chairman learned that SPIEGEL intended to publish the appointment of SPD left winger Gunter Huonker as the new state minister at the Chancellery, than Wischniewski sent an alarm signal to his boss two Thursdays ago: "Helmut, you must talk to Egon Franke."

Schmidt had forgotten to inform his Inner-German Minister about the change from Wischniewski to Huonker--although Franke's department is immediately affected by the personnel change.

After all, Franke's Ministry handles the management of inner-German affairs generally. By reason of the special features of German-German relations, however, the state minister at the Chancellery is the official superior of Guenter Gaus, Bonn's representative in East Berlin. At the same time Wischniewski, not Franke, is the opposite number for the GDR representative in Bonn.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Germany Minister insists on being consulted in the choice of Wischniewski's successor: If his department is to make any sense, he must arrive at some understanding with his colleague in the Chancellery.

Such niceties did not even occur to Schmidt who is most reluctant to deal with German-German politics. Franke promptly took offense. The leader of the right faction subsequently took out his annoyance with the Chancellor on Huonker who, in a telephone interview, had frankly classified himself as "to the left within the SPD spectrum."

Franke commented: "That was bad. He did not do himself any favors with this kind of statement."

Bonn's outstanding promoter of Germany policy and detente, SPD majority leader Herbert Wehner, registered the conflict with a good deal of displeasure. Schmidt's negligence confirmed his long cherished suspicion that the Chancellor is intent on blocking any new major initiative in East-West politics.

In the fall of 1978 Wehner had called for the incorporation of the Germany policy as a basic element within the new total framework of future peace and disarmament politics. A prominent Bonn Eastern politician commented: "Wehner is quite right. It has been far too long since anybody conceptually tackled the further development of our relations with the GDR."

Together with some of his cronies the majority leader wrote down all issues and areas which he considers to offer further opportunities for a rapprochement between the two German states. He then used his vacation in Sweden to polish his total concept.

In Wehner's opinion our Germany policy must be closely linked with disarmament policy. The Federal Republic and the GDR are both situated at the sensitive joint of the power blocs and therefore represent the area of the largest weapons and forces concentrations anywhere in the world. They are consequently obligated so to develop their relations that they may be able actively to affect the coming disarmament negotiations of the superpowers.

To help speed up the resumption of political contacts between Bonn and East Berlin at the highest level, Wehner indicates the basic treaty: In 1972, by means of an article (admittedly hardly applied so far), the two countries agreed on consulting each other on all issues of common interest. After ratification of SALT II Helmut Schmidt also would have an excellent opportunity for trying a new initiative in the Germany policy--and to enter into personal discussions with SED chief Erich Honecker.

So far Wehner's plans have been frustrated by the power struggles in the Bonn Government apparatus: By now some 130 departments and offices in 9 ministries are dealing with disarmament and arms control. Franke, for 10 years preoccupied with German-German affairs, says: "There is far too much confusion; coordination must be insisted upon with the proper authority."

In recent years the Germany Minister has seen the very necessity of his department questioned. In Wehner's plans he sees an opportunity to provide himself and his department with a great future. He recommends the consolidation in one ministry (preferably his own) of "the entire complex of issues"--coordination of the Germany policy and disarmament--"due to its importance this cannot be done by anyone who does not hold Cabinet rank," if for no other reason than to settle outstanding conflicts with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the Defense Ministry.

Franke has already considered a possible name: "Ministry for Detente and Disarmament, or something similar." However vague the SPD plans for a new organization to deal with future peace politics, the resistance of the FDP coalition partner to this loss of authority is already well defined.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is keeping a very suspicious eye indeed on the personnel changes in the Chancellery. While Hans-Juergen Wischniewski represented a partner whose loyalty he was certain of, he has his doubts about Huonker--especially because he too was surprised by the appointment. Not until the Friday before last did Wischniewski quietly inform him of the Chancellor's choice. Genscher's reaction to the SPD plans to reduce the Foreign Ministry's influence on important areas of future foreign policy? "Completely out of the question."

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EASTERN BORDER ISSUE THREATENS TO BECOME CAMPAIGN DUEL

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Necessity or Provocation?"]

[Text] The Government has thrown down the gauntlet on behalf of a Germany and Eastern policy--and the opposition has accepted the challenge. Remote indeed is the arena where the battle is being fought with tenacity and some subterfuge. The Federal Government has used a turnover tax bill amendment, introduced because the Federal Government is obligated to enact it as a consequence of European agreements (incidentally, that is why the pressure of time has been added to fuel the fire) in order to redefine the scope of the turnover tax law as follows: The former German eastern territories--Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia--are foreign territories. The GDR is certainly not domestic territory. Superseded thereby is the definition of Germany in the borders prevailing on 31 December 1937.

Necessity or provocation? Chancellor Schmidt says that the treaties (especially the 1970 treaty with Poland and the 1972 treaty with the GDR) call for this amendment. Speaking to the Bundestag he enjoyed putting the rhetorical question whether the Union intended to send a turnover tax demand to a firm in Dresden--something nobody had ever even thought of doing. The Union in turn talks of pussyfooting and kowtowing to the East. Unless appearances are extremely deceptive, this coming Friday the Bundesrat with its Union majority will for the second time refuse to approve the amended bill. A third and final round will then be left to produce a compromise.

The Federal Government was certainly not obligated to make these changes. Admittedly (and the Coalition cites this fact in support), the Poland Treaty says that the Oder-Neisse line represents Poland's "western national borders." Also admittedly the basic treaty states that both states in Germany exercise sovereignty only on their respective territory. However, it took a lengthy dispute, involving notes and counter notes, statements and confirmations as well as a Bundestag resolution for these phrases in the treaties to be laboriously adapted to the constitution which assumes a Germany in the borders of 31 December 1937 (that is before the national socialist annexations).

The terms quoted in the treaties describe a state of affairs; they do not anticipate the peace treaty.

The two Eastern treaties mentioned do not modify the constitution; the constitution limits the treaties. The general rules of international law would have precluded any change by later treaties with other partners to the Federal Republic's agreements with the Allied Powers; only these earlier agreements, not individual treaties, are given constitutional status in the constitution. The fact that the Allied Powers retained the term "Germany as a whole"--and that is Germany as it used to be in 1937--, is no longer the prerogative of the victorious powers, it is a privilege of the Germans and to be carefully nurtured. Berlin, especially, is a pawn in this otherwise rather abstract game. The artful decoration of the Eastern treaties, bestowed on them by the Federal Republic due to the exigencies of the constitutional situation, was accepted by the partners and confirmed in 1973 and 1975 by the Federal Constitutional Court as the condition for the acceptance of constitutionality.

It is therefore nonsense to talk of a legal duty for removing from all federal laws the definition of Germany in the 1937 borders. Such removal would have to begin with the constitution proper (article 116), and everybody, even the people in Warsaw, is well aware that the Federal Government does not command the necessary majority. If the Coalition Government had felt it insupportable to retain the definition "Germany 1937" for a forthcoming amendment to the law, another term might have been used. Unexceptionable, for example, is the phrase "scope of the constitution"; the CDU/CSU has at all times quietly accepted it. Yet the Federal Government deliberately chose the definition farthest removed from the Union standpoint. Therefore: Confrontation must have been intended.

The CSU/CDU accepted the challenge. There are people who claim that chancellor candidate Strauss wished it so; it looks very much like his impetuosity. Duels of this type are not fought with foils but with the blunt sword of propaganda. That Strauss is vehemently committing himself to this battle well suits the image of a politician who is not famous for coldly calculating opportunities and risks.

Schmidt's position is far more complex. He is showing what amounts to passion in his championship of the removal of the "1937" definition. And yet Schmidt is very well aware that this comes dangerously close to the nerve of common German citizenship, which East Berlin is so persistently drilling. The final abandonment of the "fiction" that the GDR is to be considered "inland" from the constitution's Germany definition, would have highly pregnant consequences which would be felt by every refugee and every resettler: From the right to a passport to a pension claim.

Chancellor Schmidt is fully justified in praising the steadfastness of the Polish nation which persisted in yearning for national unity despite a forced division lasting well over a century. He cannot possibly take pleasure in relinquishing the constitutional Germany definition in the turnover tax law.

But he is probably looking at two advantages: Opponent Strauss makes himself subject to attack as not being ready for peace with the East. Vis-a-vis those in his own party who consider concessionary formulas proof of progressive virtue, a small concession--possibly providing more scope elsewhere--may do some good. After all, even a strong chancellor must make sure that he will remain strong.

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EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN AID POLICIES URGED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Sep 79 p 8

[Report of speech by Dr Konrad Seitz, member of the planning staff, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn]

[Text] The Tokyo newspaper YOMIURI SHIMBUN, at 11 million copies daily the largest circulation newspaper in Japan, organized a 2-day forum on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany. Present were, in addition to leading Japanese politicians and economists, the following official representatives from the Federal Republic: Schleswig-Holstein Minister President Stoltenberg, former Federal Minister Hoecherl, Bundestag deputies Ahlers (SPD) and Blumenfeld (CDU) as well as Karl Hohmann, one of the closest collaborators of former Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. Karl Schiller was also invited and had agreed to come but was compelled by illness to cancel at short notice. One of the most interesting reports at this forum was presented by Dr Konrad Seitz, member of the planning staff at Bonn's Foreign Ministry, on the topic "Third World Politics From the German standpoint." As Seitz was involved in the drafting of nearly all important speeches delivered by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on international topics, the theses presented in this Tokyo lecture are likely basically to correspond to Genscher's concepts and pronouncements.

In 1970 John Kenneth Galbraith passed the 1960's in review and arrived at some conclusions for international politics as then conducted. He wrote: "The developing countries are poor and agrarian..., they have no vital relevance to the economic or strategic situation of the developed countries." This quotation strikingly illustrates the extent to which the international situation as since changed.

generally comes from developments in the Third World. Especially energy and raw material supplies have thereby become a focal problem.

Developments in the Third World have relentlessly drawn the Federal Republic toward world and world economic politics ever since the mid-1970's. No longer can our republic concentrate on Western integration and Eastern politics within a secure world political and world trade system; now it is also confronted with the challenge to contribute to the evolution of an international system which will provide the global interdependence of nations with a stable basis for a genuinely global system. Such a world system is feasible only within the community of the industrial democracies. The tasks involved, therefore, can no longer be defined as German tasks exclusively--only as tasks for the trilateral community: Europe-Japan-United States.

We must tackle three major groups of issues: 1. The developing countries are rejecting the legitimacy of the world economic system created by the West after 1945, because they assert with some justification that this system is inadequate to support the goal of development. We must therefore provide a new system of relations which will be recognized as fair and just, and consequently upheld by the Third World also. Only thereby will it be possible to restore legal security and long-term stability to North-South relations. 2. The growing internal unrest and external conflicts in the Third World represent a growing threat to world peace and the stability of world trade. Consequently the Western countries must do everything possible by a coordinated approach to encourage stability in the Third World. 3. The conflicts in the Third World are exacerbated by being part of East-West competition and Soviet-Chinese rivalry. The West must therefore aim to integrate the Soviet Union and China in an international system to aid stability.

To produce stable cooperation between industrial and developing countries it will be necessary most of all to utilize the North-South dialog carried on in UNCTAD and the United Nations. Up to now, though, the industrial democracies united in the OECD have failed properly to use the dialog for this purpose. All they have been doing is to react to Third World initiatives. That in turn implies that negotiations are largely concerned only with that which the industrial countries are expected to do, not with that which the developing countries will have to contribute themselves.

-- We negotiated about the amount of development aid to be granted by the industrial countries, not how this development aid may be made to produce greater stability.

-- We negotiate about opening the markets of industrial countries, not about the obligations which the industrially advanced developing countries in turn must accept.

-- We negotiate about price and revenue stabilization for the raw materials of the developing countries, not how adequate raw material investments in the Third World may be secured.

-- We negotiate about a code of conduct for transnational firms and a code relating to technology transfers, not about the issue of the restoration of legal security for foreign private investments in the Third World.

-- And lastly we do not at all negotiate the issue which, like no other, has become crucial for the growth and development of the world economy: The assurance of energy supplies.

It is impossible by these methods to develop a North-South system for which both parties will accept joint responsibility regarding the dual target of stable growth and speedier, broad based development. It therefore appears to be about time for the Western industrial countries to advance to an active North-South strategy. The North-South dialog must not remain a dialog by which the industrial countries allow themselves to be forced by the Third World into more and more concessions at the longest possible delay. Instead it must become a dialog restoring the long-term stability of North-South relations, without which we will be unable to recover our own economic stability.

Every year some 5 percent of developed world deposits of natural resources are exhausted. At the same time world demand for mineral raw materials (excluding fuels) will rise by 4-5 percent annually in the next 10 years. Based on these figures the need for mining investments in the 10 years 1975-1985 was estimated at \$120 billion (at 1975 prices). However, we already note that these investments are not going to be made if the current situation persists. A world recession due to raw material shortages cannot, therefore, be excluded. The most important cause of this situation is the collapse of the system formerly used to finance and carry out mining investments in the Third World: Many countries no longer admit the Western mining corporations which used to handle this task. Even where they might still be admitted, they are scared off by fear of future confiscation and, especially, future unilateral changes in the agreed conditions. In 1961 57 percent of the exploration expenditure incurred by the 15 largest European mining corporations were spent in the developing countries; this percentage had declined to 15 by 1975.

Most developing countries, for their part, are unable by themselves to carry out major mining projects. They have neither the necessary capital or the technology required. All exploration and development of new deposits has therefore ceased in large areas of the Third World. The mining corporations are shifting investment back to Western countries: To Canada, Australia and the United States. Instead of developing more easily accessible deposits in the Third World, they prefer to exploit formerly uneconomic resources in "safe" countries.

As early as 1976, on the occasion of UNCTAD IV, Kissinger warned that raw material prices would go through the roof if this development were to continue. He proposed the establishment of an international raw material bank which was to serve as a kind of mediator between developing countries and mining firms, providing capital for investments and guarantees for the investors. However, at UNCTAD IV the developing countries rejected discussion of this proposal

because the West, for its part, rejected the Third World proposal for a common raw material fund.

This is a prime example of missed opportunities. The OECD countries managed to inflict serious damage upon themselves by their negotiating strategy of continuing delay. We urgently need to get away from this kind of strategy. The OECD countries should have to offer generous services--and in good time--all the while making their offers dependent on the developing countries assurance of countervailing contributions, without which it is impossible to secure a properly functioning world economy, growth in the industrial countries or development in the developing countries. It is imperative to foster a new awareness and clearly to appreciate that the services demanded from all sides are not only services for the benefit of others but also serve our own concerns.

Stable cooperation can be achieved only with a stable partner. The trend in large areas of the Third World, though, is precisely directed to increasing instability. The reasons for this instability are many and varied: Territorial disputes such as that between Somalia and Ethiopia about the Ogaden; hegemonic and annexion policies such as in Indochina; the Mideast conflict; decolonization and racial conflicts in southern Africa and, finally, as the most common cause of internal stability: The convulsion of the traditional social balance by the very process of development.

Economic development is impossible without social development. That, however, implies that the destabilization of the social structure inevitably follows economic development. It is therefore a vital task to contain this destabilization by an appropriate development strategy. Here the West has earlier failed far too often to give the developing countries sound advice. According to the prevailing doctrine the developing countries are poor because they lack capital and technology for the establishment of modern industries. It was therefore considered essential to provide capital and technical aid for industrialization; in that case growth would necessarily follow. To begin with it would make social inequalities worse, but in the long run prosperity was bound slowly to extend to the poor. All important initially were the greatest possible growth rates.

If we consider the developing countries in general, this goal was definitely achieved. Despite the tremendous population growth, per capita incomes in the Third World rose by nearly 3 percent in the period 1950-1975. This rate is well above the growth rates recorded by the present industrial countries in the era of their industrialization, though their population growth was far smaller. Yet, despite this amazing success we must now note some regrettable weaknesses of the exclusive growth strategy:

-- Some of the developing countries were largely excluded from growth. The Third World is now divided into the threshold countries and the poorest countries.

-- At the same time large strata of the population in the developing countries were virtually excluded from the economic advance. The economy and society divided into two spheres: A modern sector benefiting from growth, and a traditional sector where everything remained the same as before, where people continued to live in misery.

We therefore need a new and balanced development strategy--a development strategy involving the masses of the poor in economic growth by providing them with the ability and opportunity for productive employment. In most developing countries the chief impetus for such a strategy will have to come from farming. We will urgently need to develop a modern but labor intensive agriculture. It is also imperative to integrate industrialization into the growth propelled forward by farming. Industry must produce goods for mass consumption, and, in turn, the involvement of the masses in growth must create the purchasing power and thereby the demand for these goods.

This so-called "basic demand strategy" should not be misinterpreted as an alms giving to the poor. Rather is it a growth strategy aiming at growth primarily by mobilizing the labor of the people. Basic demand strategy is not designed completely to replace but to complement the strategy of industrialization. The developing countries need both: Growth by the development of a labor intensive agriculture and an industry using labor intensive and adapted technologies, and on the other hand growth by exports, the establishment of modern and sometimes even capital intensive industries. It will depend on the specific situation of the respective developing country how these two growth strategies are to be combined. The developing countries differ widely in their equipment with natural resources, the status of education of their peoples. We must therefore have specific development strategies, a single one simply will not do for all countries.

It is up to the developing countries to decide the development strategy they may wish to adopt. The Western industrial countries, though, may provide an incentive to balanced development strategies by the offer of generous financial aid, thereby significantly improving the opportunities of the developing countries for carrying out such strategies. Two scenarios come to mind:

1. The industrial countries and the rich oil countries could set up a huge international capital fund which would be available to those developing countries willing to use a growth strategy based on basic demands. This fund should also finance local costs (that is costs not payable in foreign exchange). At the time of capital allocation individual projects would not be checked, only the implementation of the general development plan.

2. An international institution might be set up, charged with encouraging the transfer of adapted technologies to the developing countries and strengthening their ability to apply these technologies and independently further develop them.

In the matter of the stability of the Third World the interests of the Soviet Union differ fundamentally from those of the West: The Soviet Union is self-

sufficient in raw materials and carries on little trade with the developing countries. It is therefore not dependent on stability. On the other hand instability offers it the opportunity to expand its influence in the Third World by arms aid and military intervention. Such a Soviet policy, though, exacerbates the conflicts in the Third World, in fact makes them virtually insoluble. It must therefore be the West's aim to keep East-West rivalry out of the Third World and recruit the Soviet Union for participation in an international system directed to stability. In the longer run this goal is not nearly so fantastic as it might appear right now.

Soviet ambitions for political and ideological domination of the Third World are obsolete. They are opposed by the nations insistence on independence, which tends to be the strongest political factor precisely in the Third World. Soviet policy is therefore ultimately doomed to failure. Its fiascos--from China to Egypt--speak loud and clear.

Soviet expansionist policy is pursued at great political cost, because it endangers East-West detente. It also involves equally great financial strain. In all this we must remember that the Soviet gross national product is smaller than the combined national products of the Federal Republic and France. Furthermore, the growth rates of the Soviet economy are on the decline. And lastly: The Soviet Union, and to an even greater extent the other European CEMA countries, see themselves slowly involved in world economic interdependence: They also are getting to rely on the international economic system. Their interest in stability is increasing accordingly.

Third World policy serves the goal of establishing secure cooperative relations between industrial and developing countries, fostering the stability of the Third World, keeping East-West conflicts out of the Third World and including the Soviet Union and China in an international system oriented to stability. These goals are crucial for the success of Third World development efforts and also for the security of our own future in freedom and economic stability.

11698
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1980 LABOR NEGOTIATIONS IN METALWORKING INDUSTRY VIEWED

Trade Union Views

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 17 Sep 79 p 1

[Text] In Homburg last weekend the executive of the IG [industrial labor union] Metal decided the basic outlines of its 1980 standard wage demands. HANDELSBLATT has learned that this involves a change in labor union strategy: Though not completely renounced, the Braunlage standard wage demands (see HANDELSBLATT, 30 April 1979) have been revised as a consequence of the inflationary development expected in 1980. These demands were intended to replace percentage wage increases by objective improvements in conditions. In 1980, however, negotiations will be concerned with wages only, and the battle will rage about percentages, not improvements in conditions (see also page 2).

According to one information, the Homburg decisions may be summarized as follows:

-- The closed meeting did not discuss the actual amount of the demands to be made for 1980. Agreement was reached, though, on the following wages formula: Complete equalization for inflation without adjustment of the rate of inflation by the percentage points of the imported rate of inflation, plus productivity increase, plus redistribution bonus--the latter in view of the employers allegedly very favorable profit situation.

-- At its closed meeting the IG Metal executive assumed a 4 percent productivity rate and a 4-4.5 percent inflation rate for 1980. Therefore it may be expected that the wage negotiations in the metal industry, the first to be affected in 1980, will be confronted with a figure 9 before the decimal point. The discussion revealed that the figure 10 is to be avoided in consideration of the 1980 elections.

-- Qualitative demands such as foreshadowed in Braunlage will be omitted. In the course of the 1979 negotiations the IG Metal had in any case gone quite far in matters of cutting the work week. However, an additional raise will probably be demanded for the lower paid workers, either by way of minimum amounts, favored for a long time by the followers of Franz Steinkuehler, or

by the elimination of wages group II. In justification of this structural improvement it is claimed that the lower wage groups are affected worse by the rise in heating fuel than their higher paid fellow workers.

-- A rise in the amount of the Christmas bonus will not be discussed at the time of the wage negotiations. The IG Metal in fact barred its own way here by arguing against a supplementary round. Moreover, any Christmas bonus would not be paid until nearly the end of the standard wage period, at Christmas 1980, and therefore hold little interest for wage negotiations at the beginning of the year.

-- Not dealt with at all was the issue of compensating wage demands by tax relief in 1980. The IG Metal is not inclined to enter into a triangular transaction involving labor union/employer/Federal Finance Minister.

-- Nor was the matter of asset formation discussed. There was agreement that the IG Metal will continue to reject individual employee asset formation, and that a resolution is to be considered only in terms of the above-enterprise formation of "social capital," possibly in the shape of industry pension funds financed by employer contributions and offering the same enterprise pensions to all employees in the industry. The plans of Rolf Boehme, parliamentary state secretary in the Federal Finance Ministry, and suggestions by Labor Minister Ehrenberg or his State Secretary Anke Fuchs were benevolently mentioned from this aspect--albeit only marginally.

-- Homburg did not question the Br unlage decisions concerning a new tactic in the labor struggle and the differentiated though coordinated approach to the next round of standard wage negotiations. Agreement is also reported to have been achieved regarding the aim of getting greater union freedom for applying these new tactics in the negotiations beginning this week with Gesamtmetall [Metal Employers Federation] on a new arbitration procedure, though nobody wishes to dispense with the arbitration procedure as such. Also discussed, for a change, was the problem of the "cold lock-out" in connection with article 116 of the employment promotion law.

The closed meeting proceeded quite placidly and took so little time that even the executive was surprised. There were no obvious differences of opinion regarding the concepts described earlier. Even Stuttgart regional chief Franz Steinkuehler accepted that it is the decisionmaking organ, not he personally, who must set out the guidelines for the wages policy to be adopted, and that, in recognition of the need for disciplined organization, he fully approved the central decisions. At least that is what he told HANDELSBLATT.

Management Views

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 18 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] On 17 September 1979 HANDELSBLATT reported the decisions taken by the IG Metal executive at its closed Homburg meeting last weekend with regard to

1980 standard wage demands. Talking to HANDELSBLATT, Dr Dieter Kirchner, general manager of Gesamtmetall, characterized these decisions as follows: "After the oil shock the labor union seems to be planning a wages shock."

Though, according to our information the executive of the IG Metal has not yet decided on the actual wages demand, the union opinions so far reported are considered by Kirchner to suggest a "return to the wrong headed wages demands of the past." By asking for greater raises the labor union leadership wishes, as in 1974, to save its members from the consequences of the oil inflation. At that time, Kirchner claims, this policy decisively contributed to the most serious economic crisis and the worst unemployment of the postwar period. "It is regrettable that the IG Metal leadership is currently either unwilling or unable to learn from the mistakes of the past," Kirchner emphasized.

He hoped that this year's early beginning of the wage negotiations may help demonstrate the dangers of a wrong reaction and thereby prevent the "oil crisis of 1979 from becoming the wage cost crisis of 1980," at the end of which another economic crisis with increasing unemployment and a high inflation rate would threaten.

Kirchner is unimpressed by the intention of reducing wages policy to a more or less simple "wages formula." The rule of thumb proposition "productivity plus price rate," for example, he considers an unsuitable prescription for coping with the risks foreseeable for 1980. Important in his view are not general rules but credible and realistic economic goals. "Our goals for 1980 are the achievement of more stable prices after this year's oil price crisis as well as another reduction in unemployment," Kirchner stressed. "I am quite sure that the employees in the metal industry will do well in these circumstances."

Imported Inflation a Cost Factor

Kirchner does not think that the price development is firmly programmed in the wages. Certainly not if other countries are primarily responsible for price rises. "Imported inflation" does not represent earnings for the metal firms; in fact it is a most disagreeable cost factor. Those citing these costs to justify wage raises are obviously unconcerned with the question how such wage raises are to be earned. Anyone incorporating the "imported inflation" in wages must share in the guilt for destroying jobs.

As far as Kirchner is concerned not even the so-called "home made inflation" need be reflected in standard wage raises. After all, this part of general inflationary pressure also results from wages demands. "Wage raises are strongly related to costs, and costs to prices." The IG Metal tactic of assessing the 1980 inflation rate very high in order to have an alibi for exaggerated wage claims must therefore be considered most reprehensible. "The Federal Government expects a 3-4 percent inflation rate in 1980, the IG Metal has arbitrarily changed this to 4-4.5 percent and claims the appropriate wage compensation. "Acting thus contributes to that very rate of inflation," is Kirchner's opinion.

Kirchner judges "positively insane" the claim for a distribution surcharge in view of the unexpectedly satisfactory profit development in the metal industry. "As a matter of fact," says Kirchner, "our material costs have risen far more than was assumed in early 1979, while our sales prices--as expected--increased by only about 3 percent. Only better capacity utilization has enabled us in 1979 to achieve roughly the same profit margins as in 1978." The IG Metal calls for redistribution for 1980. Obviously it has failed to appreciate that the improved utilization and investments of 1979 were not the result of high wage raises but the consequences of a more stable earning situation.

Kirchner considers as merely a rehash of the old leveling policy the IG Metal announcement that it will call for a supplementary raise for lower paid workers who, the union points out, suffer more from the rise in heating oil prices than their better paid colleagues. Kirchner claims that it is up to government social policy in such cases to assist the lower income groups. In fact the necessary money has already been allocated in the recently enacted supplementary budget.

Concerning the wage claim speculations now making the rounds Kirchner indicates the only 1980 factor already quantifiable in terms of wage policies: The 1.4 percent burden of wages costs on the metal industry. It arises from the last stage of the capital forming payment (0.5 percent) taking effect on 1 January 1980 as well as the agreed graduated vacation provision (0.9 percent).

Government Concern

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Sep 79 pp 60-61

[Text] Bonn hopes for moderate wage settlements in the election year. Is IG Metal chief Loderer willing to play ball?

It is rare for people to share so much good news.

Last Tuesday in the Chancellery, the Federal Chancellor assured his 30 guests --unionists and employers officials, federal bankers and entrepreneurs--that the economy is doing just fine. Helmut Schmidt: "The outlook for 1980 is also satisfactory."

Bundesbank president Otmar Emminger went one better yet. According to his glowing report the Federal Republic is in a "simply marvelous situation."

To the timid objection by DGB executive member Alois Pfeiffer, to the effect that the economy might turn sour next year, Emminger optimistically retorted that 1980 also would be quite wonderful. Unemployment figures would continue to decline, the economy grow by a healthy 3.5 percent.

Without mentioning the imminent wage negotiations the Chancellor was obviously intent on setting right the negotiating partners invited to his inner

sanctum. The Bundesbank president quickly came to his aid. Disregarding the oil price hike, said Emminger, an inflation rate of no more than 3.5 percent would be recorded for 1979. "If that really happens," Emminger encouraged himself, "wage negotiations could proceed in relative peace and quiet."

Bonn's economists as well as the federal banker, wedded to stability, are intent on preventing the fear of a new inflationary wave from assuming greater dimensions.

After all, fear of fast rising prices might seduce the trade unionists into including the expected monetary decline in their initial demands. On their part the employers would try to raise prices accordingly--in that case the economic prospects for the 1980 election would be less than promising.

Of course Emminger's estimates of inflation conveyed to the Chancellor's guests did precisely that which one of them, Eugen Loderer, had publicly objected to. According to the IG Metal chief the union did not intend to differentiate between domestic and sheikh-made inflation when putting forward its demands in the forthcoming negotiations. Loderer said: "The IG Metal will not join in these magic tricks."

The calculation dismissed by Loderer as a trick is admittedly no more than that which Chancellor Helmut Schmidt personally--and with a great deal of effort--used to obtain worldwide publicity.

Whether at the OECD in Paris or the economic summit in Tokyo: The Bonn economist preached that the dollars or D-marks paid the oil sheikhs could not possibly once again be distributed to the wage earners at home.

However, the arguments which seem so reasonable from the aspect of the economy spell out real hardship to the metal workers. The union leadership was hard put to it indeed to withstand the demands for supplementary raises for 1979.

Loderer is therefore bound most emphatically to reject any suggestion for asking sacrifices of his members in 1980 also. The 1980 wages formula adopted at a closed meeting in Homburg was quite uncompromising: Full equalization for inflation, plus rise in productivity, plus surcharge on rampant corporate profits. With full understanding for the situation, an adviser to the Chancellor said: "They must keep their troops together by sounding the trumpet."

Still, Schmidt's economists fear that they will have to deal not only with strong words but that the once more rising rate of inflation might compel the metal workers to show themselves inflexible against their better judgment.

After all, it is expected that the price level (compared to the previous year) will rise above 6 by the end of the year. The sober explanation that this is a temporary statistical problem due to an untypical decline in prices in the second half of 1978, is unlikely to help the union leaders in their discussions with the rank and file.

While Schmidt was very careful not to offend the unions at his supper meeting, he castigated the representatives of commerce and industry. To the Chancellor it seems that far too many firms are exploiting the good business conditions and the oil price hike to get some extra profits.

In fact the price rate of industrial products--reflected somewhat later in the consumer price index--rose from 2.3 percent to nearly 6 percent in the course of the year. And this time the employers cannot blame high wages. In fact wage costs per item have remained quite steady. Schmidt's planners are now presuming that at least the rising trend of prices will be broken by the end of the year when the metal workers arrive at their final wage demands.

In the light of possibly declining rates of inflation, they calculate, out-rider Loderer might succeed in persuading his followers to accept the guideline agreed by the IG Metal executive: 10 percent are to be claimed with a great fanfare, but ultimately 7 percent would be quite acceptable. This could satisfy everybody: The metal workers who would get far more of a raise than in 1979; the employers whose profits might well rise further if business continues satisfactory; and the Chancellor whose forecast for 1980 might then really come true.

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HAMBURG SENATE TURNS ON MAYOR WEAKENED BY POISONS SCANDAL

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Sep 79 p 12

[Editorial by Klaus Wagner: "Off With His Head Morality Secures Survival for the Time Being"]

[Text] As we have learned, the development in the Hamburg poison garbage scandal may yet escalate. None of those present in city hall last Wednesday night will soon forget their applause at the departure of Justice Senator Dahrendorf who resigned his office while the meeting of townspeople proceeded close to the scene of this scandalously enforced departure. When Dahrendorf who had arrived alone, left the chamber still alone and without adding another word to his brief but pregnant statement, angered reporters called for Klose. Senate speaker Bissinger used a rather flippant phrase to explain why the mayor had not turned up to witness the leave taking of one of his most able senators: "After all, Dahrendorf had resigned of his own free will."

The subsequent events in the Phoenix Chamber and the lobby of the assembly were unprecedented in recent city hall history. It is impossible more severely to condemn the behavior of a Hamburg mayor. Even declared followers of this government chief (outside the assembly majority) changed from initially open exasperation with the "off with his head" verdict which Klose had imposed on Dahrendorf, to an expression of stony contempt for a man who has managed for the time being to ensure his own political survival by this sacrifice--generally felt to be quite unfair and even unnecessary. At present it seems to be widely felt in the Hanseatic city that Klose's apparent reprieve may be no more than the lull before the storm, that is the overthrow of yet another Hamburg mayor.

Dahrendorf's Mistake

This appraisal of the situation is based on the dire situation of the Hamburg Social Democrats, which is linked to Dahrendorf's resignation. Nothing describes this party's internal disarray so graphically as the simply devastating loss of members. Not all that long ago membership stood near 40,000; it has now dropped to some 29,000 comrades. Its groups and cells, sprouting

like weeds under the protective umbrella of decades of SPD domination and currently sole SPD rule, have never yielded even a tiny following to Justice Senator Dahrendorf, a definitely independent "egghead" who, due to his undisputed efficiency as state counselor, had been considered ministerial material long before his appointment to the Klose Senate.

Obtuse left-right preoccupations and actions within this Land organization in the old SPD fortress Hamburg have made people of the intellectual caliber and nonaligned integrity of a Dahrendorf virtually foreign bodies in the constantly fluctuating tide of interest groups and ideological cadres. In a certain way, therefore, they are homeless because they lack solid backing in the event of innocently suffered disaster. On Wednesday last such an emergency occurred quite suddenly--due to the practices of the leadership of the Senate and the SPD assembly group, which are little distinguishable from politically--or let us say party politically--motivated blackmail.

Dahrendorf himself was guilty of one grave mistake (and his admission of this mistake may be read between the lines of his official resignation statement): Despite the total lack of backing--and, we must mention, while on vacation--he failed to remember how often Mayor Klose had already put his foot in his mouth, and on how many occasions--when not restrained by Frau Elke--he said just one fatal sentence too many, or how often he has gotten into difficulties simply by speaking thoughtlessly. This happened once again when Klose, as late as last Tuesday, issued for himself and his Senate that unfortunate certificate of collective innocence based on the lack of earlier knowledge of "misbehavior attributable to personal failings," though these were already amply documented by the Rabels report. Mentioned there is precisely the incriminating event of 1971, though without naming names; Dahrendorf in turn explicitly pointed out this fact in his resignation statement. While Klose and assembly group chairman Hartmann might have overlooked this detail in the welter of many far more embarrassing revelations, investigator Rabels, recently appointed counselor and reputed Klose confidant, was bound to be aware of the event and, if necessary should have restrained his mayor from making rash statements involving possibly grave consequences. That did not happen. Instead Klose and Hartmann gripped Dahrendorf (who had stubbornly and with valid arguments resisted assuming the role of scapegoat) in what amounted to be a hammerlock. By threatening that they might both have to resign, they managed last Wednesday night, after hours of discussions, to get the Justice Senator to depart and thus saved their own skins at least for the time being.

The image of the hammerlock is in fact quite apt. Dahrendorf had gotten between the interest groups of the party wings embodied in the Klose Senate. He was unable--and at the end probably unwilling also--to escape from this impasse. Such political gamesmanship was obviously repellent to the man who had earlier suffered defeat in his attempt at loyal cooperation with Interior Senator Staak, generally reputed to be weak but supported by the powerful Study Committee for Workers Issues (AFA). Transferred to the distressed school agency was the outstanding senior official in the internal agency, who was too efficient to be comfortable for the rather pedestrian Comrade Staak.

The contested Interior Senator, on the other hand, returned amid general surprise when the Senate was reorganized last year: Klose's favorite for the Interior Department, attorney and deputy assembly majority leader Voscherau was unavailable for compelling professional reasons. After all, everybody knows that Staak is an honorable man.

Buddy Mentality

Is it possible to say the same--without any reservations--about the holder of the opposite job in the Klose Senate? Labor and Social Senator Ehlers, outside left on the Senate team, has just been the subject of a citizens controversy involving the fact--considered highly regrettable even in SPD circles--that this highly paid top social official of the Hanseatic city himself lives in a city housing project. Of course the actual circumstances in the assembly are rather private; largely involved here is the need to look after his mother-in-law. Consequently we observers were quite ready to consider inadmissible the CDU opposition's claim that the apartment had been misappropriated. But then we were told--and nobody refuted this subsequent assertion--that the Senator (who earns DM15,000) had justified his housing situation to the SPD assembly group by talking of the extremely high costs involved in his divorce. He is said--and again this figure was not contradicted--to be left with no more than a minimum of about DM2,000. His assembly group colleagues doubtlessly were moved to tears. This almost incredible attitude also characterizes the current morality of the entire Klose Senate, not merely some highly placed Hamburg SPD left wingers.

To clearly understand this kind of buddy mentality of the "13 conspirators" (as they were dubbed in a cartoon obviously directed at the Senate), it is necessary to go beyond this temporarily reduced in-group. There is Hans-Joachim Seeler, newly elected to the European Parliament and former senator, who--just as Dahrendorf--in 1971 issued a certificate of clearance in the Stoltzenberg case. True, he has since left the Senate. Will he who had quite a part in Mayor Peter Schultz' 1974 overthrow, now display some courage and style at a time when a blameless man like Dahrendorf is being treated unjustly? Only lately, with the reactivated rhetoric of the former senior ecclesiastical councilor has Seeler jumped in with both feet to help Social Senator Ehlers on the occasion of the embarrassing debate about his residence conditions? After all, in contrast to Dahrendorf, Seeler has a good deal of backing in the party. In the discussion about the succession to Land chairman Paulig (said to be tired of office), for example, Seeler's name is frequently mentioned alongside former Young Socialist and present Land executive member Orwin Runde, accused lately by the opposition of being tarred with the same brush as Labor and Social Senator Ehlers.

That is how interests in the Hamburg SPD are hopelessly tangled. Consequently Hans-Ulrich Klose, a sensitive and fundamentally rather weak as well as indecisive man who likes to represent himself as the victim of admittedly unfortunate party political necessities, falls victim not to duty but to his tendency to run off at the mouth. The "ungovernability of the cities" which he is not the only one publicly to ponder, is certainly not eased by the

strangling party chains carried by a Hamburg mayor and leading politician: In fact it is now being demonstrated in an unprecedented and drastic manner. "Political alienation," such as Klose complains of--again not the only one to do so--receives all too plentiful nourishment from the antics of politicians at the highest level, who are obviously subject to outside pressure. What would young people have to be like if they failed to feel profoundly "insecure" (to use against him one of Klose's favorite phrases) upon witnessing the teetering of democrats, particularly Social Democrats, intent only on preserving their own power--as in the Dahrendorf case?

The Klose case came close to a scandal last Wednesday. It supplies a wonderful illustration from the political sphere, a prime example how to lose face by using the "off with his head method" of maintaining credibility.

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BRIEFS

DKP: ALSO PROTEST SCHMIDT--After the Ruhr riots against Strauss, the chancellor candidate of the Union parties, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) has now called for demonstrations against Federal Chancellor Schmidt. An article on the events in Essen and Cologne published by the KPD organ ROTE FAHNE says that the "left" must be quite aware that protests against Schmidt are just as necessary as against Strauss. The KPD reasons thus: "Any unileteral stop Strauss campaign would prevent the evolution of alternative electoral alliances as a really independent force beyond SPD and DKP interests." [Text]
[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Sep 79 p 8] 11698

CS0: 3103

NATIONALITIES PROBLEMS VIEWED IN ARTICLES, INTERVIEWS

Problems of Corsica Surveyed

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Sep 79 p 6

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] "The France that we know is going to explode and crumble. We are headed straight for a series of developments that are going to make the events of May 1968 look like a demonstration by well-mannered people. It is therefore urgent to establish a French federal republic. Otherwise, we will be rushing blindfolded towards a revolution." Faced with this apocalyptic outlook described by writer Jean-Pierre Richardot, France, which is still tied to Napoleonic centralism, is staking everything on the hallowed unity of the fatherland. Our correspondent in Paris, Feliciano Fidalgo, traveled to Corsica, Brittany, southern France and the French Basque Country to report on the ferment among the "peoples of France" in the last 20 years. We begin this survey today with an initial look at the deeply rooted Corsican identity.

Last 19 August in Ajaccio Stadium, under an immense tent that housed a meeting aimed at the internationalization of the Corsican home rule movement, which was attended by the representatives of the nationless states of Western Europe, 3,000, 7,000 or 9,000 persons (the French authorities, observers and the organizers came up with differing estimates) listened religiously to Alfredo Conde, a Galician writer and the personal guest of Dr Simeoni. The home rule leader read his poem to Corsica: "I love you, Corsica, because your dead lie beside the tepid warmth of the home; I love you, Corsica, because you have a sea that was a path to flee from hunger...For that, for all that (and for much more that I will not say) I will sincerely weep on the day of your freedom." The poem, written in Galician, was read by Conde in Corsican. At its close he announced: "Now let us read it in French." The public responded with a furious and triumphant roar of "No!", revealing to the traveler how an awareness has been awakened in entire families, businessmen, men and women in liberal professions, farmers with an enmity towards their counterparts imported by Paris from north Africa, young people without

distinction as to class, all of them members of the home rule movement against "French colonialism."

This overwhelming reality was exalted by a mass said in Corsican during a special celebration and glorified by the emotional singing of the "Dio vi salvi regina," the Corsican national anthem since 1715.

"The isle of beauty" and its inhabitants, along with the rest of the peoples of the "French hexagon," "came out of the closet" that long ago May 1968, a month that prompted the awakening of all minorities, ecologists, feminists, homosexuals, nationalisms, which until then had been holed up in intellectual or underground strongholds.

Colonized by 20 Countries

At the airport, the girl working at the car rental office showed surprise when asked: "Are you French or Corsican?" "Why, Corsican, of course." At an Ajaccio hotel a French tourist couple was conversing with the waiter, a young student who works summers: "I have to study in Paris because we have no university here." "Well that's nice because you'll get to know France." "No," the boy replied dryly; "I want to breathe the sea air, not the smoke of factories." Ghuiliu Alfonsi, a man from the interior of the island, a former policeman in France and today an employee at an island bank, says: "I left the police force because in order to pursue the career here you have to spend 15 years on the continent. I have nothing to do with France." "And," he adds, "what you see in Ajaccio and Bastia is nothing. This has already been perverted quite a bit. You have to come here, to the interior, where we eat only chestnuts. To us, France is far away." The walls of towns and cities, the windshields of cars and the highways are used to express the people's wrath in the form of drawings and graffiti: "Free Corsica," "Freedom," "Giscard's Repression," Corsican music, Corsican salami and a fanciful independence poster on the wall that says: "Corsica will be liberated in 1981." Under the inscription a militant waves Corsica's future red flag while trampling the torn French flag. This independence poster is the same as one that appeared at the close of World War II to hail the island's liberation. The original read: "Corsica will be liberated in 1943," and today's militant was a French soldier trampling the Nazi flag and waving the French tri-colored flag.

According to the latest research, the first men arrived in Corsica 9,000 years before Christ. Since then, the history of this "mountain in the sea" (as a geographer put it), cloven by immense valleys and crowned by snow-covered peaks for several months of the year, has been tragic and tumultuous. Close to 20 countries have colonized it. Only national hero Pascale Paoli achieved independence for the island for 40 years during the 18th century, and for the last two centuries France has been trying to assimilate it, without conclusive results.

"Every method has been used to try and throttle Corsica's indisputable identity. There has been an economic policy of industrial underdevelopment parallel to that pursued in other peripheral regions. As far as Parisian colonialism is concerned, Corsica has been nothing more than a source of men for wars and emigration. For a dozen or so years now it is true that Paris has been intimidated by the resurgence of Corsican culture, traditions, theater, novels, songs, the Corsican soul in general. But what has this late awakening resulted in? A bid to buy our 'right to be different' with a few million francs." This analysis by a home rule supporter is an everyday speech on the island. "We want to govern ourselves, we want to live here and work here."

Corsicans have been constantly voicing their demands for 20 years now, and Paris has come up with one economic modernization plan after another but has failed to carry them out with equal regularity. The growing unrest among home rule supporters and nationalists and the attacks in the early 70's truly disturbed the central government, which once again showed a desire to take the development of the island seriously.

A preliminary study under the plan for Corsican reorganization advised: "The erosion of Corsica's cultural identity must be accelerated, for example by encouraging another massive wave of immigration from the mother country. In this way the transition period will be shortened as much as possible, and Corsica will quickly reach a population level (about 500,000) most of whom will not be natives." This "planned death of the Corsican people," according to Dr Simeoni, which is based, moreover, on "Corsica's priority as a tourist center," aggravated tensions. This was shown by the independence advocates of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), who operated outside the law, and the home rule supporters of the Simeoni brothers, who operated within the law (these are the two major Corsican movements), with their bombs, dramatic assaults and "mass demonstrations that no traditional party is capable of holding," says Marie Helenes Mattei, a young Bastia attorney.

The Dominance of Clans

The island's weak, disjointed economy, as encouraged by Paris, cannot be separated from the system of political representation, which is "obsolete, discredited and organized around the traditional families and clans, all of whom are incapable of taking up Corsica's aspirations," journalist and historian Jean Paul Delos feels. It is not easy to find someone who trusts French parties. "The obtuse right wing has already amply demonstrated what it is. The left wing is little different. The people here do not vote for parties; they vote for the clans that dominate the island, that provide jobs and loans in exchange for votes and that commit those famous and shocking frauds in every election. This is why Corsica's four deputies are Gaullists and also why the people who go to the polls are mostly the old, who still have ties with France.

Emigration, necessitated by the island's historical underdevelopment, and Paris-backed immigration resolve things for all of the parties, but not for us Corsicans," says Marie Ange Colomade, a married student of speech therapy.

"Corsica" is not France. A minimally attentive and objective observer can see that. It is impossible to predict the outcome of the correlation of forces between the French state, with its powerful resources, left-wing parties (some 2,000 Communist Party members and fewer than 200 Socialists), with their respective plans for advanced regionalism, and on the other side, the home rule supporters and "the front," as the independence-backing FLNC is commonly called.

Corsican Leader Expresses Views

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 5 Sep 79 p 7

[Interview with Edmond Simeoni, the leader of the Corsican People's Union (UPC), in Batista, by Feliciano Fidalgo; date not given]

[Text] The Simeoni brothers, Roland, Max and Edmond, are the leaders and philosophers of the Corsican home rule movement. The former two are currently out of the picture. The UPC, which is within the law and represents the home rule aspirations of close to 40 percent of the Corsican people, is led today by Edmond Simeoni, a doctor by profession. Our correspondent in Paris, Feliciano Fidalgo, conversed in Bastia with the doctor on the problems, the present and the future of what he symbolizes.

"We find ourselves today in a situation of legitimate defense." The man who thus galvanized the 8,000 participants at the Ninth Congress of Action for the Rebirth of Corsica (ARC) in Corte on 17 August 1975 was Edmond Simeoni, who along with his brothers Max and Roland, heads the island's most popular home rule movement. Dramatic events took place 5 days after his words. Led by Edmond, as his friends call him, a dozen militants armed with shotguns took over the Aleria commune tavern of Henri Depeille, a nationalized French Moroccan settler involved in a wine scandal. The outcome: two policemen slain and several wounded among the occupants. Paris dissolves the ARC. Simeoni is tried, found guilty and jailed, and the "Aleria

strike" goes down as a crucial, historic event in the struggle against "French colonialism." Aleria made an impression on Parisian centralism: President Giscard D'Estaing acknowledged the limits of "an administration that has not always taken the island into account." But 4 years have passed, "and Paris has given us nothing," says Bastia newsmen Stephane Muracciole. And today, 45-year old Dr Simeoni, who is married to an Alsatian and has two children, the leader of the autonomy movement and "the man of Aleria," symbolizes the current crucial juncture in Corsica, as defined by the imprint left by two trials, his own and that of 21 alleged FLNC independence backers who were tried last June.

Question: What does Corsican autonomy mean to you?

Answer: Regaining national rights. To summarize, outside of foreign affairs, defense and currency, which would remain under the control of Paris, we want a democratic society with a legislative assembly and with an executive emerging from this assembly. We have to recover all national goods that are in the hands of settlers and for which we would pay them the ridiculous purchasing price. In short, democratize the economy by returning it to Corsicans and, in the overall picture, move towards a progressivism that will encourage community life and harmonize with the two extremes of capitalism and collectivism.

Question: And with what resources are you going to do all this?

Answer: Corsica is rich, contrary to the officially fostered myth. One asset is the personnel trained in exile. Another is the 4 billion francs that Corsicans have in savings banks. Tourism, properly exploited by appeals to hunters, fishermen and mountain climbers, would span 8 months of the year. The utilization of foreign travel agencies is another Corsican asset. We would plan foreign investments fairly, and without elaborating any further, I can cite another Corsican asset: the 320 million francs that we pay in taxes on oil products.

"Violence Is Inevitable"

Question: How do you assess the FLNC's violent strategy to achieve independence for the island?

Answer: Violence is inevitable because of the way that Paris is obstructing the situation with increasing repression. Giscard says that "there is no Corsican problem." But we are clear-thinking and have chosen the democratic route by operating openly. This does not mean that we justify the ferocious crackdown against the FLNC, because they are patriots.

Question: What do you mean when you assert: "We are not married to the law?"

Answer: That the law is our path, but of course, it would be suicidal to say that we will remain within the law no matter what happens.

Question: For the last 3 days the word "repression" has been on the lips of all the people we spoke to...

Answer: Come now, it's not a question of repression but of all sorts of repressions practiced by Paris. There is a public repression under the pretext of combating the FLNC. Everything goes, and democratic laws are violated in every way on a daily basis. The State Security Tribunal that tries us is a special tribunal that does not belong in a democratic country. There are 680 police in the city of Corte, which has 4,000 inhabitants. We are besieged by military and police personnel. There is also administrative repression. Coercion, intimidation, parallel police, "hit men." With regard to the activities of the latter, let me mention that my insurance company (nationalized) suspended my still valid policy, and 3 days later my office was destroyed. Paris's latest invention in this regard is the creation of two Corsican 40-man riot squads to intervene in demonstrations. This is an attempt to set Corsicans against Corsicans. This is centralism's last chance. But all of this militarization or crypto-fascism proves that we are a danger.

Question: Is independence possible for Corsica today?

Answer: That's not easy to answer. I think that France is still capable of changing policy and allowing Corsica a democratic life. Only intellectuals used to talk about independence. Today, the idea is no longer laughable. Tomorrow, who knows what might happen?

Question: Another idea circulating in Paris is that the FLNC consists of a group of fanatics manipulated and aided from abroad.

Answer: It is always hard to talk about an underground movement, but I personally do not believe that, because I know them; they are patriots aided by Corsicans.

Ambiguity of the Left

Question: What is the attitude of France's left-wing parties towards the Corsican problem?

Answer: Ambiguous, in general. The Socialists are reversing themselves, and here the radicals on the left are reactionaries.

Question: Are there differences between the Corsican problem and the problem of the other French nationalities?

Answer: There are basic differences. Historically, Corsica is a nation, a sovereign state. We speak our own language and we have struggled more than other peoples. The fact that we are an island and our Mediterranean strategy differentiate us even more. Nevertheless, if we exported the language that we used here and used the word "nation" at the core of the debate, I think that most of the French public would turn against us.

Question: What did the presence of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and the CDC [Democratic Convergence of Catalonia] from Spain at the 19 August meeting in Ajaccio mean?

Answer: That at a time when Corsican autonomy is being internationalized, we feel close to those who have waged the same struggle as we have. In this regard, I have accepted the PNV's official invitation to visit the Basque Country from 23 to 30 September.

Question: What solution does the autonomy movement propose today?

Answer: A five-point referendum that would satisfy all possible aspirations: independence or autonomy or the statute proposed by the Communist Party or the statute proposed by the Socialist Party or the status quo, which all Corsicans condemn.

Question: Some people liken you to a charismatic, populist figure, with all of the derogatory implications of those terms.

Answer: Nothing of the sort. Dealing with Corsicans requires a certain approach. There is neither charisma nor populism. Everything that we do is aimed at progressivism, not populism, but there will always be distortions. It so happens that our struggle frightens France and the Europe of the Giscard and company, because it represents a different concept of democracy, which will torpedo the militarized Europe of the merchants and enfranchise man.

Question: To conclude, you are a man who seeks to work within the law but who does not fit in the French legal system. Moreover, in the case of Spain, for example, the conclusion of the historical process called Francoism fostered the reestablishment of autonomies, but it does not look as if "Giscardism" is exactly going to end tomorrow. How do you view the future?

Answer: It is true that the advantages that the end of Francoism brought to the autonomies in Spain are not on our horizon. Thus, the only thing that remains for us is the struggle. And in this regard, everything is

taken care of: we are willing to lose our lives, health, freedom, everything, absolutely everything. Our faith and the faith that we are trying to inculcate in our militants will never die.

No Tangible Gains

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 6 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] Since the early 1970's, Corsica, the "isle of beauty," has witnessed the awakening of a strong nationalist aspiration that seeks to regain the identity that was lost after two centuries of French "colonization." In yesterday's article the moderate nationalists, who are calling only for wideranging home rule, spoke through their main leader, Dr Edmond Simeoni, who heads the UPC. Today, EL PAIS's correspondent in Paris, Feliciano Fidalgo, who spent several days traveling around the island, narrates the struggle of the extreme nationalists, who engage in violence and demand independence, and also reports the view of the island's number one authority, the prefect of the department of Corsica.

"To those who want Corsican autonomy, things are clear and vague at the same time," explains a close colleague of Dr Simeoni.

"French colonialism will utilize every means to conclude its demographic war against the Corsican people. On the one hand, youths are encouraged to leave because of the lack of professional training, of a university, of jobs. On the other, the ill will of not a few employers and the administration hampers the return of emigrants, while the planned immigration of Frenchmen or foreigners is promoted. In short, we know that the future is in our hands, but under these conditions how can we hasten autonomy before being devoured by the human 'black tide' with which French settlers are threatening us?" Here is where the other weapon in the struggle against the Parisian central government enters the fray, the Corsican National Liberation Front, an underground, radical movement of armed struggle that advocates independence and a free and socialist Corsica. Nevertheless, the source of the bombs exploding for independence is unclear, because over time the extremist violence of the left wing has found a response from the "barbouzes," men of mysterious forces denounced a thousand times a day by each person with whom I spoke. With this reservation, the following is the tally: 111 attacks in 1974, 226 in 1975, 298 in 1976, 258 in 1977, 247 in 1978 and 217 over the first 5 months of this year.

The "strike" at Aleria, followed by the trial and imprisonment of Edmond Simeoni, was a milestone in the history of the home rule struggle in defense of Corsican identity. After the trauma triggered by the

repression from Paris, its ambiguous initiatives to benefit the island prompted the lull that the UPC autonomy advocates are now trying to overcome. "Although the struggle might be long, clarity and faith until the death."

Simultaneously, after 3 years of improving relations between Corsica and Paris, last June's trial of 21 FLNC members by the State Security Tribunal seems to mark another historic moment in this independence crusade: expectant silence. In the wake of the harsh sentences (6 to 15 years in prison) handed down against "youths who employ violence but who have never killed," everyone in Corsica was waiting for a consistent reaction. But nothing, neither bombings nor attacks. Has the FLNC disappeared? Where is it? What is it going to do? For 4 days in Ajaccio, Bastia, Corte, in five different cities or towns, we heard these questions on the lips of dozens of people. "Where are they?" Finally, a nationalist from Bastia promised: "It will be possible to see them tomorrow." But a half hour later he corrected himself: "They don't want to find out anything; it's impossible right now."

Bastia, 2300 hours, San Nicolas Square, a unique center, our "guide" indicates, explaining: "The 'respectable folk' are at this cafe; the nationalists and Gaullists at the next one, and on the corner of the square we'll find the young people." The young people are the alleged independence advocates or their sympathizers, or simply youths, men and women. Beer, coffee, gusts of fresh air from the nearby sea, interest in what the military ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] is going to do in the Basque Country. And what about the front?

Here in Corsica its sympathizers never speak of the FLNC, just the "front." "This is the dominant question at the moment: knowing what the front is going to do," replies one of the persons with us during these stifling evenings in late August; day after day, the only topic of conversation is the Corsican problem. "Look, don't be so trusting; Simeoni can give seven different speeches at the same time." But when all is said and done, the FLNC revolutionaries see Dr Simeoni as a reformer but they reflect on the anti-Paris impact of his struggle. When asked about Corsican Communists, they smile: "They are the ones who invented the 'flying battalions' for the elections, in other words, 45 persons who go around voting in 14 different electoral districts. It's a variation of what elections are like here: a manipulation by the clans." It is impossible at present to find out what the FLNC is preparing, but everyone in Corsica figures that it is thinking about the follow-up to its strategy. Two factions are struggling within the front: one that interprets the island's decolonization in the legal sense of the word, and another that feels that Corsica should maintain special ties with France, without renouncing independence. "Three years of bombings," a nationalist says, "have made many Corsicans aware of our identity. But so far there have been no tangible results."

No one answers when asked about how long the front's pause will last, but nationalists, home rule backers, militants or sympathizers are honoring or at least respecting this truce. The FLNC's ideas are shared only by its members or supporters, but it is not easy to find Corsicans who are not indignant with Paris "because of the unjustified repression. We think that they are moving too quickly by calling for independence, but for the time being we are not reproaching them for anything. On the contrary, they have fostered the resurgence of Corsican identity," states Ms Mattei, an attorney who backs home rule. The man who runs the U Bargaghju Inn in the town of Barchetta, also a home rule supporter, goes further: "More young people are taking the ETA as a model every day. Their reasoning is brutal and simple: they have killed, and the Basque Country has achieved home rule. Paris is to blame for this." And what does Paris think about this?

How Many Votes for the PNV?

The prefect of Ajaccio, Claude Viellecaze, was the one who asked the first question right after inviting his guest to sit down in his austere government office. "I want to welcome you and give you information, but please, first of all, tell me how many votes the PNV won in the Spanish Basque Country in the election." The prefect already knew the answer and went on to explain that, according to his calculations, Dr Simeoni's UPC, which he compares with the PNV, represents "not even one percent" in Corsica.

The prefect acknowledged, however, that there is an identity problem, but added that it is one of many problems aggravated by Corsica's insularity. In Corsica, as in other French regions, it is a known fact that now "everyone wants to work and live in the country," the prefect feels, "but I repeat that this is widespread, and as far as Corsica is concerned, the facts show that its economic capacity does not enable it to fulfill its desires." Mr Viellecaze insists on the parallel with the Spanish Basque Country, "which is an industrialized country that can afford what Corsica cannot." The government representative is somewhat annoyed that there is so much talk about Corsican grievances "and that no one talks about us, because in 1979 we have handed over 466 million francs in loans for public works. In other words, our efforts entail an investment of 2,026 francs (34,000 pes.) per inhabitant." The prefect brushed aside one of the Corsicans' complaints: the lack of universities, which necessitates "French-style" training. "There are already loans to build a university in Corte, and construction will begin before long."

But this "quantitative response by Paris to Corsica's real problems does not interest us, just as we are not interested that many French regions have economic difficulties. Those are their problems; ours is the island."

Problems of Brittany Surveyed

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] Brittany would be another Corsica if it were an island. Brittany was the region of France in which the monarchy most conscientiously respected local privileges and idiosyncracies. The Breton identity began to fade only with the revolution, on 4 August 1789 to be exact, after the region was divided into five departments. But nationalism, which became politically organized in the early 19th century, never achieved true popular support, neither in its legal nor in its illegal struggle. In any case, there has been somewhat of a cultural resurgence since the mid-1970's. EL PAIS's correspondent in Paris, Feliciano Fidalgo, traveled through Brittany and reports on the extent of Breton nationalism.

"Are you Breton or French?" Along the Brest road my surprised traveling companion replies: "I'm Breton, of course, and French too." Brittany is a story apart. If it were an island, Brittany would probably be like Corsica, but it is like Galicia. Neither in Brest, nor in Pon-Aden, nor in Chateau Neuf du Faou, nor in Pleyben, nor in Landerneau, nor in Rennes, nor on walls nor on cars do you have to look far for traces of the 1961 Breton farmers' wrath or of the home rule movement called the UDB [Breton Democratic Union] or of the Brittany Liberation Front-Breton Revolutionary Army (FLB-ARB), the two best known forces (one within the law, the other underground and favoring independence) in the battle for a reaffirmation of the Breton identity. This does not mean that the culture, language and traditions inherited from the Breton kingdoms of the fourth century and the duchies of the Middle Ages have been swallowed up by the changes decreed by industrial society. In 1968, Georges Pompidou, the then prime minister of Gen Charles de Gaulle, was already alarmed by the rebirth of Breton individualism: "Brittany is on the verge of revolution; we have to do something." Four years later, the same Mr Pompidou, now president of the republic, lashed out with this generalization: "There is no place for regional languages in a France destined to make its specific mark on Europe." Such concerns have been around for a long while. In 1831, the minister of public instruction, Mr de Montalivet, opined: "It is absolutely necessary to destroy Breton." In 1925, the man who was by then called minister of education, Mr de Monzie, voiced the same harsh comment: "For the sake of France's linguistic unity, the Breton language must disappear." Breton has not disappeared. It is spoken by some 700,000 persons of the 3.5 million that inhabit the five departments of this region, to which the laws of the republic accord no legal status, merely that of a district. Whether to attack or defend it, all today acknowledge the existence of a specific Breton culture, which for the

last quarter century has flourished again spurred on by the spirit of challenge of all Western minorities. Writer and journalist Xavier Grall, who advocates autonomy, notes "the sudden development of all Breton cultural manifestations since May 1968." The secretary of state to the Interior Ministry, Marc Becam, a deputy and mayor of Quimper, told us in this regard: "The recent establishment of the Breton cultural charter and the recognition of the Breton language in educational programs prove that the Breton culture is alive, as can also be seen from the revival of folklore." This official interpretation of Brittany's cultural resurgence is not the same in the mouth of the native singers Stivel or Glenmor, the current troubadours of Breton independence. Mr Grall goes so far as to assert: "With a view towards the reaffirmation of our identity, cultural efforts are more important than the work of the parties and even than the actions of the F.L.B."

This widespread recognition of the supremacy of the cultural "weapon" in the battle for the "right to be different" illustrates the crucial times that the Breton people are living in.

Like Corsica, Brittany has suffered the consequences of being a peripheral, rural, abandoned region, a "storehouse of men" for wars and emigration (one million Bretons have left the region). But Brittany is tied to the capital, and Paris anticipated "the revolution" that Georges Pompidou announced in 1968. Demographic and economic imbalances continue to characterize Brittany's scant industrialization; 47 percent of industrial jobs in Brittany depend on outside decision-making centers.

A Poor Region

Half of its industry is outside the control of the Bretons. Brittany is still one of Europe's poorest regions, but the Breton problem might be on the way to a resolution, says historian Panch Olivier. This is not because roads are better or because factories have been built or because the standard of living has been raised. This is the ransom of growth. The Breton problem will be resolved because it has become a classic problem of regional underdevelopment, because everything that today constitutes what is specifically Breton will have ceased to be useful for the economic survival of its inhabitants. Will the cultural resurgence be reduced to a folklore that, like an aspirin tablet, eases the pain of identity?

No one in Brittany tries to cover up this possibility, although for opposing reasons. Mr Becam, the secretary of state, is categorical: "The aspiration for home rule is entirely a fringe movement in Brittany, and it always has been. The autonomy movement brings together nostalgia lovers, nonconformists of Celtic origin and a number of anarchists."

Dr Yeu Gourves, a former member of the FLB and today a member of the Unified Socialist Party, is categorical: "The cultural phenomenon is the important thing, but in 20 years it could all come to nothing. The UDB autonomy supporters (6.5 percent in the last elections) are not dangerous, and if they were, Paris would ban it, and the FLB has chosen the wrong tactics. Its armed struggle is not profitable, and as you have heard said repeatedly, the consequences of its attacks eventually turn against the Bretons, and in addition, the police hunt them down like little birds. What is needed is a tougher movement with a long-term political strategy."

A Brest truck driver backs this assessment of the FLB: "We were the ones who paid for these foolish acts by the FLB. It's not that we condemn them, but you have to ask what good their attacks do."

Everyone in Brittany seems to have come to the realization that their region could totally and definitively incorporate into the French nation, even if not tomorrow. But this realism brings with it some positive questioning, a nationalist states. In Corsica, for example, there is a widespread awareness of the problem of their identity, but the island is being drained of its natives. We have the opposite problem: there are enough of us but we lack that fervor; we are at a crossroads, but we are aware of it. The authorities are worried about what lies beneath this "expectant realism."

Last year an official organization wondered whether there might be some relationship between alcoholism and the Breton identity: "Isn't the historical denial of the Breton identity one of the factors in the widespread alcoholism that exists in Brittany?" the report inquired. Brittany is the region of France with the highest death rate from excessive drinking: 63 per 1,000 as compared to the French average of 41 per 1,000. And 11,000 Bretons are currently confined to insane asylums or psychiatric hospitals, seemingly for reasons of nostalgia, hysteria and religious delirium.

Writer Grall comments on this point: "It's true. A people who get drunk are dreamers, and because they dream, they imagine another world. This is due to psychological factors, but there is a weightier reason: colonialism." Songs, nighttime celebrations (fes-nos), a cultural awakening, autonomy movement, the indifference of left-wing parties, the certainty of an identity, uncertainty about the future and more uncertainty about the FLB, the men in the underground, who are but who are not there: Brittany faced with the decision to be or not to be.

Underground Movement Advocates Violence

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 8 Sep 79 p 4

[Interview with a spokesman of the FLB-ARB by Feliciano Fidalgo; date and place not given]

[Text] As in the rest of France's regions today, Brittany's realization of its own identity, as reflected in a moderate home rule movement, has triggered an underground armed struggle. For several years now this "strategy of bombs" has been pursued by the revolutionary movement called the FLB-ARB. Feliciano Fidalgo made contact with its spokesman, who explained the difficult times that the FLB is going through, its objectives and its restructuring towards a harder line.

The first Breton nationalists emerged close to 20 years ago. The FLB has gone through various stages, its current orientation taking shape in 1974. The results from 5 years of bombing "colonialist goods" are not positive: 48 members currently in jail serving stiff sentences (between 7 and 15 years). Moreover, on the 17th in Paris the State Security Tribunal will try another case against a dozen alleged members of what is currently called the FLB-ARB.

Like the other cultural or political movements calling for a reaffirmation of the Breton identity, the revolutionaries are having their doubts about the future. After handling the vicissitudes that the underground entails, EL PAIS met with the spokesman of the FLB-ARB somewhere in Brittany.

EL PAIS: Is it true, as people are saying, that the FLB could disappear?

FLB: The front has certainly been decimated. There didn't used to be so many police, but the repression has been unleashed. Of course, this does not justify the fact that they have been able to arrest us so easily, and thus the public does not view us as a serious group. At the moment we are doing a more serious restructuring. Autonomous groups will be placed in Breton departments without a knowledge of each other. We are setting up what could be called a political bureau as a complement to the military branch, and our actions will be harsh.

Question: Does this mean that whereas you have attacked only property so far, individuals will also become targets in this new phase?

Answer: Our response will be commensurate with the tortures that the police inflict on us. We know their names, and they know that one of these days...

Question: You are an extremely small minority. How are you going to overcome this handicap?

Answer: Minorities have always been the ones that have undertaken revolutions. But moreover, the people do not reject us, as the government would have you believe. When they need us, they call, as was the case during the "black tide." Our battle has been positive so far, despite the mistakes.

Necessary Violence

Question: Why a violent struggle?

Answer: Because we will not succeed in freeing ourselves from colonialism through universal suffrage of any kind. We won't even achieve autonomy. Violence is a necessity for the Breton people. There are all too many examples: the nuclear powerplants, the military fields and the cultural charter have been rejected by a majority of Bretons.

Question: How do you define yourselves politically?

Answer: We are struggling for socialism accompanied by self-rule.

Question: In view of what the socialist countries have become, on the one hand, and considering the capitalist surroundings in which you have to bring about your self-run socialist society, how do you plan to resolve the problem?

Answer: Yes, the socialist countries are totalitarian too, and we know that it is hard to build a society in today's world without alliances. But you cannot confine the future in preconceived formulas either. Bretons have always been men of ideas. Regionalism is already here, the home rule movement too, and the independence that we are struggling for will also come with self-rule.

Question: Europe has been building itself for the last 20 years, and national minorities have been airing their grievances in parallel fashion. Is this a contradiction, or are these grievances the foundation of another Europe?

Answer: The Europe that is being built is the Europe of big money, and France as a state (because France is not a nation but a group of nations) is a pawn in this Europe. The only valid Europe is that of the people,

in which man has his own identity and is not just a pawn that is moved about in accordance with the manpower needs of big money. In this present-day Europe, Brittany will be reduced to a tourist center and site for nuclear powerplants.

Question: Is the current economic crisis beneficial to the nationalist struggle?

Answer: If the economic crisis results in a political crisis, nationalism will develop, and we feel that this political crisis is unavoidable, because Giscardism will not last, and the left, from which we do not expect much either, will be supplanted by a fascism unlike the one we know but a fascism nonetheless. This is clear to us.

Question: Are you financed from abroad, as is thought?

Answer: We have made international contacts and we will make more, but that's as far as we've gone til now. We live off funds from Brittany. There is an FLB financial network.

Question: How do you assess the attitudes of the traditional leftist parties towards your strategy?

Answer: The Communists currently denounce the attacks. The Socialists and the PSU neither approve nor condemn systematically.

Question: Do you think that the French state's policy can possibly erase the Breton identity?

Answer: It is not impossible with industrialization at all costs.

Question: What is your analysis of the ETA's activities?

Answer: After autonomy, which ETA rejects, if the politicians and the military manage to coordinate their struggles, the Spanish state will capitulate and grant independence. And the French Basque Country will ask the same from Paris and will get it more quickly. France is playing a very important role today in everything happening on the other side of the Pyrenees. In any case, with regard to ETA, we must say that it is an example of revolutionary struggle.

Question: Do you think, as has been said, that your struggle can be likened to the struggle for Algerian independence?

Answer: That's simple. Things that are not comparable cannot be compared. The colonization of Brittany is not the same as Algeria's was.

Question: To what degree has the repression intensified lately?

Answer: Physical violence, which was not present before, has made itself brutally felt now.

Question: What do you expect in the trial to begin on the 17th.

Answer: The sentences handed down in similar previous cases already give some indication of what might happen. Regardless of what the sentences are, it is certain that they will be tried for the same beliefs.

Question: How do you view the future?

Answer: The end is not near. It all depends on what we propose to the people and on our militants' faithfulness to do serious work.

Cultural Awakening in Southern France

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 9 Sep 79 p 6

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] Southern France, with its five provinces (one-third of the entire country), more than 200,000 square kilometers, 14 million inhabitants and a language subdivided into numerous dialects, is too big and varied to generate a true nationalist movement. "Southern France is a feeling," asserts a regionalist intellectual from the area, a feeling that has fostered a cultural awakening that so far lacks a political side. After traveling through Corsica and Brittany, EL PAIS's Paris correspondent Feliciano Fidalgo now analyzes the southern French phenomenon from its southeastern zone.

"Look, take the map and take a close look at southern France and you'll see our problem. Southern France makes up one-third of the territory of the French state. It took the kings of France four centuries to conquer this geographic region. Thus, a national sentiment cannot be expressed as in a small area with few inhabitants and a single climate. Hence a widespread national outlook does not exist." EL PAIS heard this from Robert Lafont, a university professor at Montpellier and vice president of the region's major cultural organization, the Institute of Provençal Studies.

To the professor's comments on the region's size we can add that it has 13 million inhabitants and 32 departments, of France's total of 99, within the 5 historical provinces of southern France: Limousin, Auvergne, Gasconne, Languedoc and Provence. The socioeconomic, cultural and political complexity that the above data represent, "after three

centuries of centralist colonialism, which has manipulated these realities at its whim and to its advantage, mean this: if Corsica becomes independent, nothing happens; if Brittany becomes independent, nothing happens, but if southern France were to break away, the French state would fall apart, and so would Europe, because southern France is the hinge connecting southern and northern Europe."

Therefore, Provençal movie-maker Henri Moline tells us: "Southern France is a feeling." Local writer Jean Pierre Richardot defines the problem more strictly: "Southern France has never been a unified and independent political entity. But no one denies that there is a southern French civilization in which Rome is much more alive than in the civilization of northern France. The France of the Paris basin has a much more definite Germanic nature. The southern French are survivors of the Roman Empire. Now then, just as in Corsica or Brittany, albeit in a vaguer way, southern France is witnessing the resurgence of a nation or, as Renan would say, the union of people who want to live together. This does not mean that the southern French are necessarily going to set up an independent state, as could occur in Corsica. But the movement has gained enough importance that we can predict that the southern French will never again live under the baton of Paris, the north. The southern French want to recover their language permanently and organize around their own country, which is no longer just France."

Linguistic Unification

The Provençal language, or the langue d'oc (or langues d'oc, because several dialects are spoken in southern France), is the vanguard of the cultural rebirth in southern France today. "Linguists were the ones who launched the southern French movement," explains Aix-en-Provence journalist Olivier Vergniet. "The language was originally unified, and thus it would be a key starting point to recover this unity."

As has happened with the various ethnic groups in contemporary France, the neo-southern French movement was highlighted by the barricades of May 1968. "The grievances of southern France," Mr Lafont explains, "have the same basic roots as in the rest of the world: the fierce industrialization, carried out by the multinationals, that followed the Second World War and that tends to make individuals and natural social groups uniform. Hence this rebirth of one's own social, economic and political identity. Motivated by this right to be different, the people in southern France list all of the colonialisms to which Paris-based centralism has subjected them. The cultural colonialism or genocide is designed to wipe us off the map as an entity. Provençal is not taught in public primary schools, and only a few regional radio stations broadcast in Provençal for 15 minutes a week. The Paris press, and especially the state radio and television, crush and alienate everyone and everything. Economic colonialism: industrialization failed in

southern France, and the country's new rich have invested overseas; this region has thus stagnated in the relative underdevelopment that all of France's peripheral regions suffer from. Like Brittany and Corsica, southern France has been reduced to a farming area and a region for the uneven tourist industry."

"Southern France has become a poor country," explains a regionalist militant. "Wages are lower than the national average. On another level, southern France is the equivalent of Andalucia in Spain. Some time ago a revealing advertisement appeared in *DEPECHE DU MIDI* (a major newspaper in the region) offering a textile factory and emphasizing that the labor was the cheapest in France." Emigration was the initial consequence of this underdevelopment. Between 1954 and 1962, 168,550 persons, a great majority of them youths, left southern France for the north, mainly Paris.

Another typical result of being a colonized country: "Southern France is becoming the French state's 'military paradise,' the same person explains. "The Larzac military field is the best known internationally, and we are afraid that Paris is going to appropriate 20,000 hectares initially and then 40,000 more." In short, "we are being dispossessed of our wealth, all of which goes to the big trusts, without a chance to get the administration's ear. Thirdly, the central government has imposed Parisian culture." The famous writer Louis Ferdinand Celine (*"Voyage to the Ends of the Night"*) wrote in reference to the south: "A zone populated by Mediterranean bastards, Arabian parasites, degenerates. South of the Loire River there is nothing but rot, vagrancy, contaminated blackened half-breeds."

"Colonized southern France," vis-a-vis the "colonizing state," has so far gone little further than cultural opposition based mainly on the resurgence of its language, which is spoken by one and a half million and understood by five million. It was just 5 years ago that the cultural awakening really took place when Robert Lafont tried to run for president of the republic (his candidacy was rejected because he did not gather 100 valid signatures). In the field of culture, the southern French movement is experiencing a spectacular revival through the Institute of Provençal Studies. This institute has branched out all over the country and has 62 regional centers. A dozen Provençal theaters and two movie associations are in operation, and some 50 member publications are put out.

Will these cultural demands lead to a political struggle? Today, Sunday, a seminar concluded in Nîmes on the southern French movement. It was organized by the Provençal Studies Institute and attended by French sociologist Alain Touraine, who prepared a wideranging study on the "case" of Languedoc. He summarized for us his conclusions in connection with the political present and future in southern France:

"There are three realities involved: a cultural entity, a situation of relative underdevelopment and an internal, in other words, political colonialism with a repressive side promoted by Paris-based centralism. Consequently, the problem consists of finding out how to cope with these three realities in order to undertake political action. Bearing in mind the current situation in France (the failure of the left, and the Breton, Corsican and Basque nationalist movements) and the world economic crisis, I do not think that the people will mobilize easily, and thus an autonomy movement will come up against a sort of apathy. Now then, this stalled situation, along with serious social conflicts such as with the farmers in the early 1907's, which could occur again quite easily, will favor the nationalists, who are a tiny minority, true, but who propose a clear-cut option, a struggle for independence, and who might prompt incidents or in the end lead to a clear political struggle."

Two Factions

In addition to many other small and divided groups, there are two political factions: the major one, the autonomy movement called "We want to live in the country" (a slogan invented by Mr Lafont) and the independence movement led by Professor Yves Rouquette and his brother, a priest, called "Larzac," after the military field. Robert Lafont acknowledges the scant influence of his home rule group but feels that social conflicts are in his favor. In particular he thinks that "Spain's entry into the Common Market has been a "warning signal" to this country's farmers, and the day that the states negotiate an expansion of the EEC without consulting us, as they have been doing, we will have won a political battle. The building up of Europe, as it is being undertaken, for the benefit of the big international trusts, will bring the poor regions of France into confrontation with other poor regions of Europe, and the wealthy regions will get wealthier. Spain should not become part of this Europe. We say yes to a Europe with authentic natural regions in which each one of them 'is boss.'" To Professor Lafont, the minorities advocating independence cannot yet be taken seriously, and like everyone with whom we spoke, he feels that the left-wing political parties (the Socialists are in control in southern France) "are interested in the southern French movement in order to reclaim it, but they will not succeed."

Nationalism in French Basque Country

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 11 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] Today EL PAIS adds the French Basque Country to the series that it is devoting to a study of emerging nationalist movements in

France. With fewer than 250,000 inhabitants and separated by the Bidassoa River from the Spanish Basque Country, the northern Basque region has recently revived the struggle for its own identity. Because of this, along with socioeconomic factors (farming, tourism and emigration), progress in regional awareness is largely dependent on developments in the southern Basque Country, as explained by our Paris correspondent, Feliciano Fidalgo, who has traveled throughout the French Basque Country.

Last Sunday in Hendaya, a few meters from the French-Spanish border, this writer asked a pedestrian: "Is that the church of Hendaya in the distance?" "Pardon me, but you're a bit lost," the fellow in his twenties replied; "that's the church of Fuenterrabia."

"That's right, I'm sorry; that's Spain over there." "No," the man exclaimed almost violently; "this and that over there is the Basque Country, but a few bastards have put up that 'wall of shame' called the Bidassoa."

"We are in the minority but we are not on the fringe, as French government officials would have you believe," claims an "abertzale" (patriotic) militant, emphasizing: "abertzale and not nationalist, because the nationalists can be right-wing and not independence advocates." The same militant feels that 10 percent of the 250,000 inhabitants of the northern Basque Country have now been motivated "by the struggle that in the long run will lead to the unification of the two Basque regions and to independence." Another abertzale sympathizer complains: "The basic problem is psychological: the northern Basques are still not aware enough of their identity and of the need to defend and develop it."

Insignificant Minority

An official in the Foreign Affairs Ministry told us: "In local elections the nationalists have gotten between three and four percent, but all of these movements are insignificant." Jacques Abeberri, a Bayonne financier and ideologue of the Eubata movement, explains the issue in greater depth: "Unlike in the south, there is no tradition of struggle for Basque patriotism in the north. Ever since the French Revolution everything has been choked off by the myth of 'eternal France,' by the 'grandeur of France.'" It was in 1914 that the French first Gallicized the region; at the conclusion of this world war (1914-1918), in which the Basques fought for France, gave the state their lives, or their labor or their relatives and thus veterans or pension and medal recipients, the Basque people were alienated. Later on, the centralists, the dominant language and the colonialist economic strategy rounded out the effort.

Are there the beginnings of a widespread coming to awareness? In abertzale circles (which include all patriotic groups and movements) the answer is a resounding yes. The reasons given are similar and all cite the examples offered by experience over the last few years, "because elections," says Mr Abeberri, "are not significant. Discussions at the French state level do not concern us. You can see the growing audience for Basque nationalism more clearly when our specific current problems are brought up."

An example are the "ikastolas," which did not exist 10 years ago because of opposition from Paris and which now have some 600 children. Estimates are that the Basque language is spoken by some 80,000 persons. "These schools are self-financed. Paris bans demonstrations aimed at fund-raising, as happened with the Nantes-Saint Sebastian Party that was dissolved last August, but when they have tried to raise official barriers, as many as 5,000 persons have demonstrated in protest. This linguistic rebirth is essential, because we know that throughout history the loss of political autonomy has always been accompanied by the decline or disappearance of the language. By the same token, we also can see throughout history that language is a decisive element in the rebirth of a historic nationalist awareness."

"But from every standpoint the case of the northern Basque Country could seem to be an adjunct to an issue that is of particular concern to a bordering state, specifically Spain. The armed struggle unleashed by the ETA in the southern Basque provinces seems to confirm this impression."

Aid to Refugees

The focus of the northern Basque movement is not on its own demands vis-a-vis the French state but on aid to combatants from the south, such as protection of political refugees." This assessment by Daniel Chatelain and Pierre Tafari, who are specialists in French home rule movements, is shared, albeit with slight differences, by all of the movements in the northern Basque region. "Developments in awareness here depend a great deal on what happens in the southern Basque region. The Autonomy Statute is not in agreement with our principles but it marks a stage that will show that there is a government, that there is a flag," states Coco Abeberri, an attorney who defends Basque refugees and causes. "Autonomy in the south will encourage a dynamism here, and even those outside our struggle realize this," we were told repeatedly in Bayonne, Saint Jean de Luz and in all the towns and villages where there are sympathizers or militants. And the issue of defending political refugees from the southern Basque Country is cited as evidence that reunification and independence for the northern Basques will be hastened or slowed by what happens in the south.

Polarization Seen in French Basque Country

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 12 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Feliciano Fidalgo]

[Text] Unlike what is happening in the other French regions with their own identity, there is no push for home rule in the French Basque Country. All of the violent underground groups, as well as the numerous small legal movements, seek independence within the framework of a unified Basque Country (north and south). EL PAIS's Paris correspondent, Feliciano Fidalgo, reports on this aspect of the struggle of those calling for independence, who are described as "irresponsible" by the deputy and mayor of Biarritz, Bernard Marie.

At his latest international press conference in February at Elysee Palace, the president of the French Republic, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, gave a categorical and solemn no in answer to the newsmen who asked him whether the ETA's armed struggle in the southern Basque Country might some day serve as a "model" for the northern Basque Country. Native Basque nationalists, as well as the mayor of Biarritz, a deputy in Giscard's majority, Bernard Marie, are more cautious in broaching in the topic. The latter asserts that "the ETA is trying to influence youths here through small revolutionary groups. In this way the northern Basque Country is running the risk of undergoing the same process that has led the very bourgeois and very liberal Spanish Basques who want home rule to leave their region or to lower their heads when faced with events that they themselves have set in motion and that are currently unfolding in a manner that they disapprove of but that has completely escaped their grasp."

Limited Violence

Violent action on behalf of northern Basque Country independence began 3 years ago. Youths belonging to three groups are involved. The major one is allegedly called Iparetarrak (the northerners), which some consider a "son" of ETA's military branch in the French Basque Country. The other two are Euskal Zuzentasuna (Basque Justice) and Hordago, and so far their targets have always been the symbols of the French administration or tourism, not individuals.

"These groups are extremely small," a young abertzale explains to us, "and it is not easy to find out who belongs to them. So far they have never granted interviews to the press. We only know that they exist as groups from their communiques, when they have something to say or demand. There are both pro- and anti-violence people among us abertzales. But in any case we feel that, for now at least, such actions have to be sporadic and only in instances when the public can clearly see that they

are necessary. By this I mean that we do not want to fall into a cycle of violence, which leads to unwarranted actions. The military branch of the ETA, for example, knows how to control the armed struggle."

They are from 17 to 30 years old and come from the towns of Garazi, Baigorri and Ostibarre. "Our objective," they explain, "is a living Basque culture and through culture to make people aware. To us, culture is a way of life, everything that personalizes the country's people, everything that differentiates one person from another, relationships among different people." The Izan group was recently formed, and its aim is to be "a working structure independent of individual political options and to engage in a struggle to resolve immediate problems through self-rule."

"Current economic and political developments are making people more interdependent. It is not a question of cultivating the egoism of one group, one region or one people but of asserting our Basque community's right to live alongside the other European and world communities."

Bearing in mind, as all those with whom we spoke noted, that the future of the Basque people in quantitative terms is essentially at stake in the south because of its demographic, economic and political weight, everyone in the north closely monitors developments and realities in the Spanish Basque Country. "The Autonomy Statute," a Bayonne industrialist notes, "is a positive thing but it could also immobilize the situation and 'Ulsterize' the south. Now then, in the long run independence is unavoidable. The Madrid government, which brought about democracy astonishingly well, made a historical mistake in not seeing the Basque problem. The PNV was primarily to blame for this. But this party can find people here among the current local authorities whose tolerance of centralism is steadily declining. On the other hand, there are some very open men in the PNV."

Mr Abeberri says this about the ETA: "Unquestionably, there are personal relations between the ETA people and the Basque nationalists, but ETA has never gotten involved here and it never will. And just as it was easier for it to establish its bases here during the Franco era, today I feel that it would be more difficult than expanding in the south, in spite of all the police personnel that Madrid has stationed there."

The Centralist Left

In dealing with the separatism of the Basque north, the traditional left "chooses whatever course it can or to its own advantage in each case." At the local level, when faced with specific situations or on an individual basis, the Socialists and Communists "give their support, but when all is said and done, they are centralists."

The mayor of Biarritz, majority deputy Bernard Marie, gave us his calm assessment of the small but active movement stirring in the northern Basque Country: "These people who want independence are irresponsible. Today's world is moving towards the formation of large blocs. At a time when the EEC is being built up, we have to ask what 100 Basques are going to do, just as we have to ask what would happen in Spain, in France and throughout the world if each region were to request independence. We would regress ten centuries."

The fact of the matter, however, is that an independence movement is under way, and there are reasons for it. "True," notes Mr Marie; "it is due to the magic word 'independence.' But I can assure you that many of the African countries that were our colonies are sorry that they are independent today. Because of the lack of natural resources they have all retrogressed." And isn't Paris-based centralism also a cause? "I'm not a centralist, but I wonder whether the opposite is not to be feared more. Centralism guarantees that the best persons will be selected for all domestic and international positions."

No Simple Solution to Problem

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Sep 79 p 6

[Interview with Riccardo Petrella, a high level official with the European Communities, in Brussels, by Feliciano Fidalgo; date not given]

[Text] Jean Monet, one of the "fathers" of Europe, wrote in his memoirs: "We do not make coalitions of states; we unite men." More than 40 languages are spoken in Europe, and there are even more regional cultures, many of them rendered sterile or rejected. The resurgence of these regionalisms is an obvious fact and unquestionably prompts much debate. To conclude our series of articles on the particular case of France, EL PAIS's Paris correspondent Feliciano Fidalgo had a conversation in Brussels with Riccardo Petrella, a former director of the European Center for Social Science Research and currently a high level official in the European Communities. Petrella, the author of "The Rebirth of Regional Cultures in Europe," is regarded as one of the top authorities in this field.

Questions: For the last quarter of a century, the Western European nation-state has been the victim of a dual onslaught. On the one hand, the building of a united Europe is a threat to its absolute sovereignty, and on the other, the self-assertion of national minorities also undermines its omnipotence. What does this dual onslaught mean?

Answer: The self-assertion of national minorities (like a future federated Europe, but that is another matter) challenges the validity of the supremacy of the nation-state and its single cultural, political, economic and social model. If we look to the past, we can see that the history of Europe is a history of outlying areas and centers that have sought to subdue these outlying regions without regard to methods and, above all, without realizing that many of these outlying regions are older and more clear-cut than the nation-state that subdued them. The reasoning of every center (an almost genitral reasoning) is to impose its authority and thereafter its program for society. Diversity from the center must be eliminated. It is tolerated only if it is thought to be unimportant or insignificant. Moreover, the fact of "being different," of opposing the dominant mode of production and the center's rules of the game has become synonymous with reactionary, underdeveloped and archaic. On the purely political level, the attitude of the center is even more intolerant and totalitarian. The modern-day history of the Europe of nation-states is the history of a bid for uniformity. The attempt at uniformity is carried out at all levels and in all sectors: dispossessing the conquered peripheral areas of their history, the depersonalization of the conquered peripheral areas, the attempt to destroy everything that differentiates them from the center, language, traditions, customs, ways of life. And thirdly, the wearing down of everything that could encourage action and behavior not in line with the center's dominant and standard model. Now then, the resurgence of cultural minorities in Western Europe is a challenge to this centrist reasoning of the nation-states.

The Nation-State Losing Influence

Question: What is the destiny of the centralist nation-state?

Answer: In the first place, we should ask ourselves whether the nation-state is going to disappear. It will not disappear in the span of a generation. There is going to be a two-pronged development. First, the nation-state will lose influence on the world scene; second, it will utilize all its resources to thwart the development of regional aspirations.

Question: With regard to the building of democracy in Western societies, what does the rebirth of national minorities mean?

Answer: The rebirth of these minorities, like the emergence of all of the other minorities (ecologists, feminists, etc), is a basic contribution to the building of democracy in our societies. These minorities express the need to assert the realities and initiative of individuals and groups in a society that respects the potential of all. They are, in the final accounting, a tool of struggle against the current tendency towards uniformity that marks our societies.

Question: What is your analysis of the dual tendency in struggles of national minorities, towards autonomy, on the one hand, and independence, on the other?

The Threat of Separation Is Inevitable

Answer: Every expression of the "right to be different" entails a desire to talk about secession and separation from the centralist political and cultural system. It is an illusion to think that the problem of genuine minorities can be resolved through simple "arrangements" by the nation-state. In my view, in terms of a dynamic evolution, the threat of separation is inevitable. But this separation brings with it violent reactions and changes. Therefore, the backers of home rule cannot openly proclaim their deepest motivations. Moreover, in the current context of a world economy and of growing interdependence, any bid for independence gives the impression of being somewhat reactionary and unrealistic.

Question: In connection with this latter point, is the resurgence of national minorities compatible with the European integration that is under way?

Answer: Not only is it compatible; it is an absolutely necessary condition for carrying out a European program based on the fundamental principles of our civilization: participation, freedom, justice, respect for the various components of European culture. No Europe will be possible if it is built on the basis of overemphasizing some, in other words, solely on the basis of the cultures that are regarded as the dominant or main ones, and relying on hierarchical and discriminatory relations vis-a-vis minorities. But the truth is that the only possible and desirable Europe, that is to say, a federated Europe based on the principles of territorial democracy, is unfortunately still not on the horizon.

Question: At present, the centralist nation-state is the political instrument that the multinational economic structure utilizes for its development. To what extent does the resurgence of the national minorities affect this production apparatus?

Answer: Current economic mechanisms, based on the supremacy of supply production, have to expand. Goods and services are produced so that the production machinery grows, and hence standardization. In contrast, the cultural, economic, political and social diversity entailed in the rebirth of regional nationalism brings with it a reorientation of demand production. In order to do this, enterprises have to be reduced in size. Technological development has to be redirected; in other words, technology must be exploited, not to modify high technologies, but to multiply the use of intermediate technologies in Europe and

to develop the technologies that are appropriate for the Third World. Everything that I have just said, of course, is equivalent to the transformation of our societies into socialist societies, but which would have nothing to do with the type of socialism in Eastern Europe.

Question: Do you mean that the regional movements are a new form of political action?

Answer: Yes I do. The regional movements represent new modes of political processes, for all of the reasons that you can deduce from what I said and also because traditional political institutions have lost credibility. Political parties mobilize for elections only. They are obsessed with votes, regardless of where they come from, and this forces them to constantly and seriously pare back their programs to transform society.

Question: What is your assessment of the autonomy process in Spain?

Answer: In general, it has made a very favorable impression on me. In this area Spain today has surpassed countries like France and England. Now then, on the other hand, the changes projected by the Madrid authorities suffer from considerable limitations. One of them is the vulgarization or generalization of the regional autonomies. What I mean is that in granting autonomy to all of the domestic units, even though the objective conditions for this are not developed enough, they have partly detracted from the significance of the autonomies. One might say that they have been an aspirin to ease the pain.

No Solution without a Basque State

Question: What is your opinion regarding the Basque problem in particular?

Answer: Just as Catalonia has never been a serious danger to the central government, and I feel that its case will be resolved within the framework of the Spanish state, in the Basque case I dare say that there is no solution without a Basque state. All of the past and present reasons point to this line of thought. This does not mean that the French Basque Country will achieve its independence immediately afterwards, because it does not meet the various requirements.

Question: Do you think that the phenomenon of the minorities in Western Europe will be repeated in the eastern part of the continent?

Answer: Yes, I think that nationalist feelings will explode in the USSR and the other Eastern European states.

Question: How do you feel that these regional minorities will develop in the future?

Answer: The forces of change in our societies are going to check the regional movements. What the nation-states portray as an economic crisis could reverse the process of breakoffs that regional aspirations entail, except in cases like the Basque Country and Ireland. A much more intensive battle would be required than the one being waged now. Otherwise, everything could be swallowed up.

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GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION POLARITIES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

Athens EPIKAIIRA in Greek 13 Sep 79 pp 48, 49

[Article by G. Katsonis]

[Text] Last Saturday the government and the opposition realized their first confrontation, the first using "demagogy" and the second "failure" as weapons. The premier spoke in the hall of "Makedonia Palace" in Salonica--an impressive but rather suffocating hall (the sweat had soaked even the knot of his elegant tie)--right after the inauguration of the [Salonica International] Fair, while the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] spoke in the fresh air of the Nea Philadelfia Park on the occasion of the PASOK Youth celebration. The "salvos" were almost simultaneous in the political and economic fields with diametrically opposite data, predictions and allegations. In its "historic" part the premier's speech covered the following:

1. The agreement on Greece's entry into EEC, which as he reiterated, will change the country's destiny, but which demands a change in mentality as well as toil and sacrifice.
2. The national income which during the 1974-1978 4-year period was increased by 5.4 percent (compared to 2 percent in EEC) and is expected to have a smaller rise (about 4 percent) during the current year (as against 2.5 percent in EEC).
3. The investments which were not proportionate with the level the entry into EEC dictates. For this reason new incentives were adopted and the first result was the acceleration in the import of capital goods.
4. The public finances with emphasis on the satisfactory results of the measures taken against tax evasion and the pending revision of the income tax scales.
5. The balance of payments and the deficit in current trade. This deficit will reach 1,800 million dollars this year due to the high cost of imported oil.

6. The price index which will increase by 21 percent from December to December (or by 18.5 percent in average monthly levels).

7. The wage policy whose real increase during the 1974-1978 4-year period reached 39.1 (compared to 12.5 percent in EEC) while this year it will remain intact due to the price index deterioration.

8. The rise in the standard of living which is reflected in:

a. The per capita income (from 2,165 dollars in 1974 to 3,430 dollars in 1978).

b. The deposit accounts which increased from 5,566,000 to 7,790,000 during the 1974-78 period and the deposits in savings banks and time deposits which also increased from 180 to 493 billion drachmas during the same period.

c. The privately owned vehicles whose number from 336,520 in 1974 has now reached 815,000. For the import of 460,000 new cars alone the cost was 1.4 billion dollars.

d. The TV sets which from 940,000 in 1974 exceeded 1,400,000 in 1978.

e. The private consumption which increased by 102 percent during the same 4-year period.

"I ask, then, the demagogues who try to lead the people astray by reciting in tragic terms their misfortune: Who benefited from this spectacular rise--the 500 or 1,000 capitalists or the 9 million Greeks?" asked Karamanlis.

"When We Give Plenty"

Karamanlis admitted that inflation, this great problem of the world as well as of the Greek economy, is caused by external factors (rise in the price of oil and raw materials) and by internal ones (excessive increase in credits, in public expenses, wages and incomes) and frankly described the responsibilities: "Therefore, all of us, the government and people alike, are responsible for the expansion of inflation. The government because it gave plenty and the citizens because they spent a lot," said the premier, and added:

"When we give plenty, the opposition accuses us of feeding inflation and when we do not give any it accuses us of causing economic recession and doing injustice to the working people. It accuses us of not restricting public expenses, but it also accuses us of not increasing the credits for health, education and the country's defense. It accuses us of not suppressing inflation but it also accuses us of doubling the prices of farm products, salaries and pensions."

He subsequently said that the swift aggravation of the international situation dictates the difficult policy of balance between inflation and development and recommended "a cautious way of life," stressing that "we spend more than is needed and more than we can afford" and "we spend 400 million dollars annually for cars and other luxury items at a time when the energy crisis is compelling us to save even the last dollar."

He concluded with the warning that our behavior will be the touchstone of the nation's wisdom and that "it is time to understand that we cannot solve our problems with irrational demands, strikes and demonstrations. On the contrary, we will make the problems worse as has happened in those countries which are suffering from political and social turmoil."

The Big Alibi...

At the very same hour, A. Papandreou was assuring the youth [in New Philadelphia] that the "anti-people, unprogrammed and inconsistent government policy has led the country to economic impasse" and that "yes, the energy crisis--the great government alibi for the failure of its economic policy--is a world reality but it would not have had such a serious impact on the country's economy had there been a complete program for the utilization of the domestic energy sources."

On the more specific points of the premier's speech the PASOK leader warned that:

1. The average family income according to tax returns is less than 200,000 drachmas. How many families, then (of working people, pensioners, etc.), have "the colossal per capita income" of 3,430 dollars which is about equal to 500,000 drachmas?
2. The slack in investments is known, while the incentives for their increase are but unfair allowances to big capital.
3. The measures against tax invasion and the token decisions are hurting mainly the middle and lower income classes while they exempt the big capital (to which the government replied: "This is incorrect. But even if it were true, should we forgive the middle class tax evaders just because there are big ones?").
4. The increase in the current trade balance deficit from 1,000 to 1,800 million dollars does not constitute a progress but an unprecedented deterioration, while the need for a foreign loan shows that the foreign exchange position of the country needs strengthening.
5. The 1979 price index will exceed the government forecasts (will reach 25 percent) which means that the government has lost control over the prices and is trying to cure inflation with the policy of desired recession (to which the government responded: "Why does not the PASOK

leader say that the deficit is due to the rise in oil prices? And why does he not reveal what he would do to cope with the energy crisis and inflation?").

6. The premier's assurance that the working people were favored during the 1974-78 4-year period aims at justifying the refusal for equitable price index readjustment of the salaries and wages in 1979 when their average increase was around 10 percent while the price index percentage will be more than double. (The government replies that the incomes of the working people will not suffer any decrease during 1979 because their average increase is not 10 but 18.5 percent, while the average price index increase will not surpass this level.)

In his speech to the youth, Papandreou said also that it is unavoidable for the working people to move against the one-sided policy of austerity "and for this reason one of the main government targets was and is the subjugation, guardianship, diversion and weakening of the trade union movement in the country."

He asked that Greece stay out of EEC because its entry "will mean that the country will be completely dependent on the Brussels headquarters [of EEC]." He then referred to the national questions in the same aggressive way.

Investments and Shortages

In a less sloganeering way the president of the Party of Democratic Socialism G. Pasmazoglou also responded to the premier's speech in Salonica (even though the government spokesman did not condescend to reply).

He said that Greece's entry into EEC as well as its closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries, especially the Balkans and the Arab world, are positive prospects which are supported by the great majority of the Greek people. Their success, however, depends on the vigor of the Greek economy and this preassumes continuous and intensified support by the Greek working people. In this respect he pointed out that:

1. The productive investments on which the economic development depends are unacceptably low.
2. Especially in the agricultural sector, the investments which primarily are affected by public decisions are by 26 percent lower than the higher level of the past and remain stagnant since 1974.
3. From International Bank loans totaling 105 million which were granted during 1975-76, the state until now has absorbed only 5 million dollars. This explains the stagnancy of the agricultural production in recent years, a stagnancy which the government invariably attributes to "unfavorable weather conditions."

4. The real income of many categories of working people will drop this year while the government ignores "hundreds of families of Farm Insurance Organization and Greek Craftsmen's and Tradesmen's Fund pensioners who did not receive any, not even a nominal increase in 1979."

5. The deficit in the current trade (balance of payments) will reach 2,000 million dollars. This is due not only to the oil shortage but also to the intense increase of the other imports.

Pesmazoglou said that he considers as justified the appeal of the premier for national unanimity and social cohesion (in a time of uncertainty, instability and insecurity our modern world is experiencing), except that the government actions are not in harmony with this appeal. "If the deterioration does not stop," he pointed out, "we will be led to a serious economic and social embroilment which will result in weakening our defensive ability"--something no one wishes to happen.

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GREECE SEEKS MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM BRITAIN, GERMANY

Athens TC VIMA in Greek 5 Sep 79 p 1

[Text] The talks held in Athens by West German Deputy Minister of Defense Billow [transliteration] centered on the supply of military equipment to the Greek armed forces. In another development, National Defense Deputy Minister Avramidis is scheduled to leave for Britain on 9 September to visit British armament plants.

These visits coincide with reports published in TO VIMA concerning delays in the delivery of military materiel and especially of spare parts from the United States.

West German Deputy Minister of Defense Billow visited yesterday the Greek Minister of Defense Averof and discussed defense issues concerning the two countries and especially the question of German military aid to Greece. Present at the talks were the two Greek Deputy Ministers of National Defense Avramidis and Katsadimas.

Billow then met Chief of the National Defense General Staff General Davos in the presence of the chiefs of staff of the three branches. In the afternoon he left for Crete to visit the firing range.

Avramidis is going to Britain by invitation of the British government. He is in charge of weapons production and is scheduled to have talks with the British defense minister and the director of war industries and war materiel sales. He will also visit the war materiel exposition of the British Navy, units of war industries, and military installations of the British armed forces. Avramidis' visit to Britain will end on 14 September. During the same period Greek Navy Chief Admiral Dagiannis will visit the war materiel exposition of the British Navy.

The newly built Greek submarine "Amfitriti" built in Kiel is expected to arrive in Salamis tomorrow. This is the second of four submarines to be built in W. Germany. This submarine left Kiel on 14 August, traveled on the surface through the North Sea and the Channel and submerged in the Biscaye Gulf. It continued to travel submerged for 2,400 miles and will resurface tomorrow as it enters the Saronikos Bay. Lieutenant Commander Koutsougeras is the commander of the new submarine.

HIGHEST INTEREST RATES FOR DEPOSITORS

Athens TA NEA in Greek 1 Sep 79 p 3

[Text] The Currency Committee issued a decision to raise interest rates paid to depositors and interest rates paid by borrowers. As a result of this decision, the interest paid to depositors by savings and commercial banks is raised to 13.5 percent, by the Agricultural Bank to 13.75 percent, by the Postal Savings Banks to 14 percent, while for term deposits the interest rate is set at 15 percent. The interest for 3 to 6-month deposits is set at 14.5 percent; from 6 to 12 months at 15.5 percent; and for more than 12 months at 16 percent. The corresponding interest rates on time deposits in the Agricultural Bank are increased by 0.25 percent. For time deposits, the new interest rates will be credited as of 1 September 1979, and for the rest as of 23 August 1979. The restricted deposits will yield 11.5 percent.

On the other hand, the interest rates for loans are set as follows:

1. Loans to industries for working capital, 21 percent.
2. Business loans to domestic merchants, 21 percent.
3. Loans to small businessmen, 21 percent.
4. Loans to hotel and tourist enterprises, 21 percent.
5. Loans to maritime companies for working capital, 21 percent.
6. Loans using debentures as collateral, 21 percent.
7. Other loans and credits (press, auto owners, contractors, etc.), 21 percent.
8. Investment loans to industry, handicraft industries, mines, commerce, 16 percent.
9. Loans to maritime companies, in drachmas, 16 percent.

10. Loans to public enterprises and organisations, 16 percent.
11. Investment loans to tourist enterprises in Zone I, 14 percent, in Zone II, 12 percent, in Zone III, 10 percent.
12. Loans to transport firms, 16 percent.

Financing of Exports

1. Export loans, 9 percent.
2. Financing of exports for the first 4 months from the granting of the loan, 9 percent.
3. Loans to the tobacco industry for operating capital, 9 percent.
4. Loans to mining enterprises, not exceeding 9-month payoff periods, 9 percent.
5. Financing of exports after the first 4 month period, 12.5 percent.
6. Loans to the handicraft industries, 12.5 percent.
7. Loans to technical/engineering firms engaged in projects abroad, 12.5 percent.
8. Financing of ship and aircraft food suppliers, 12.5 percent.
9. Loans to tourism for the construction of (hotel) rooms depending on the area, from 8 to 11 percent with a grace period rate of 6 percent.
10. Loans to shipbuilding companies, to be repaid in foreign exchange, 12.5 percent.
11. Loans to importers, 23 percent.
12. Loans to domestic trade, 23 percent.
13. Consumer credit, 23 percent.
14. Loans to small businessmen, 23 percent.
15. Discount of notes for preconstructed buildings, 23 percent.

Handicraft Industries

16. Loans to handicraft industries for working capital, 18.5 percent.
17. Loans for (movie) film production, 12 percent.

18. Loans to mining enterprises for permanent installations, 10.5 percent.
19. Loans to furriers and furrier cooperatives, 10.5 percent.
20. Loans to Greek oil marketing companies, 13.5 percent.
21. Loans for shipbuilding, altering or repairing in foreign exchange, 8.5 percent.
22. Loans for permanent installations of productive units with payments in foreign exchange, 10.5 percent.
23. Loans to private farming industries, 16 percent.
24. Financing of permanent installations and replacement of rolling stock by the OASTh and EAS, 13 percent; to individual bus owners, 15 percent.
25. For rearranged loans of tourist enterprises, 14 percent.

The interest rates for housing loans are set as follows:

26. Standard, 15.5 percent.
27. To newspaper editors, etc., 13.5 percent.
28. To depositors in housing savings and loans in drachmas, 15 percent; in foreign exchange, 11 percent.
29. To importers of foreign exchange, 14 percent.
30. To blue-collar workers, 13.5 percent.
31. To public servants and the employees of Legal Entities and public agencies, 13.5 percent.
32. To those entitled to worker housing and to the Welfare Ministry housing program, 9 percent.
33. To the victims of natural disasters, 8 percent.
34. To the insured, pensioners and the employees of Insurance Funds and other public agencies, 11 percent.
35. To farmers, 10 percent.
36. To frontier regions standard and construction, 13 percent; farmers, 7 percent; public servants, 9 percent.
37. To blue-collar workers and seamen in area "E," [no interest rate given].

- 38. Simple housing loans to wage earners, 11 percent; seamen, 9 percent.
- 39. To exchange importing wage earners, 11.5 percent; seamen, 9.5 percent.
- 40. To depositors in housing savings and loan banks in drachmas, 12 percent; in foreign exchange, 8.5 percent.

It is further explained that the new interest rules will come into effect today, 1 September 1979. With regard to loans outstanding prior to 31 August 1979, the following exceptions are in force:

- A. On all housing loans issued prior to 1 September 1979 and on loans to housing cooperatives, the interest rate is increased by 2 points compared to the corresponding level on 31 August 1979 with the exception of loans by the housing savings and loan agency in foreign exchange and loans to those importing foreign exchange when the increase is limited to 1.5 points.
- B. No adjustment applies to the interest rates on the following categories of loans made prior to 31 August 1979.
 - a. Loans from the Savings and Loan Fund to local self-government agencies, Legal Entities of Public Law and public utilities.
 - b. Loans made by the Bank of Greece for imports on the basis of the Clearing Agreement with Egypt, and for settling debts by the flour mills of Rhodes and Mytilini.
 - c. Loans by the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank [ETVA] to the ELVIK Corporation.
 - d. Loans for the payment of obligations by individuals or Legal Entities in the zones of Syros, Rodopi, Isthmi, Dodekanisos, Lesbos, Rhios and Samos.
 - e. Loans to flood victims.
 - f. Emergency loans to merchants and small businessmen in Salonica who were earthquake victims.
 - g. Loans with debentures as collateral.
- C. The interest rates applying to loans made prior to 1 September 1979 will continue in force after that date for the period covered with disconnected notes issued by buyers of productive machinery and for purchases which were made prior to that date.
- D. For the outstanding balances of loans whose granting is not provided by the existing decisions the interest rates are increased by 4 units following 1 September 1979.
- E. In the case of loans whose interest rate is tied to the interest rates of general financing the rate will be that of the new interest rate for the general category.

RELATIONS WITH VATICAN OPPOSED BY MT ATHOS CHURCH

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 23 Aug 79 p 49

[Article by P. A. Lambropoulos]

[Text] The extraordinary session of the Holy Synod held 2 days ago revealed the feelings of certain metropolitans toward Archbishop Serafim, especially with regard to decisions on vital questions concerning the Church. The conservative bishops and their religious followers cannot agree, for example, on the establishing of diplomatic relations between Greece and the Vatican.

They accuse Serafim of giving in in order to "survive" at the summit of the Church or in order to promote his own men. The next meeting of the regular Synod to be convened in Athens is bound to cause more headaches for the Primate who is trying to avoid a regular Synod, calling only an extraordinary session.

But while the Church insiders are working feverishly backstage, with the Archbishop trying to avert the discussion of burning issues and the conservatives trying to have such discussions with intense publicity at that, the Holy Community of Mt Athos (Agion Oros) unanimously condemned the establishing of diplomatic relations between Greece and the Vatican.

The news traveled throughout Europe. It was broadcast by the news media and discussed by Catholic newsmen with a touch of irony. In Greece the news item and the text of the Mt Athos clergy (hard-hitting on certain points) went by largely unnoticed. Mt Athos condemns this policy as anti-people, anti-orthodox and anti-national.

Mt Athos Document

The Mt Athos monks write in their proclamation, in part:

"It is anti-people because all the peoples of the world have learned by now that the God-hated regime of the papacy decisively assisted the takeover of power by Mussolini and Hitler who initiated the Second World War. Who will relieve the Vatican from this terrible responsibility for the death of so many millions of people and for so much suffering?

"It is anti-orthodox because the papacy due to its temporal structure and the framework of its objectives wants to subjugate the Orthodoxy by making everything Catholic, because Orthodoxy continues its unceasing, vocal or silent criticism of the adulteration of Western Christianity.

"The politically inappropriate action of the government is also anti-national because the papacy wants to break up every Orthodox nation in order to make the people easy prey to their subjugation by the papacy. More specifically, it wants to undermine Greece because it is a thorn in the eye of the pope for its Orthodoxy, even since Byzantine times.

"Who does not know today of the shameful crusades of the popes against the "schismatic" Byzantium and the occupation of Constantinople by the Franks for two centuries--the first 'rape' of the city?

"Who does not know today the speech of Pope Eugenios the Fifth at the 'rape' of Constantinople? 'I would not have been as happy with 10 victories against the Turks as I am today with the subjugation of the schismatics!'

"Who does not know that the destruction of 4 million Orthodox Greeks in Asia Minor was due to the intrigues of the papacy which feared the reemergence of a new Byzantine center of Orthodoxy, a foe of the papacy? Documents have come to light which show beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Vatican as well as other powers had urged France (and Italy) to help the Turks because the Vatican did not want the Greeks to take Constantinople. The Vatican was afraid that the Greek Orthodox Church would become a serious rival in the event it regained its old seat of Eastern Christianity. During the same period the Vatican flattered the Soviet Union in the hope of subjugating its Orthodox Church to Catholicism...

"In addition to these specific historic illustrations of the unchangeable hatred of the papacy against Orthodoxy, the government should recall the congratulatory telegram sent by the Vatican to Kemal at the time of the Asia Minor tragedy. It should recall the Vatican's guilty silence in 1955 at the time of the 'second rape of Constantinople.' It should recall the Vatican's lack of compassion for the drama of Cyprus.

"Nobody is in a position today to say with certainty that the Vatican had no part in the persecutions carried out by Turkey against Orthodox Hellenism and in the insistent threats for uprooting the Ecumenical Patriarchate and in the Aegean Islands. Everything is possible in the framework of the unscrupulous diplomacy of the papacy which employs the Jesuit dogma. 'The purpose sanctifies the means' since Orthodoxy is the 'red cloth' and Catholicism must prevail not only through its tried policies but also by fire and iron. The blood of 1 million Serbs 'cries out to God,' slaughtered by the Catholics of Croatia, the only reason being that they were Orthodox!

"The above words are not voiced by the Holy Community of the Mt Athos Holy Monasteries in order to reopen old wounds but in order to help the government understand that the acceptance of a papal nuncio in Athens is fraught with dangers against the unity of Hellenism. But also to point out that it should not expect to obtain any benefits, in the sense of improving the conditions of our national life."

With a dramatic high note of warning, the 20 representatives of Mt Athos voice this reminder:

"At the ordination of the pope, or rather at his coronation while they are placing on his head the three-crowned tiara (Tiregnum), the following unbelievable words are spoken: 'Take this tiara decorated with three crowns and know that you are the father of kings and princes, the shepherd of all the world and the vicar of Jesus Christ our Lord on earth!' which means that the papacy, hiding behind the mantle of religion, wants to achieve political domination over the peoples."

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BRIBE ACCEPTANCE TO BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Sep 79 p 1

Text According to a provision of a draft law being prepared by the Ministry of Justice, bribe acceptance will henceforth be considered a crime punishable by incarceration up to 10 years and a minimum penalty of 500,000 drachmas in the case of a bribed employee whose said action "seriously impairs his duties." The relevant task was assigned to a special committee which will amend Article 235 of the Penal Code.

The same draft law increases to at least 3 years--instead of the 1 year now in force--the minimum sentence for bribes and also adds a minimum penalty of 200,000 drachmas. The provision defining bribe acceptance as a crime will be added as part B to Article 235.

Bribery

Bribery also will be considered a crime. According to Article 236 of the Penal Code, bribery is punished today with the same punishment as that for bribe acceptance--that is, with an imprisonment of up to 1 year. Under the new provision bribery will also be punished with a minimum imprisonment of up to 3 years and with a minimum penalty of 200,000 drachmas. In the case of a crime, moreover, the punishment will be the same as that for bribery acceptance (imprisonment up to 10 years and a minimum penalty of 500,000 drachmas).

Article 235 of the Penal Code as applies today, states that "he who gives, offers or promises gifts or other things in exchange...will be given the same punishment" provided by Article 235. In other words, it will be necessary to amend this article, too, so that bribery also will be defined as a crime provided of course that the same condition of serious impairment of the employee's duties exists.

These amendments will be included in the draft law the Ministry of Justice is preparing which will also amend the provisions on seducing minors. As was announced, the age limit of a minor is reduced from 16 to 14 in defining seduction as a crime.

NEW FORESTRY LAW UNDER FIRE

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 15 Sep 79 pp 3,4

[Text]

ONE of the most sensitive points in Greek life was touched upon last week in Parliament with the discussion of a new law covering the protection of forests. The proposed law is intended to protect State land which many claim has been "usurped" in the past.

The state itself has never managed to successfully exploit or defend its forest properties and though the first failure might be attributed to the acknowledged bureaucratic defects of the state machine, the second is simply the result of a lack of good definitions of what exactly a forest is. Simply put the ill-defined issue concerns what are forests and forest land and what area of the country forests cover but this very basic questions remains unanswered in the proposed new law. This deficiency is the principal drawback in the new law which greatly reduces its possible effectiveness and lays it open to very severe criticisms.

The law has been drafted following increased demands for greater protection of Greece's forests and forest areas and with a view to forestry areas not being given over to other uses unless this is "in the public interest".

"The aim of the government," as the Agriculture Minister Mr. Boutos explained recently to the press, "is to serve the public interest and above all to protect, develop and exploit our

forestry resources, as all countries do. Exploitation here may mean protection and maintenance of either the ecological environment or the aesthetics of forest areas, or finally, their economic exploitation."

To achieve this aim the law proposes the suspension of the special protection granted to forest areas in Greece. The total area over which the protection has been lifted covers 15 million stremmas (1.5 million hectares), though according to different sources within the same Ministry of Agriculture this total area is 24 million stremmas (2.4 million hectares). This area, it must be noted, consists not of proper forest but of the so-called "forest land" that holds only small amounts of vegetation if any at all. Such areas are usually on the borders of forest zones and have very often materialised as a result of fires or the free use of wood for domestic purposes in older times. Though destined for reforestation and prohibited for use for livestock breeding, nothing significant has happened, or is expected to in the development of these areas, either because natural conditions no longer favour the growth of trees (e.g. the soil layer may be too thin) or because the administration is too lazy to invest in such an "unproductive" activity.

Thus some form of redistribution

of such areas to end users other than speculative real estate businessmen is desirable. Yet, serious doubts arise in the effectiveness of the new law:

- 1) From the lack of any mapping and precise plan of the areas.
- 2) From the lack of any priority among the various possible uses of the land, which, for instance, places industrial activity and livestock breeding on the same footing.
- 3) From too lenient incentives for industry to properly reforest land for its own use, e.g. a long 50 year leasing period, and a ten year period during which companies have firm priority to take wood from the reforested area, even in the case that those companies have not honoured the terms of the contract drawn up with the state (the land owner) for the reforestation of the land.

Referring to the first defect of the draft, criticism has come from the technical advisor to the Prime Minister himself, who has described the draft as "not an integral law but a list of special cases." He continued: "there is a vagueness in the positioning and bordering of forest land" and recommended that a map of forests be included in any general national land inventory which is to be established.

As for the second point, the unrestricted distribution of land that is no longer designated as forest land, leads to fears by many that the ones that will take advantage of the new law will be those involved in mining industry and construction (for tourist or residential purposes) and least of all livestock breeders who are in real need of proper grazing land.

As livestock farming in Greece is declining and the foreign exchange paid for meat imports is a serious problem currently occupying the government, this would seem to be an ideal opportunity to supply grazing land to this sector.

Another serious point is that the draft does not mention at all the constitutional provision that all forests destroyed by fire should be reforested. With the high rate of forest fires in the country — many caused by arson according to public opinion — Greek forests could continue to be burnt down and the land then given to "other uses" as forest land and eventually forests disappear from Greece, which even now is dangerously short in forests. Foresters and wardens are extremely few and far between in relation to the area which is their responsibility and compared to most European countries they may correspond in number to just 10 percent of those employed in Europe, many of whose countries have few of the forestry problems of Greece. To give a picture of the problem it is worth noting that for an area of 90 million stremmas (which is the current area of forests and forest land in Greece and represents 75 percent of the Greek territory) there are only 600 people available to guard it from fire and illegal use.

It is interesting to note that the Association of Foresters in Greece were among the first to voice their opposition to the new law which was also severely criticised by an ex Minister of Agriculture of the current government. According to press reports, even some government members have expressed their opposition to and their doubts concerning the new law and the purpose behind it.

It certainly requires a good deal of change and clarification of definitions for the new law to lose the title given it by its critics: "About the Destruction of Forests". When anybody can take advantage of the lack of infrastructure, — national land inventory, forest guards and fire guards — and while on the other hand the State cannot even inspect or effectively penalize misusers (and when there are

no criteria for the selection of who may exploit a forest area other than "significance"), how can any law really protect the nation's forests or attempt to develop them properly?

The Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) added new fuel to the fire with its own report on the new law. It stated that: "As the State advisor on technical matters, and as the people's advisor according to its principles, we feel it necessary to document the negative aspects of the draft law and to show the ways in which the national forests and natural environment are offended." The government ought to withdraw the draft, the TEE claims, and should form an interparty committee that will draft a new law according to the true meaning of the constitutional demand for a law on the protection of the forests (article 24).

One of the reasons that led the Technical Chamber to this conclusion was that the draft law was rushed through the summer session of parliament, without being offered for public discussion. Specifically, the Chamber mentions several points to back its views. It observes that the law has principally been the result of action by pressure groups since no consultation was taken with social bodies, the Forest Service and the Geotechnical and Technical Chamber of Greece, etc.

The Chamber claims that the State is giving the protection of the forests to various private interests and in this way gives away the benefits but none of the responsibilities to individuals, irrespective of their activities as "arsonists or usurpers". "The draft," the Chamber notes, "does not mention reforestation, although article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that all forests destroyed by fire be reforested. In this way," the Chamber continues, "all arson is prized and becomes legal".

Article 3 of the new law changes the definition of "forest land" and frees over 15 million stremmas from constitutional protection, the Chamber continues, while from article 68 it is concluded that civil and agricultural

legislation will take care of these areas and will not altogether preclude the "altogether unconstitutional" industrial use of forest land.

The draft not only does not deal with the vast forest property owned by both the church and powerful private concerns, but it also creates new privileges (article 38 and 55) by leasing land for up to half a century, "when even the dictatorship regime did not dare to exceed the 30 year limit when violating the forest code".

The Chamber report continues by saying that the forests are viewed as a new source of profit for capitalists and privileges are given to mining and quarrying that destruct the environment, to high revenue tourism, and to construction companies while at the same time sanction is given to the speculation hidden behind building activity.

"The draft also abolishes the auction procedure for exploitation of forestry products," the Chamber continues, "and does not provide penalties for improper reforestation. On the contrary, to the operator that failed it gives the shocking privilege of preference among buyers of the products for a 10 year period".

The TEE also points out that article 49 safeguards past mis-use of publicly-owned land, while hitting the small holiday residence (articles 48, 49, 67).

Finally, the Chamber points to article 60 which provides that Greek territory can be leased to any "international foundation or organisation" for any use, military use not precluded.

With similar criticism from almost all of the political spectrum, from scientist and from leading figures in the Ministry of Agriculture itself, it was perhaps unavoidable that Mr. Boutos, Agriculture Minister, promised alterations in several articles of the draft law. Article 3, however, releasing 15 million stremmas from forest legislation, has survived and it remains to be seen whether the altered articles are to be structured in a way to better secure the best use of this land for the "public interest".

INTERPRETERS SCHOOL FOR UNIVERSITY GRADUATES' OPENS

Athens ELEVTHERTOTIPIA in Greek 12 Sep 79 p 12

[Text] The first Greek school with European orientations and curriculum, and objectives which are related to Greece's entry into the EEC and the responsibilities such an entry creates, has begun operations this year in Kerkira. It is the School of Interpreters at the Translation and Interpretation Center [KEKEDI] which will start operating in 1981. The first entrance examinations were held this year in the School of Interpreters and already 52 university graduates of fine arts (mainly philological) schools have begun attendance a few days ago.

But along with the opening of the school there also appeared the first student problems. The first announcements of the ministry last year about the establishment of KEKEDI stated that "a number of scholarships to students was envisaged." The provision of scholarships is of vital importance because the students attending this school are, as stated earlier, graduates of university schools and many of them have family and other economic obligations. And even though they passed the entrance examination, some of them are sceptical about moving away from home for 2 years to Kerkira and facing financial difficulties if they--especially the needy ones--do not get any assistance.

We are informed that the KEKEDI director and the appropriate ministry officials have exerted efforts to have money appropriated for a considerable number of scholarships. The matter is now being considered by the Ministry of Coordination and the first indications are encouraging--scholarships will finally be granted. But this should be done soon so that the students directly concerned will know what to do.

KEKEDI has been established in the Kapodistrias mansion in Kerkira which was renovated especially for this purpose. It consists of the School for Translators, the School for Interpreters and the Translation Service. The authorities believe that the location of Kerkira will help in achieving the target; that is, to make KEKEDI an excellent institution which will serve the needs of many state and other agencies in the field of translations and interpreting since KERAYRA is linked by air with European capitals

and can organize international congresses, etc. Graduates of a Greek or foreign institution of higher education can register in the Translators School. They must know the Greek language perfectly as well as have an excellent knowledge of two out of the three languages of English, French or German (without the need of a specific certificate of studies).

The program of studies lasts for 2 years with about 20 hours of weekly attendance in courses in translation and the perfect learning of foreign languages, in elementary economics, political and social subjects as well as in practical subjects (typing, dictating machines, preparation of minutes, etc.). The entrance examinations (which have already been given this year) are conducted in Greek with translations into Greek from two languages and with answers to questionnaires written in foreign languages.

In the Interpreters School, which will start operating in 1981, only graduates of the Translators School or an equivalent school can register following entrance examinations. In this school, too, the program of studies will last 2 years. The courses will concern the teaching of textual and simultaneous translations, the familiarization with the procedures of foreign organizations, congresses, conferences, et al. The students of both schools will be able, during their second year of studies, to assume the duties of a translator or interpreter for a period of supervised training in public services or international organizations.

The professional placement of the first translators and interpreters as well as that of many who will follow is to a large degree assured in the KEMEDI Translation Service which will accept work from public agencies and public utilities, in EEC services here and in other Community countries, in Greek and foreign public services and in private enterprises. The need for such cadres is great everywhere.

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CSO:4908

NEW PROCEDURE FOR ADMISSION TO UNIVERSITIES PLANNED

Athens ELEVTHEROITYPIA in Greek 12 Sep 79 p 16

[Text] In their present form, the entrance examinations to the Institutions of Higher Learning [AKI] will not be abolished for 2 more years as concerns those who graduated from gymnasiums in past years. In its final form, the draft law for formalizing the abolition of the entrance examinations as well as the change in the manner of admission to AKI as of next year (with selection by the Panhellenic Examinations of Secondary Schools [Panhellenic]) provides that:

- a. In 1980 and 1981, the so-called candidates "of past years," that is, those who graduated from a 6-grade gymnasium, will be able to take the entrance examinations regularly as has been the practice until now. However, they are entitled only to a percentage of positions of candidates admissible to AKI: for 1980, 30 percent, and for 1981, 20 percent of the positions. It is evident that this concerns all those who this year will have the misfortune of being rejected for admission to a supreme school.
- b. As of 1982, when the percentage for this category of candidates will be dropping to 10 percent each year, the candidates will be taking entrance examinations no longer but they will be able to participate in the selection of the "Panhellenics"; that is, they will be taking examinations during the same year in the courses selected by both Panhellenics (B' and C' secondary schools along with the students of the secondary schools who will participate regularly in their year for examinations). The grades of candidates of "past years" will be multiplied regularly by the same factor as for other candidates. But in their case only the grade of their graduation certificate will be multiplied by this factor and not as in the case of the other graduates when the grade from a secondary school of class B and that of the graduation certificate from a C class secondary school will be multiplied by the factor.

The draft law further provides that:

A large number of positions of candidates admissible to Higher Technical Education Centers will be filled exclusively by graduates of technical and trade secondary schools.

The special entrance examinations for military schools are abolished and admission to these schools will be done within the selection procedure of the "Panhellenics," provided, of course, that the students have declared their preference for those military schools and have passed successfully the physical examinations dictated by the National Defense Ministry. In any case, the whole procedure of selection and admission will be finally conducted by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education will also conduct as of next year the selection of those higher schools which are under the supervision of the Ministries of Social Services and Merchant Marine (social workers, nurses, midwives, captains, engineers, wireless operators, etc.). The special examinations given until now for admission to these schools are being abolished. The selection of candidates will be made on the basis of the grade of the certificate from class B and graduation certificate of class C secondary schools as well as on the basis of special courses.

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PARTIES FIGHT FOR HOLD ON STRIKING DOCK WORKERS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 8 Sep 79 pp 20-23

[Article by Jan van Hoof: "Struggle for Power Over Dock Workers"]

[Text] The strike actions in Rotterdam. Once again the dock workers were ostracized by obscure groups which acted primarily from political motives. Away with the policy of labor conditions. More dough must come. ELSEVIER portrays the leaders and describes the atmosphere.

"Smit Rusland" is the name of the tugboat on which the action center of the striking tugboat personnel in the Rotterdam port is set up. It seems a somewhat provocative choice by Cor van der Zanden, the man who is seen as the leader of the strikers. He is a staunch communist. Everyone in Rotterdam knows that. Van der Zanden doesn't deny it either. But according to him that has nothing to do with the actions. "They originated with the tugboat people and coincidentally I belong with them." Therefore he continues to react angrily and irritatedly when the communist party, of which he is a member, is repeatedly mentioned as the most important instigator behind the wildcat strikes in the Rotterdam port. Of course it is indeed not easy to prove, but members of the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands], who have watched the work in the harbor from the outside from a tourist boat, are present remarkably often to advise Van der Zanden on the strategy to follow.

In Rotterdam Van der Zanden is better known as an agitator than as a tugboat machinist, a profession he has now been practicing for over 30 years. A retired dock worker from South Rotterdam calls him "The Fre Meis from the Meuse City [Rotterdam]." "I do not believe that he does anything besides agitating," says the man in his honest opinion. Vander Zanden has indeed done everything possible to evoke that image of himself, in spite of his regularly repeated claim that his person is not of any importance and that he does not want to be portrayed as the great leader. For it has escaped no one's attention, of course, that during the last 5 years he has walked at the head of all the big and little demonstrations in the Meuse City -- and definitely not only when the interests of the port tugboat

personnel to which he "coincidentally belongs" were at stake. In April of this year, when the unrest in the Rotterdam port was already announcing itself, he also marched along in a demonstration of dock workers from the general cargo sector who blocked the Meuse tunnel for some time the Friday before Easter. He did that in his capacity as secretary of the Action Committee of Rotterdam Dock Workers.

Van der Zanden was never very much attracted to regular trade union work. Earlier he was a member of the Transportation Union of the NVV [Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions] and he was even a member of the CAO [Collective Labor Agreement] group council for the port tug services of that union, a confidential group which has an important voice in policy. In 1976 he was expelled, because at a meeting of tugboat personnel he had called a 24-hour strike, while a majority of the CAO group council had already rejected that idea. Van der Zanden opposed that at the head of an "Action Committee for the Preservation of the Purchasing Power," formed by himself. The union saw that as an unjustified transgressing of policy and found a justification in the statutes to cancel his membership. For that matter, it was not the first time that Van der Zanden had to be reprimanded by the union. In 1975, without the knowledge of the union, he called a meeting of port employees at which he also brought up matters which were contrary to decisions made earlier by the union. At that time he escaped with a reprimand. People such as Van der Zanden apparently have difficulty feeling at home in a democratic system. In 1974 he became a member of the Rotterdam municipal council for the CPN. But that did not turn out to be a success either. He was absent quite often. The City Renovation Committee often could not even make decisions, because, partly due to Van der Zanden's absence, the required number of members was lacking. Alderman Van der Ploeg, who acted as chairman of the committee, subsequently called the mayor and then Council Member Van der Zanden's decline was carefully prepared behind the scenes. To the great annoyance of the principal person himself of course, who disappeared in 1976. Naturally the excuse for his regular absence was his irregular service hours as tugboat machinist, but the colleague-council members were of the opinion that even anti-capitalists had to reasonably fulfill their obligations as council members in view of the monthly compensation of over 1500 guilders. Moreover, in the municipal council one had been aware for some time already that Van der Zanden did have time for extra-parliamentary work. "He was not an unpleasant man as a council member, but most people found him dull," a former council member recalls. "Many of the stories which he delivered had clearly been prepared by others. They were better than one could expect from the man and that was clear when he had to do it himself the second time around."

It is remarkable that Van der Zanden has been able to maintain himself for so many years as a leader during the actions of workers in the Rotterdam port. Also now, at the Willemsskade where the tugboats of Smit International Port Tugboat Service lie tied up many rows deep, everything is again turning around him. Several dozens (of the almost 500) striking tugboat people were continually present on the quay to hear the latest news from his mouth. About reactions of employers, discussions with unions or decisions by the action

committee. Continually tugging on his pants, whose belt probably was already cinched in to the last hole as a result of nervous tension, he ran back and forth from discussion to discussion and from demonstration to demonstration, meanwhile encouraging the strikers who were asking questions. His only point of rest was the tugboat "Smit Rusland," lying far from the quay and screened off by a few confidants. There machinist Van der Zanden finally was captain for a change -- although insiders claim that he is continually prompted by lawyer Dr B. Tomlow of the Socialist Party, who indeed does not leave his side. In any event Van der Zanden clearly has better been able to keep the matter in hand than his colleagues of the Action Committee for Rotterdam Dock Workers on the other side of the New Waterway, in South Rotterdam. Flip Schults and a handful of underlings had seen an opportunity on Monday 27 August to talk dock workers from some firms into striking after a Rotterdam judge had ordered 16 tugboat workers to go back to work. But Schults lost his leader's role already on Tuesday morning. And it was rather humiliating. Directly in front of the building of the South Shipping Association, the employers' organization in the port, he was drummed out with booping. "We do not want a forced-, but an elected strike leadership," according to the majority of the demonstrating strikers. Jim Stavinga of the categorial Port Union Federation (FHV) seized the microphone and the leadership. "Our Actions have to have direction and we must not become divided," he said. A day later he was the undisputed leader and spokesman and when ELSEVIER wanted to have a conversation with Schults on Thursday morning at the action center, Stavinga refused to commit himself. "We don't have time for that. Come to the Afrikaander Square. There we are together every morning at 9 o'clock and you can hear what we have to say." Stavinga's voice sounds somewhat threatening. In case we should continue to insist. "I was almost molested when I stood talking with a little group of strikers," Ton Crijnen, reporter for the weekly DE TIJD, says later. "The strikers had to keep silent and I had to get out of sight."

Friday morning on the Afrikaander Square. An open area in a district in Rotterdam which appears dreary and untidy in spite of the sun. Partly dug up and thus a wasteland. Partly covered as a stadium and provided with a seating area in a failed attempt at playfulness. In it and around it are about 400 of the 7000 dock workers who have stopped work either voluntarily or not. The others probably are drinking coffee at home at that moment, wondering from what the rent and the shopping will be paid this week. 'An a sort of balcony sits the leadership of the strike committee, which meanwhile has turned into a considerable group. Mutual division appears to have been put aside for the duration of the action. Jim stavinga is still indisputably the most important spokesman and leader of the e nt. But the others are also allowed to hold the microphone once in a while. Rough speeches intended to instill courage -- for doubt is continually lurking. Isn't we better postpone the actions for a little while, until the result of the discussions conducted by the FNV is known? The action leadership does not see any use in that. Whatever the FNV achieves, it will always be less than what the leaders of wildcat strikes have in mind. Schults urges not to let the actions weaken over the weekend, to continue to picket and for once not to go off in the camper. The nice weather is a bad omen.

Schults also gives an aggressive dissertation on drinking coffee. "Don't go to the cafeterias of your company. Then they will get you. We will have coffee for you at the gates of the companies." Once in a while the word "comrades" is used. A somewhat aged strike leader in any event does not appear to have lost his voice yet. He denounced AVKO's [General Broadcasting Association] "Televizier" broadcast in which wives of strikers spoke on the question of what they had to live on now. All journalists -- except those from DE WAARHEID at most -- are accused of negative reporting on the strike. "All of them are vassals of the capitalist system."

That criticism seems to refer primarily to reports on intimidation which agitating dock workers were said to have used to "convince" colleagues to lay down their work also. At the gate of a company in the Waal port, picketing strikers react indignantly to a radio broadcast of the NCRV's [Netherlands Christian Broadcasting Association] newscast "Here and Now" on the use of baseball bats. Just the suggestion of the use of intimidation already makes the strikers' blood boil. This was experienced by an ANP [General Netherlands Press Agency] reporter who made notes on Cor van der Zanden's remark that the latter called the application for immediate judgment against the striking dock workers "an intimidation attempt" of the employers. A striker was looking over his shoulder and saw that he was jotting down that remark. He called out: "Intimidation nothing," and threatened to throw the reporter into the Waterway with his notes and everything.

With these types of threats dock workers also were freed of their doubts about stopping work last Monday and Tuesday. "Strike with us, get thrown into the water, or get a knife in your ribs," a dock worker related the choice given him. Wisely he went home. At the Rotterdam terminal a small bus with non-strikers was solicited by the strikers. At Handelsveem Steinweg at the Meuse port 70 strikers and non-strikers came to blows. The gate was forced open and the non-strikers were forced to leave the grounds. On Tuesday the FNV transportation unions decided to call back from the Rotterdam port their cadre members -- who had tried to ward off the strike threat -- due to the threatening attitude of the strikers. "Leaving them in the ports was no longer justified," said a spokesman of the FNV in Utrecht.

The FNV transportation unions this time obviously are themselves the offending party. The strikers complain more about them than about the employers. There is disappointment -- about the continued absence of a CAO [Collective Labor Agreement], about the fact that the unions do not listen to their members and make demands which are too little. And because the unions do not support the current actions. "It is always the same old tune. The unions are always bringing up the rear," said a striker.

For a long time the unions in Rotterdam have been confronted with action groups which annually spring up around the CAO negotiations. Often under a different name, but usually with the same leaders. They try to get the dockworkers to make continually higher demands and to oppose their own union cadre. In 1970 the Workers' Power Committee was the big initiator behind the agitation and that

was the first time that the unions were put "in the rear." The wage flood of 400 guilders at once was its result. Afterward the recognized unions have however been able to keep matters reasonably in hand. Until now, for during the past few weeks they appear clearly to have lost their grasp on the situation. The fact that the tugboat personnel would suddenly demand another 50 guilders net per week -- after the concluding of a new CAO, nota bene of course could not be predicted. That was more a result of the generosity which employers in the meat sector displayed just as suddenly. Van der Zanden, always tuned in to the possibility of agitation, saw his opportunity to latch onto that, with the necessary demagogic talent and not averse to turning facts and figures around. The tugboat personnel supposedly were worse off with the new CAO. The obvious misunderstanding lies in a new arrangement for travel expenses, which is an improvement for most, but a net deterioration for some, although the latter had for a long time been receiving more than they deserved. It has been determined that everything is OK with the new CAO, but apparently the unions have not been able to clarify it sufficiently to their members. Either they did not listen, or they are not members. Van der Zanden says on the late reaction to the result of the CAO: "Everything is very simple. Only when you get your new wage statement, will you see that you are worse off."

The agitation of the dock workers from the general cargo sector was foreseeable. Flip Schults of the Action Committee of Rotterdam Dock Workers predicted already in ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE of 19 May that there would be big trouble in September [see insert]. "After vacation, for no one wants to risk that, of course." Already in April there was restlessness. A small majority of dockworkers who are members of the FNV rejected at that time the CAO on which their leaders had reached agreement with the employers. The most important points from that: 12 [Dutch] cents per hour additional, 1 additional vacation day in 1980 and early retirement at the age of 63. At the time, Schults said to ELSEVIER on these 12 additional cents per hour: "That is 4.88 guilders gross per week. Just about enough for a bottle of beer and a piece of pastry." The Action Committee of Rotterdam Dock Workers already at that time tried to urge the dock workers toward the demands which now indeed are on the table: 30 guilders more per week, 25 vacation days, retirement at age 60, a 35-hour work week and a 5-shift system. From the beginning, the unions found those demands too high. It did not become clear with what they wanted to go back to the employers on behalf of their members. Indeed, the employers first refused to talk again and wanted to stick to the agreement in principle concluded in April. Only under threat of the strike did they declare themselves again prepared for a discussion. With the same strike over them, the demands of the FNV transportation unions probably also have become greater: another additional vacation day in 1979, retirement at age 62 and assimilation of all sorts of extra allowances in the CAO wages. What amount that will ultimately lead to is of great importance for the ending of the strike.

The demands of the transportation unions don't go far enough yet in the opinion of the agitators of the strike. But the unions hardly want to, nor can, go any further. They are stuck with the labor conditions policy

determined by the Federation Council. In it, immaterial matters -- the right to have a say in decision-making and decreasing the number of unemployed through shortening of the work week -- occupy an important place. However, on these points union leaders seem to have misjudged the willingness and solidarity of many of their members in the ports. The latter primarily want more money. No shortening of the work week. "We've been kept on a string with that for many years, but the results for work opportunity are zero," says a dock worker. Of course Wim Kok is smart enough to shift the blame. According to him the unions have kept workers at the zero-line for many years, but the government and the employers are to be blamed for the fact that the workers have hardly seen the results of those sacrifices. But in the Rotterdam port they couldn't care less about that shifting the blame. "The unions? They are we."

[Insert p 23]

Rotterdam Is Smouldering

The dock workers in the Meuse City have dropped their union leaders like hot potatoes. They rejected the CAO accord and now walk behind the red banners of communist action committees. A crisis is smouldering, like in 1970. /Jan van Hoof/ [in italics] is prepared to go on the barricades ... but only after the summer vacation. From ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE 19 May.

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1980 BUDGET PROJECTS SHARP INCREASE IN NATURAL GAS PRICE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "Natural Gas Substantially More Expensive as of 1 January"]

[Text] Natural Gas

As of next 1 January, natural gas for the small consumer may be 8 cents per cubic meter more expensive. The price of natural gas would then be 35 cents per cubic meter. It is an extra increase related to the explosive increase of the price of oil. As a matter of fact, last year the Ministry of Economic Affairs had concluded an agreement with the gas companies and the Gasunie to the effect that the small consumer price of natural gas would go up 2 cents on 1 January 1979 and on 1 January 1980, and another 1 percent in 1981. Talks with Vegin and the Gasunie concerning the extra adjustment, up to approximately 8 cents, have already started.

The special consumer tax (a kind of tax on luxury goods) on new cars is going up: for cars up to and including 10,000 guilders, there is no change, but higher up (up to and including 22,000 guilders) the percentage increases from 17.5 to 19 percent, and for yet more expensive cars, from 17.5 to 21.5 percent. Thus, new cars will become respectively 2 to 5 percent more expensive.

Gasoline Excise Tax

The excise tax for gasoline will go up 4.35 cents per liter. Due to the effect of the BTW [Value-Added Tax], prices at the pump of both premium and regular gasoline will go up 5.13 cents per liter.

Interest

A limitation on the tax deduction for interest paid in the private sector will be introduced. The limitation will take effect in 1981 and will be carried out over a period of 5 years. It will not apply to interest on mortgages or loans for a first house. Ultimately, interest paid in the private sector will be deductible only to the extent that the total interest is not greater than the capital income plus 5,000 guilders.

Savings

Savings will become more attractive for private individuals. Next year, an amount of interest up to 700 guilders (at the present time it is still set at 200 guilders) will be tax free. In the words of the Ministry of Finance, this is called: the positive balance of earned and paid interest will become tax free up to an amount of 700 guilders.

Exhibit

The budget for General Affairs includes an item of 700,000 guilders for a permanent Dutch exhibit in the national museum in the former concentration and annihilation camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau.

With a package of directional measures -- costing 2 billion guilders -- the government hopes next year to be able to strengthen job opportunities, to improve the economic structure and to push back energy consumption. Four hundred and sixty-five million guilders have been set aside for the creation of 15,000 extra jobs in the market and public sector. The government wants to spend 450 million guilders to improve the job market, 400 million to strengthen the structure of industry (management sector), 345 million to set up an energy savings program, 132 million to promote innovations and 200 million for additional activities.

New Technologies

The Ministry of Science Policy, together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, intends to put more money into research for new technologies. Both ministries have decided to do this because industry is gradually putting less and less money into research work. It had been expected that Dutch companies would increase their input by 9 percent, but it appears that for 1980 the figure will not be above 2.5 percent.

Both ministries are trying to compensate for this setback in expenditures for research with a fund of 200 million guilders. Details about this fund and other government stimulants aimed at turning Dutch industry more toward new activities will be published in the Memorandum on Innovation prior to the general debate in October.

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CSO: 3105

ALVARO CUNHAL SPEAKS AT 'AVANTE' FESTIVAL

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 13 Sep 79 pp 6, 7

[Text] Comrades and Friends:

We all, communists and noncommunists, are aware that the festival of AVANTE, the glorious organ of our party, forms an extraordinary event in the nation's activity.

The AVANTE Festival is one more demonstration of the objectives and of the political practice of our party, of its constructive contribution to solving the nation's problems, of its democratic activity and of its style of collective work, of its indissoluble tie with the working classes and the masses of the people, of its firm, consistent struggle in the service of the people and of the nation, with whose interests it is entirely identified.

I transmit warm, fraternal greetings and congratulations from our Central Committee to all the party organizations and active members who have made this great event possible with their dedicated, energetic, tenacious, confident, enthusiastic and at times extremely hard and burdensome work.

By greeting those who here, on Ajuda Heights, have given and are giving the festival their work, their imagination, their talent, we are greeting our entire immense collective of the party, because the whole party has been involved in this unparalleled achievement and the festival was possible only with that earnest commitment.

It is also proper to greet those who, although they are not communists, made their contribution by working with dedication alongside the communists drawn like a magnet in the same creative effort.

We are certain that just as we have worked together for the production of this festival, so we can work together in every sphere of the nation's activity so that the April Portugal may move forward.

Because it is an eminently national and patriotic event, the AVANTE Festival demonstrates both the internationalist feelings of the Portuguese communists and the support given to the PCP, to the Portuguese people, to the Portuguese Revolution, by sister parties and revolutionary movements in other countries whose presence here -- with their delegates, their stands, their artists and athletes -- is an affirmation of solidarity that will never be forgotten.

In greeting our guests fraternally and warmly, we express to all our high esteem and gratitude for their presence.

With their recollection of the AVANTE Festival, they will surely carry away with them an image of April Portugal, of its situation, of its problems, of its struggle, of its hopes.

We are certain that they will also carry with them the true image of a party and a people that, since they are eminently patriotic, are imbued with deep feelings of internationalist solidarity with the revolutionary forces and the people of other countries.

We say to all those who brought us their fraternal embrace:

When you return to your countries, you will be able to state that the Portuguese communists, inspired by love of their people and of their nation and by the ideals of proletarian internationalism, are and always will be actively in solidarity with your respective peoples and parties.

We regard our national duties and our internationalist duties to be inseparable. And we also believe that the greatest contribution that we can make to the universal cause of the liberation of mankind is, at the present time, for us to guarantee defense of the great conquests of the Portuguese Revolution, is for us to guarantee to Portugal a free, democratic, progressive, peaceful, independent future, with a socialist society as the objective.

The AVANTE Festival is a noble affirmation of our confidence that we shall succeed in attaining this objective.

AVANTE Festival, Expression of April Portugal

We were refused the FIL [Lisbon International Fair]. Later, without any plausible reason, we were refused Jamor. When we finally obtained Ajuda Heights, a completely abandoned, rocky plot of land, extremely irregular and full of undergrowth, there were those who proclaimed again, just as they had done in Jamor: "Now, indeed, the communists are going to be buried on Ajuda Heights."

But no, the communists were not buried on Ajuda, just as they were not buried in Jamor. The communists are the workers' party. For communists, work is the driving force of human activity, the source of wealth, of well-being and of progress. The communists threw themselves into the work.

They planned, They organized. They studied and found solutions. With intelligence, technology, skill, arms and hands, sweat and song, tension and joy, ideals and dreams, thousands of comrades, brigades of volunteers, men and women of every age, joined by the pioneers, removed tons of rock, cleared away undergrowth, leveled the ground, opened up streets, avenues and squares, installed water, electricity and sewers and, in a short time, built this whole magnificent 3-day city for "the festival that brought Portugal to Lisbon."

Just like Jamor, the communists were not the ones buried on Ajuda Heights, but rather the plans of the reactionaries to prevent the holding and the success of the AVANTE Festival.

It has been rightly said that the Avante Festival is the greatest, the most fraternal and the most human festival ever held in Portugal.

Much more has been said and will be said. I should like to point out here only a few of its essential features.

In the first place, the AVANTE Festival is a festival of April Portugal. The AVANTE Festival is a living, noble affirmation of the Portuguese situation created by the revolution, by the struggle, by the work and by the creative spirit of our people.

It is the affirmation of the value of the democratic changes achieved since 25 April. Of freedoms and of democratic activity. Of the Agrarian Reform, the finest victory of the revolution, an integral part of the democratic system that the Alentejo and the Ribatejo workers knew how to defend in a heroic struggle.

Of the nationalizations that put an end to the domination of monopolistic groups and that are still standing, in spite of the furious drive against them by the reactionary forces. Of the vigorous participation by the workers in all national activity, as an essential, indispensable factor in solving problems and in safeguarding the democratic system.

The living image of Portugal liberated from fascism, of democratic Portugal that the Portuguese people want to defend and will defend is seen in the festival as a whole, in each of its achievements, in the stands, the exhibits, the cultural and sports events, the conviviality, the healthy, confident joy seen shining in the eyes.

The AVANTE Festival is a noble expression of the Portuguese nation, the nation of the workers and of the whole people, for which we communists are ready to give our lives.

The festival helps us all, helps our people, to know better, to appreciate better, to defend better everything positive brought to us by 25 April.

In the second place, the AVANTE Festival is a great cultural achievement.

The AVANTE Festival is the most valuable and diversified cultural and artistic event held in Portugal, with the incomparable exhibit of plastic arts, with the exhibit of popular art, with the grandiose spectacles, with the exhibit and recital of Camoes, with the book festival, with the lectures and talks, with the brilliant group of artists of the theater, of song, of music, of the dance, of motion pictures.

The frontiers between intellectuals and the masses fade away in the AVANTE Festival. Creativeness and talent, seeking their deep roots in the people, are expressed and live with the people and for the people. The high artistic and technical level is merged with the manual work, the feelings, the aspirations of the vastest masses of the people.

In two and a half days, the AVANTE Festival is doing more to democratize and disseminate culture than all the governments together throughout the years.

The reactionary forces cannot stand for the communists and the workers, in today's Portugal, to be the real defenders of culture, of art, of the nation's artistic patrimony, of the true values of our national entity and of our history.

Impotent and annoyed, the reactionary forces are venting their spleen against the AVANTE Festival and are protesting against it for having laid the first stones of the commemorations of the 400th anniversary of the death of Camoes to be held next year.

Comrades, Camoes is not the voice of reaction and of colonialism. Camoes is the voice of our people, of the exploits of the Portuguese, the voice of insubmission to privileges, the voice of social and scientific progress, the voice of the Portuguese nation in a high humanistic sense.

If the present-day reactionaries, who seek to take over Camoes and who arrange, every year, provocative fascist demonstrations at his monument in Lisbon, had lived in his time, they would have condemned him, as the ruling classes did at that time, to go begging in the streets of Lisbon.

No class more than the working class and no political force more than the PCP has the right and the duty to commemorate Luis de Camoes, the talented poet, the poet of the Portuguese people and nation.

Regardless of whether or not the reactionaries like it, we shall bring the work of Luis de Camoes to the people, because Camoes belongs to the people and to the nation and not to their enemies.

In the third place, the AVANTE Festival is a contribution to a democratic solution.

The AVANTE Festival is being held at a particularly complex political moment, with new characteristics and new prospects, and for that reason it takes on a high degree of significance and significant importance in the present state of affairs.

The festival is a contribution to a clarification of the political situation, to make the constitutional process in progress prosper, to unite the workers, to unite the democrats, so that the reactionaries may be defeated and the PCP may achieve a great victory in the next election.

Comrades, allow me to say a few more words on these matters.

The Constitutional Way Out of the Crisis -- Great Defeat of Reactionaries

The fundamental characteristic of the present political situation is that a constitutional way out of the government crisis that started in 1977 with the failure of the policy of the PS [Socialist Party] government alone allied in fact with the right and extraordinarily aggravated by the brutal fascistically inclined policy of the Mota Pinto government is in progress.

At the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, the reactionaries launched an overall attack aiming at liquidating the democratic regime in the short term, in pursuit of their policy of capitalist, latifundist and imperialist recovery.

The overall attack by the reactionaries, led primarily by the PPD [Popular Democratic Party] of Sa Carneiro and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] of Freitas do Amaral, attempted to destroy the democratic victories achieved since 25 April, specifically the Agrarian REform, nationalizations and management supervision by the workers. It tried to reinstate in the nation's activity, as a normal government practice, arbitrary, illegal decisions and to impose them by means of repression of the workers, beatings, cavalry charges and packs of fierce dogs.

The PPD and the CDS have been persistently demanding, recently, the holding of elections. But the elections that they wanted were not the ones that are going to be held.

In their fear of abstention by a large part of their voters, they wanted another election law that would oblige, with heavy fines, all voters to vote, thus placing the residents of vast areas of the country still dominated by the reactionaries at the mercy of the local reactionary political bosses.

They wanted to question proportional voting, so that, in order to elect a PCP deputy, two or three times more votes would be needed than to elect a deputy from the reactionary parties.

They wanted to force an unconstitutional, illegal revision of the Constitution, by not respecting either time limits, terms or subject matter

limitations of revision by giving illegally powers of constitutional revision to the Assembly of the Republic to be elected in the interim elections, eliminating the constitutional requirement for approval of any revision by a minimum of two-thirds of the deputies, in violation of the constitutional rules specifying that any constitutional revision must respect (among other basic characteristics of the democratic system) the rights, freedoms and guarantees of the citizens, elimination of monopolies and latifundia, proportional representation, autonomy of local self-governments, national independence and unity of the state.

In order to attain these objectives, the PPD and the CDS wanted the unconstitutional process of referendum to be used, in order to deceive and manipulate the voters by means of a real coup d'etat disguised as a pseudo-democratic operation.

They also wanted (as they have achieved to a considerable extent) to assault and take possession of the machinery of state and of the mass media, radio, television, state-controlled newspapers, in order to put out misinformation, to distort, slander and poison public opinion by using, as we have seen, processes that in no way lag behind the ones used in the period of the fascist dictatorship.

For the success of this overall attack, the PPD and the CDS had, as the basic instrument in their service, the Mota Pinto government, government of the PPD and of the CDS, a government whose arbitrary, illegal acts, violence and crimes are a shameful blot on the history of Portuguese democracy.

With a view to interim elections, the PPD and the CDS, the CIP [Portuguese Industry Confederation] and the CAP [Portuguese Farmers Association] and the other reactionary forces demanded that, once the Assembly of the Republic had been dissolved and, therefore, the possibility of supervision and intervention by the Assembly over the Mota Pinto government had been removed, that unscrupulous, shameless government should continue its work of hatred and destruction until the elections and that it should be the one to arrange the elections. This, undoubtedly, would turn the elections into a masquerade worthy of the times of Salazar and Caetano.

The overall attack by the reactionaries gave rise to a worsening of the people's living conditions. It robbed land, cattle, machinery, harvests from the UCP's [expansion unknown; probably Union of Portuguese Farm Workers] and cooperatives. It turned enterprises over illegally to the sabotaging employers. It caused great damage and destruction in Portuguese society. But it was finally contained, brought to a stop and defeated.

We have reservations concerning the government of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo. Although we are aware of the burdensome heritage that she has received from the Mota Pinto government, we disagree with price increases that make the crisis fall still more heavily on the shoulders of the workers, of the most underprivileged comrades and of the people in general.

At the same time, we are unmasking the hypocritical clamor made in that connection by the reactionary forces, because we all know that the PPD and the CDS have great responsibilities in the price increases decided on by the previous governments and that it is absolutely true that, if the Mota Pinto government had continued in office or if the PPD or the CDS had formed a new government, price increases and the downgrading of the living conditions of the Portuguese people would have been still more rapid and more serious.

It seems undeniable that the fall of the Mota Pinto government, the formation of the Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo government and the holding of interim elections in accordance with the precepts of the Constitution, imply a resounding defeat of the reactionary forces and, first of all, of the PPD of Sa Carneiro and of the CDS of Freitas do Amaral. This implies an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic institutions and a real victory of the democratic forces and of the Portuguese people.

The formation of this government, replacing the fascist-leaning Mota Pinto/PPD/CDS government, inserted in the constitutional solution to the crisis, represents a positive step to consolidate and continue the democratic system.

The People's Force and Struggle, Determining Factor in Democratic Solutions

How was defeat of the overall attack by the reactionaries against the democratic system possible, when the reactionaries seemed to be galloping along in their work of destruction, of capitalist, latifundist and imperialist restoration, constantly more aggressive, taking control of the government, assaulting positions in the state machinery, in the mass media, on the levers of economic activity?

Is it or is it not true that, seized by discouragement, some persons were already regarding the process of advance by the reactionaries, of destruction of the democratic victories and of the system itself consecrated by the Constitution as unstoppable?

Yes, that is true.

But it is also true that the PCP has always emphasized that the policy of capitalist, latifundist and imperialist recovery is so contrary to the new situation in Portugal created by the revolution that it solves nothing and can solve nothing, that it is encountering inevitably just resistance by the people and that, therefore, regardless of all the harm that it may do, it is condemned to failure and defeat.

It is also true that the PCP has always pointed out that the reactionaries actually have much less strength than they claim, that the forces of democracy in today's Portugal are incomparably stronger than the forces of the reactionaries and that the system consecrated in the Constitution can be defended successfully.

In carrying out its activity strictly within the framework of the institutions and of the regime, the PCP has organized, headed and promoted the struggle against the reactionary offensive, in defense of the Agrarian Reform, of nationalizations and of management supervision, against swindles and the rise in prices, in defense of the freedoms and rights of the workers, of retired persons, of the handicapped, of small and medium farmers and tenant farmers, of intellectuals and technical personnel, of small and medium businessmen and industrialists, of women, of young persons.

At a time when powerful forces banded together were trying to isolate the PCP, the PCP waged the struggle of the masses in its traditional forms. It participated in the solution of the country's concrete problems. It acted in the Assembly of the Republic, together with the other organs of sovereignty and in the local government organs.

The PCP was the driving force of the people's struggle and of democratic action against the advance of the reactionaries and in defense of the democratic system.

The Mota Pinto government fell not only because it did not solve but rather it aggravated all the nation's problems but also because its despotic, criminal activity raised up the workers and the whole country against it. The Mota Pinto government fell, because the people's struggle made it fall.

If it has been possible to delay, obstruct and restrain, at least for now, the offensive of the reactionary forces, to prevent liquidation of the regime by unconstitutional processes and to achieve a constitutional solution to the crisis, that is owing primarily to the tenacious, confident, courageous, heroic struggle of the workers and of the masses of the people in defense of April Portugal.

The development of the political situation is proof of the analyses made and of the prospects opened up by the PCP.

Therefore, in the present situation, all the other parties appear to be nervous, uncertain, unstable, divided, disoriented, fearful, without knowing well what to do, while the PCP remains calm, sure, united, certain of its correctness and of its strength, certain of the increasing support of the workers and of the vastest masses of the people, certain that a democratic solution is possible and that the forthcoming elections can finally lay groundwork favorable to that solution.

Forward to a Great Victory in the Elections

In anticipation of the elections, our comrades, our friends and even our enemies are asking what PCP's election tactics will be.

We should like to have been able to clear up this matter entirely today. We cannot do that.

The dates of the elections have not yet been set and, therefore, there still are many doubts and questions.

The only thing that seems certain with regard to the date is that the elections for local self-governments will take place in December. But nothing is known yet with regard to the date of the elections for the Assembly of the Republic. Although in principle they should also be held in December, it is not yet absolutely certain. And, if it were, will they be held before or after the elections for the self-governments?

The PCP's election tactics will depend, naturally, on these questions.

We can say right now, in connection with the elections for the self-governments, that, just as happened in the last elections, our party will compete on the tickets of the APU [United People Alliance], established between the PCP and the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission].

The APU has acquired extraordinary prestige among the masses of the people. In the partial elections that have been held, the APU has always recorded important results. In the famous Evora elections, the APU achieved an absolute majority, with 53 percent of the voters.

Very well, comrades.

The PCP will go into the election battle for the self-governments on the APU tickets and we are certain that we shall record a great victory in the elections, increasing considerably the number of representatives of the communists and of the United People in the municipal chambers and assemblies and on community councils and assemblies.

For now, according to first estimates, we shall compete in the self-government elections in 1,000 more communities than in 1976. And we can increase this number still more by making an earnest effort to run even in those areas that seem to be most difficult, where many people expect us and where the April sun will finally shine.

We are certain that the forthcoming self-government elections will prove the rapid progress of the democratic ideals and of the influence of our party, even in regions that the reactionaries believed a short time ago that they dominated entirely.

With regard to the elections for the Assembly of the Republic, we can say little concretely, because the date is not yet known.

The reactionary forces have carried out an intensive campaign so that the elections for the Assembly of the Republic and for the local self-governments might be held on the same day or with a short interval between them.

The reactionary forces think that, if that happens, the PCP will have insuperable difficulties in conducting an APU election campaign for the self-governments and a PCP election campaign for the Assembly of the Republic.

We wish to say the following on behalf of our Central Committee to the comrades and friends who are showing concern over this:

We have studied the matter carefully and we have no fear either of elections held with a short interval between them or of simultaneous elections. The reactionaries are wrong in their calculations. We shall find the proper, just, effective way to act and we are certain that we shall not only record a great victory in the self-government elections but also in the elections for the Assembly of the Republic, regardless of whether or not they are simultaneous.

The reactionaries are concerned about the visible increase in the PCP's influence. They are resting many hopes on competition in the elections by leftist and provocative groups. It can be seen in the reactionary press and on the radio controlled by the PPD how the reactionaries are calling on, encouraging, treating kindly and inciting leftists and provocateurs.

The Portuguese, however, have their eyes open. They have seen, in recent years, how the leftists only serve to divide and weaken the left. A vote for leftists is a vote lost that will not elect deputies and that may prevent the PCP from electing one here or there.

The reactionaries should not be too confident. Competition from leftists and provocateurs will not prevent PCP's success.

There are some who say that the interim elections for the Assembly of the Republic will not solve the crisis, because, even if the election objectives stated by the PCP (maintenance of the reactionary parties in the minority, repeat a democratic majority in the Assembly of the Republic, specifically of communists and socialists, and increase appreciably the number of communist deputies) are attained, the PS will again seek an alliance with the right and, therefore, a democratic solution will not be possible.

Can this evaluation be correct?

No, comrades, it is not correct.

In the first place, if (as we believe) the PPD, the CDS and other reactionary parties should be defeated and kept in the minority, all their plans for an unconstitutional revision of the Constitution and for liquidating the conquests of the revolution and of the democratic regime will collapse.

The statement that the voters have ceased to be with 25 April and have begun to support the right will collapse. This is the statement on which

they base all their demands and attempt to form a government and to approve a new legislative counterrevolution in the Assembly of the Republic.

Defeat of the PPD and of the CDS in the forthcoming elections for the Assembly of the Republic will be an extremely important step in removing the possibility of a coup d'etat, in making the reactionaries retreat, in consolidating and continuing the democratic regime.

In the second place, if (as we believe) our party increases appreciably the number of its deputies, together with a certain, predictable failure of the PS resulting from its policy of capitalist recovery and of alliances with the right, more favorable groundwork will be laid for an understanding between all democrats, specifically between communists and socialists.

Although there was a majority of communists and socialists in the Assembly of the Republic that has now been dissolved, it was dominated by a majority of the PS with the right. That majority has to be replaced by a democratic majority, not only in the number of deputies, but also in common understanding and action.

We do not want the PS to lose votes to the PPD or the CDS. But former votes for the PS that become votes for the PCP will be a positive contribution to the defeat of the reactionaries and to a democratic solution on the basis of the understanding and unity of the democrats.

Strengthening of the PCP and of its parliamentary group is not only an objective of the communists. It is an objective of all those who want to guarantee the continuation of April Portugal.

It is such an essential objective that we know of democrats who tell us that they will not vote for their respective parties this time, but, rather, for the PCP, because, in the present state of affairs, a vote for the PCP is, after all, the only vote useful for making possible a democratic solution with the formation of a democratic government.

Communists in the Government Imperative for a Democratic Solution

The nation's activity in the last few years has enlightened millions of Portuguese with regard to the real policy and the real objectives of the political parties.

The illusion created by demagogic programs has been followed by the unmistakable lesson of the facts.

Both the PS and the PPD and the CDS have already shown what they do in government.

In the last few years, Portugal has witnessed the spectacular failure both of the social-democrat policy of the PS and of the reactionary policy of the PPD and the CDS.

The experience of the PS government alone allied in fact with the right and of the PS-CDS coalition government has demonstrated completely that the policy of capitalist, latifundist and imperialist recovery is aggravating extraordinarily the people's living conditions and all the large national problems.

The experience of the Mota Pinto/PPD/CDS government has demonstrated that a policy of liquidation of the democratic conquests, of unrestrained exploitation of the working masses, of hatred of the working class and of small and medium farmers, of restoration of the power of big capital and the latifundia, of surrender to imperialism is a policy of destruction and disaster impracticable in the democratic Portugal that emerged from the April revolution.

The experience of the despotism of the regional PPD governments in the Azores and Madeira also is a sample of the fate that the reactionaries would reserve for the whole country, in case they should dominate Portugal.

In this disturbed period of Portuguese democracy that was the overall attack by the reactionaries commanded by the PPD and the CDS, it was confirmed once more that the only political force struggling consistently in defense of the workers and of the working classes in the population, in defense of the freedoms and of the other conquests of the revolution, in defense of the democratic system consecrated in the Constitution, the only party presenting a clear program, adequate solutions for the nation's situation, a policy capable of guaranteeing improvement of the people's living conditions, development of the economy and national independence is the Portuguese Communist Party.

Therefore, the PCP is the party that the people can trust and that it trusts increasingly.

We do not claim that our party can solve all the problems by itself.

We have defended and we continue to defend rapprochement, understanding, common action by the workers and democrats, specifically communists and socialists, as indispensable for a democratic solution. We defend labor union unity around the glorious CGTP/IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] against all attempts to divide. We defend the unity of action of the antimonopolistic classes. Unity of democrats and patriots with the greatest variety of political inclinations and independently of religious beliefs, because, in the political struggle, the Portuguese are not being divided by religion but rather by their class interests and their ideals. We have defended and continue to defend the formation of a government with popular, majority parliamentary support.

The political events of recent years have, however, proved two basic things:

First, that neither PS, nor PPD, nor CDS, separately or in coalition, has a policy and a practice that will guarantee the interests of the people and of the country and consolidation of the democratic system.

Second, that only with the PCP and with the workers is it possible to guarantee the well-being of the people, defend the democratic changes of 25 April, solve the great national problems and ensure Portugal's free, democratic, independent future.

Strict respect for the Constitution, rectification of the illegalities and abuses of the Mota Pinto government (by returning land, cattle and machinery to the UCO's and cooperatives, by reexamining the cases of illegal and arbitrary removal of state interventions, putting back in posts persons also dismissed or removed), guarantee of the citizens' freedoms and rights, economic development on the basis of consolidation of the democratic changes achieved since 25 April (Agrarian Reform, nationalizations, management supervision), improvement of the people's material and cultural living conditions, a foreign policy of national independence, are basic principles of a democratic change of direction.

A democratic change of direction resulting from victory of the democratic forces and from a strengthening of the PCP in the forthcoming elections will have to mean not only a democratic majority in the Assembly of the Republic, but also the establishment of a government supported by that majority, that is to say a government with the PCP.

The PCP is the organizing, mobilizing and invigorating preeminent force in Portuguese democracy. It is an essential, determining, indispensable and irreplaceable force.

This very 1979 AVANTE Festival has been another great test, proving that there are no difficulties or obstacles that cannot be overcome for the PCP and the workers.

The communists in a democratic government will throw themselves into solving the nation's problems with the same determination and the same success with which they turned the rocky hill of Ajuda Heights into this magnificent, festive 3-day-old city.

PCP Political Project

The reactionary forces are conducting a persistent campaign according to which the PCP criticizes governments very much, but, if it were in the government, it would not have any solutions to the great national problems either.

At the present time, the great political objective is election victory by the democratic forces and the forces of the PCP, and, as a result, the establishment of a government in which the PCP is ready to assume its responsibilities on the basis of an agreement or platform.

The CC [Central Committee] of our party decided, in its plenary meeting on 6 September, to hold, before the elections, a national party conference in which the PCP's election program will be prepared and approved.

Meanwhile, in response to the reactionary campaign, the people must know the democratic policy proposed by the PCP and, in order to become more familiar with it, the people must know what the communists would do if they were in the government.

On the day when the Portuguese people decide that the PCP will be the government, the country may be certain that we shall build a better life for the Portuguese people with the workers, with the masses of the people, with all the democrats who want to work and struggle with us.

We shall act within the strict framework of the institutions and of the democratic system. We shall guarantee the citizens' freedoms and rights, democratic equality and law and order, public peace. We shall do everything possible to establish an atmosphere of tolerance, in which political ideas and religious beliefs will be strictly respected.

We shall plan and organize production. We shall overcome stagnation, recession and routine and we shall give the nation's entire economy innovative stimulation by invigorating the Agrarian Reform and the nationalized enterprises and sectors, by supporting small and medium farmers and tenant farmers, by supporting cooperatives and self-managed enterprises and small and medium businesses and industries, by guaranteeing conditions of normal activity to the private sector.

We shall turn uncultivated, abandoned or underutilized land into thriving agricultural farms, pastures and forests. We shall bring about an increase in the number of livestock. We shall guarantee the rights of tenant farmers and the rights of the people to unused plots of land.

We are going to discover and remove from the subsoil natural resources whose is still to be conducted. We shall provide the nation's fishing industry with adequate fishing equipment, cooperatives, a coldstorage network and we shall move rapidly so that the 200 miles of territorial waters will benefit the Portuguese people and Portugal.

We shall stimulate tourism, consolidating and developing the basic sector, reorganizing and reequipping enterprises and resuming and carrying out large national projects, at the same time as we shall reorganize effectively trading channels and transportation.

Our whole policy is and will be determined by the supreme objective of creating and building a free, happy life for the Portuguese people and of guaranteeing constant improvement of their living conditions. This objective will guide the wage and price policy, the employment policy, the housing policy, the taxation policy, the investment policy.

Solution of the problems of women and youth will have a prominent place with an aim at putting an end to social discrimination, inequality and injustice.

We shall pay special attention to solving the problems of the more underprivileged classes, especially of retired persons and the handicapped.

We shall guarantee democratization of education and culture and we shall organize a national health service that will ensure effective medical care for the masses of the people.

By increasing the national wealth produced by the hands and the intelligence of the Portuguese people, we shall produce much of what it imports at present. We shall increase exports and we shall thus succeed in liberating Portugal from the huge foreign deficits and from the suffocating burden of pressure, interference and IMF loans.

We shall carry out a policy of diversification of foreign relations of friendship and cooperation that will intensify -- without detriment to the relations with developed capitalist countries -- utilization of the great potentialities of relations with socialist countries, with countries formerly subjected to Portuguese colonialism and with Third World countries.

We are firmly determined to defend the nation's interests and national independence. Therefore, we shall reject foreign interference in Portugal's policy, whether by countries or by NATO, and we shall negotiate mutually advantageous agreements with the Common Market countries, rejecting membership, ruinous to our economy and offensive to our national sovereignty.

All these objectives (we are certain) are in accordance with the interests, needs and aspirations of the Portuguese people and of the Portuguese nation. They can be subscribed to by other political forces. They can form a firm basis for a platform of a democratic government.

At any rate, we take on the commitment to our people to struggle firmly for their attainment.

We are not among those who always have the word "democracy" on their lips and aim at setting up another dictatorship. We are not among those who write "socialist society" in their program and seek in practice to restore monopolistic capitalism.

In unity with every democrat who wants to unite with the communists, the PCP is struggling and will struggle for the defense, consolidation and continuation of the democratic regime consecrated in the Constitution, keeping in view, as an emancipating objective, a society of freedom, of abundance and of culture, a society without exploiters or exploited, a socialist society.

Differently from other parties, our activity is not inspired by hatred, but rather by love of the people and of the nation.

The democratic solution that we propose is a project of work, of effort, of cooperation, of mobilization, of democratic, popular confraternization.

The AVANTE Festival is in itself evidence that the policy of the PCP is inspired by a lofty ideal of brotherhood of mankind.

Just as we unite hundreds of thousands of persons in this festival in one single feeling of friendship, mutual respect, solidarity and mutual help, so we propose to unite the Portuguese people in the work of building the new democratic Portugal.

We are certain that many thousands of visitors who have come to our festival, even though they are not communists, are not indifferent to the great revelation of brotherhood inspired by the festival.

We all feel that we are close, drawn together, in solidarity, united in a lofty common aspiration: to defend and continue April Portugal. To achieve a better life for the Portuguese people. To guarantee the free, democratic, peaceful and independent future of our nation. To achieve and finally build a society of freedom, equality and social justice, a socialist society.

Hurrah for the AVANTE Festival!
Hurrah for April Portugal!
Hurrah for the Portuguese Communist Party!

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PCP ORGAN PUBLISHES LIST OF DELEGATES TO FESTIVAL

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 13 Sep 79 p 11

[Text] Foreign Delegations

Angola

Moreno Pereira de Sousa, assistant head of the Department of Political Education, Information and Propaganda (DEPPI) of the Luanda Urban Committee of the MPLA-PT.

Ana Maria Chaves, first official of the Campaigns Section of the DEPPI.

Joaquim Maria Gones, DEPPI official.

Sebastiao Soba, DEPPI official.

Argentina

Severo Cerro, member of the CC [Central Committee] of the Argentine Communist Party.

Antonia Trivino.

West Berlin

Ursula Schreiber, deputy chief of the Economics Section of the West Berlin Unified Socialist Party.

Bulgaria

Tzvetan Nikolov, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CC of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Nentcho Hranov, chief of the International Department of the editorial staff of RABOTNICHESKO DIELO, central organ of the Bulgarian CP.

Czechoslovakia

Bohuslav Fabian, deputy editor of RUDE PRAVO, central organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Miloslav Vitek, member of the editorial staff of RUDE PRAVO.

Chile

Luis Godoy, member of the CC of the Communist Party of Chile.

Korea

Rim Sun Fil, editor of RODONG SIHUM, central organ of the Labor Party of Korea.

Spain

Angel Mullor, editor in chief of the weekly edition of MUNDO OBRERO, central organ of the Communist Party of Spain.

Ethiopia

Almaz Dejene, representative of the Ministry of Information of Ethiopia.

Tadese Halle.

Finland

Markko Vainio, editor of KANSAN UUTISET, central organ of the Finnish Communist Party.

France

Laurent Salini, associate of the head of the editorial staff and in charge of the TV-Radio-Press section of L'HUMANITE, central organ of the French Communist Party.

Greece

Jorge Tricalinos

Holland

Martirjn Pruizer, of the Political-Scientific Institute of the Dutch Communist Party.

Hungary

Istvan Foldes, assistant editor of NEPSZABADSAG, central organ of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party.

Nemeth Jenő, of the Information Section of the MSZMP.

Italy

Bruno Ferrero, member of the CC and of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Italian Communist Party.

Bruno Mori, of the Mantua Provincial Federation of the PCI.

Yugoslavia

Albert Duca, assistant to the editor in chief of KOMUNIST, central organ of the League of Yugoslav Communists.

Mozambique

João Paulo Maia, deputy in the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

Luis Filipe dos Santos.

Mongolia

Tserendagva Dambastsuren, deputy editor of UNEM, central organ of the People's Revolutionary Party of Mongolia.

Panama

Miguel Peña, member of the Political Bureau of the People's Party of Panama.

Poland

Joseph Barecki, member of the CC of PZPR, president of the Polish Newsmen's Union and editor of TRYBUNA LUDU, central organ of the Polish United Workers Party.

Tadeusz Zareba, of the Press, Radio and TV Section of the PZPR.

Sahara Arab Republic

Ali Mohamed, of the Foreign Relations Committee of the POLISARIO Front [People's Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro].

German Democratic Republic

Sander Drobela, deputy editor of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, central organ of the German Unified Socialist Party.

Federal Republic of Germany

Georg Pollkelt, member of the Political Bureau of the German Communist Party and editor of UNSERE ZEIT, central organ of the DKP.

Gerd Schumann, editor of UNSERE ZEIT.

Romania

Vasil Oros, editor of SCINTEIA, organ of the Romanian Communist Party.

Turkey

Two representatives of the Turkish Communist Party.

Soviet Union

Richard Ivanovich Kosolapov, editor in chief of KOMMUNIST, theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and alternate member of the CC of the CPSU.

Grigoriev, assistant head of the editorial staff of PRAVDA, central organ of the CPSU.

Gennadiy Petrov, PRAVDA correspondent in East Siberia.

Vietnam

Tram Van Lam, representative of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Western Europe.

International Review [WORLD MARXIST REVIEW]

Ivan Prolov, member of the secretariat of the WORLD MARXIST REVIEW.

The central organs of the Brazilian Communist Party, of the Communist Party of Cuba and of the Communist Party of Japan were also represented in the AVANTE Festival with stands.

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CSO: 3101

GOVERNMENT CREATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COUNCIL

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 5 Sep 79 p 35

[Unattributed article: "Nuclear Safety Council will be independent of administration and congress"]

[Text] The CSN (Nuclear Safety Council) will be an agency independent of the central administration and the legislative branch; its primary mission will be to analyze and check on the design, construction, and operation of nuclear and radioactive power plants according to the text of the bill drafted by the Energy Commissariat to be debated during the next cabinet meeting scheduled for 7 September in Moncloa palace.

The bill which, after having been approved by the administration, will have to be introduced into the Chamber of Deputies prior to 30 September, provided that the Central Commission of the CSN, as the agency's highest body, be made up of seven members appointed by the administration from among outstanding national personalities directly or indirectly connected with energy topics. The Congress of Deputies will have a veto power over administration appointments for one month although the Council's secretary-general will be appointed by the ministry of industry and energy following a favorable report from the Industry and Energy Committee of the legislative branch.

The functions of the seven members of the General Commission of the CSN--whose assignments on the technical level will be compatible with any remunerated job--include most importantly the grant of licenses for the construction of nuclear power plants, both during the preliminary and the final phases, provided it has the proper report from the corresponding autonomous agency. The Council's decision will be binding upon the ministry of industry and energy.

The bill, which consists of 12 articles and five final provisions, practically to the letter follows the philosophy contained in the resolution which, on proposal of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], was approved during the debate on the PEN (National Energy Plan) in the Congress of Deputies.

Functions

The Council will draft and propose to the government the regulations necessary in the matter of nuclear safety and radiological protection to make sure that the standards established will meet the most objective action criteria.

Once this step has been taken care of the Council may issue rulings that are binding upon the ministry of industry and energy in the matter of granting preliminary or construction authorizations for nuclear installations which furthermore will have to be based on the preliminary report from the corresponding autonomous agency.

After the power plant or radioactive facility project has been launched, the Council will assume control and will implement the inspection measures on all levels and during the various construction phases, if necessary, having authority to close any project down if any anomaly affecting safety has been discovered.

After the nuclear or radioactive installations are in operation, the Council will likewise perform the section functions and will have authority to stop the operation of any facility for safety reasons.

In collaboration with competent authorities, the Council shall be able to draft the criteria that must be complied with in the emergency plans of the various installations and it shall also be able to inspect the radiation levels, the doses received by the workers; to grant licenses to these facilities; to advise the administration on all matters, including law, and, finally, to maintain foreign relations with appropriate and similar agencies abroad.

Financing

The assets and economic resources of the Council shall be as follows:

Assets coming from the collection of the tax to be created by this law, allocations annually established under the general budget of the state and any other allocations that may be legally granted to it.

Concerning the tax designed to finance the engineering work as such connected with the work of the CSN, the figures shall be determined through the application of the rate of 0.12 percent of the total project budget to be carried out, an amount which shall be turned over at various intervals, coinciding with the various phases authorized. After issuing the final operating permit, the Council will demand full payment of the established tax, in keeping with the total amount involved in the installation that has been completed. This tax will mean that the Council will be dealing with a figure of approximately 100 million pesetas for every 1,000-Megawatt power plant.

Each year, the operating nuclear installation will have to turn over to the Council an amount that will have to be a function of the average output value.

Concerning the Nuclear Energy Board, whose main functions the CSN inherits, it shall continue as an autonomous agency of an industrial character with research and technological development functions, with the possibility of creating or participating in public enterprises that develop the kinds of technology utilized by the board.

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CSO: 3110

LEFT-WING FORCES DEMAND HALT TO NUCLEAR POWER STATION CONSTRUCTION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Sep 79 p 31

[Unattributed article: "Left demands final termination of work on Valdecaballeros nuclear power plant"]

[Text] The temporary suspension of the construction license for the Valdecaballeros nuclear power plant, announced to the Extremadura Board on Wednesday by the minister of industry and energy, Carlos Bustelo, did not stop the series of political and practical criticisms triggered by recent government authorizations for three atomic energy plants. Yesterday, the parliamentary delegation of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] filed a motion in parliament on this topic questioning the government's energy program while the two principal labor unions (the CCOO [Workers Commissions] and the UGT [General Union of Workers]) demanded the final revocation of the licenses while supporting the demands of the mayors of Badajoz.

On the other hand, the electrical power companies yesterday told EL PAIS, through UNESA, that they, on the one hand, defend the suitability of the site selected and, on the other hand, complain about the doubts that have arisen now regarding the nuclear option when it "occupies an outstanding place in the PEN [National Energy Plan], recently debated, voted on, and approved by the Spanish Parliament.

"There was satisfaction yesterday" in the administration--according to a report from EUROPA PRESS--with the result of the meeting held with the Extremadura Board while at the same time it was hoped that the report assigned to the office of the counsellor of the interior, under the Board, would be favorable on the questions raised: Site, safety, and need for power plant.

Shortly after the decision of the ministry of industry, to suspend the construction license until 16 October became known, the Badajoz district however agreed to move against the order issued by the General Directoriat of Energy which, last August, granted the license to UNESA for the Valdecaballeros power plant.

Agreement was arrived at through a motion submitted by the UCD [Democratic Center Union] mayor, Luis Movilla, quite unexpectedly apparently contradicting government policy which was in favor of that power plant. According to an announcement by minister Bustelo, that policy will be accompanied by a public opinion information drive concerning the need for the nuclear option.

PCE Motion

In the absence of a reaction from the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], whose energy expert was unavailable yesterday, Ramon Tamames, of the PCE, told EL PAIS that his party insisted on its overall opposition to the government's energy policy, especially on the nuclear topic, because that plan--the PEN--"leaves something as important as nuclear energy in the hands of the private companies."

Tamames pointed out that the communist parliamentary delegation had filed a motion against the government in the Congress of Deputies, in which the PCE reveals its opposition to the construction of the two nuclear groups in Valdecaballeros and where it asks that the license be suspended once and for all.

For the communist deputy and expert on economic matters, the Valdecaballeros site entails serious inconveniences and its authorization violates the spirit of the parliamentary resolutions that provided the foundation for the creation of the CSN [Nuclear Safety Council]. Finally, Tamames emphasized that the CSN should be under the Congress of Deputies.

UNESA: The Nuclear Option, Adopted Democratically

As far as the electric power sector is concerned, a UNESA spokesman told EL PAIS that "It is understood that everything was done with absolute objectivity and orthodoxy in the choice of this site and in everything relating to the process of authorizing it." He added that "This site was selected after in-depth technical studies and in accordance with experiences and systems employed in the world's most advanced countries."

For UNESA, "The nuclear option holds an outstanding place in the energy plan that was recently debated, voted on, and passed by the Spanish Parliament. This is a plan whose basic outlines therefore were decided democratically, just as the nuclear option was accepted democratically as one of the fundamental alternatives in assuring Spain's energy supply and coming up with a valid response to the energy question that has been sweeping the Western world ever since the autumn of 1973. From a strictly democratic viewpoint, the administration acted with absolute orthodoxy when it came to decide on the authorization for the nuclear power plant at Valdecaballeros and the construction enterprises in turn are entirely legitimate, both from the engineering and the political viewpoint, when it comes to carrying out that project. The desire for efficiency should persuade all of us to accept to implement those measures which have already been debated at length and which were decided on by democratically elected members of parliament."

UGT: Authorization Must be Revoked

The UGT Federation of Energy Industries for its part denounced as antidemocratic the administration's approval for the order issued by the Directorate General of Energy to build those three nuclear groups without waiting for the establishment of the CSN as provided for in the resolutions on the PEN.

According to UGT, there was complicity among various government agencies and some officials who provided information on these cases were even removed. As an example of this, the socialist labor union stressed the fact that the provisions detail the conditions that must be met by these projects which include among other things the foundation although 47 million pesetas have already been invested in Valdecaballeros and although the main buildings are now ready in spite of the fact that there was no authorization, nor was there any municipal license. As far as the UGT is concerned, the administration "is trying to legalize the investment which the electric power companies made behind the backs of the laws and the people." On the other hand, according to the socialist labor union, 60 percent of the rate rise will be used to finance nuclear power plants.

The UGT finally is against the employment of nuclear energy from fission in order to produce electricity so long as cheaper resources, which do not contaminate and which are not dangerous, are available.

CCOO: Support for the Mayors of Badajoz

The chief labor union, the CCOO, feels that a series of conditions must first be met for the construction of nuclear power plants: Start of activities by the CSN; final approval of installations by the prior agency and by the autonomous government of the territory where it will be located; sufficient safety standards and a tested and public evacuation plan.

Since none of the above-mentioned conditions have been met in the case of Valdecaballeros, the CCOO believes that the authorization of that plant should be revoked and expresses its support for the actions taken by the Mayors or Badajoz.

Need for Dialogue

"Nuclear energy is not a panacea but forgetting all about it would cause considerable economic decline," Guido Brunner, energy commissioner of the EEC, said yesterday at La Granda, Aviles, in connection with his participation as reporting speaker during the course devoted to economic topics and organized by the Asturian School of Hispanic studies.

Mr. Brunner added that nuclear energy will provide 170,000 jobs for the EEC, plus another 270,000 in related industries. "We cannot drop this kind of energy," he said, "not only for reasons of supply, to slow the oil price rise down, but also for reasons of a general economic nature."

Questioned as to his opinion on opposition to the Spanish nuclear program-- which was strongest from the group of Mayors in Valdecaballeros, Mr. Brunner replied: "It is my understanding that there has to be an objective dialogue involving the criteria of nuclear energy. Perhaps there is no agreement as yet but many things will be clarified before public opinion."

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UGT LEADER ON UNION'S CHANGE OF STRATEGY

Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 22-28 Aug 79 p 21

[Interview with Jose Maria Romero, secretary of the action committee on worker's demands of the state executive committee of the UGT, by Jose A. Munoz Atienza; date and place not given]

/Text/ The complete failure of the gas station attendants strike, called with a certain "lightheartedness" by the Worker Commissions /CCOO/ and other unions of the radical left without the cooperation of the socialist General Union of Workers /UGT/, has brought up for discussion a subject which had already come up on the day that Nicolas Redondo and Carlos Ferrer signed a sort of "social pact" between the UGT and the employers' union CEOE, which the communist CCOO has not wished to join. What is going on between the UGT and the CCOO?

Something is going on, Jose Maria Romero, secretary of the action committee on worker's demands of the state executive committee of the UGT, answered BLANCO Y NEGRO. The last period of collective bargaining--this young labor leader explains--was governed by unity of action; we were practicing "aggressive unionism" because we were reacting to a situation which was inherited from the previous administration. But that period ended 2 months ago and since that time the UGT has thought that it is necessary to change labor strategy, to switch to a strategy of "position," that is, of proposing to the workers solutions which are valid but also possible and attainable.

/Question/ Has the UGT retreated?

/Answer/ Not exactly, but there must be a fundamental difference between the labor movement's struggle against the dictatorship and the kind of action which the laboring class in Spain needs today. Special circumstances have arisen: the unions were legalized after the parties. We have been flooded by an avalanche of new union members. There have not been enough cadres to guide that massive number of new members and in addition, the unions did not have an adequate infrastructure.

/Question/ Wasn't the strike undertaken "lightheartedly" and without rhyme or reason?

/Answer/ There was an extremely strong reaction. But that is only natural given the oppression that the workers lived under for 40 years. But in the last few months the UGT has studied the affair carefully and we have decided that at the present time, in view of the political and economic situation which the country is going through, the labor union action of "aggressive unionism" was helping neither the workers nor Spanish society. And I am going to give you an example: in the 78-79 period of collective bargaining more work hours were lost in Spain due to strikes than in any other European country since the "hot" autumn in Italy in 1969. And, what is even worse, the main objective of that action, the increase of salaries over the maximum limits set by the government in December 1978, was not attained.

A Strike To Be Called Again

/Question/ Is the UGT giving up strikes as a weapon because it has made a secret agreement with Suarez?

/Answer/ Not at all. The proof is that we have called a strike against the Leasing Company of the Petroleum Monoploy, Inc. /CAMPESA/ fleet for September. What is happening is that we are reevaluating the role of the strike.

It continues to be the worker's most effective weapon, but only when all possibilities of negotiation have been exhausted. And in the last 2 years the idea of negotiating a collective agreement was directly and invariably related to strike action. And it should be the other way around: strikes should be the exception.

/Question/ What differences now separate the UGT and the CC00?

/Answer/ Differences in strategy and above all the different political concepts of the two labor federations--one socialist, and the other communist--which becomes increasingly more marked.

And to emphasize the extent of this the young union leader from Seville adds that while the UGT has fraternal relations with the Spanish Socialist Workers Party /PSOE/, it is not bound by the policies of the party, a party which is strong in its own right because of its popular support, which is reflected in the number of its parliamentary seats. This means that the PSOE will not have to lean on the union. The CCO, on the other hand, is obliged to be the main support of the Communist Party which is playing for the long term in the hope that a situation "in the Italian style" will arise and for this the party's hegemony in the workers movement is vital.

/Question/ Is the UGT playing for high stakes?

/Answer/ We are playing for high stakes in order to be the controlling labor union. Our concern is not to have a revolution now but to solve the country's urgent problems: unemployment, inflation and so forth....

Historical Patrimony

/Question/ The CC00 insinuates that you have made a deal with Suarez in exchange for the return of your patrimony.

/Answer/ There is no secret deal whatsoever regarding our historical patrimony. There are negotiations which are known by all submitted to the Cortes and laid before the ILO. It is a matter of justice and the democratic government should return it as was done in Italy and Austria. There is no act of favoritism on the part of Suarez because the UGT has been his main enemy. It is no crime of ours to have had 90 years of history so we demand the return of our historical patrimony which we estimate to be between 6.5 and 8 billion pesetas. It consists of 709 houses which were confiscated, 180 of which still remain in the same status. For the remainder, which are being rebuilt or are in the hands of a third party, we should be compensated in cash. We have been attacked for having broken the unity of action with the CC00 and that is untrue because we cannot commit a permanent fraud on the working class and each federation has to say at all times what solutions it has to offer for the serious current problems. When they coincide we will go more deeply into a unity of action, but not in the sense that it appears to be understood by the CC00, which is that we all must always say the same thing, that is, whatever they say. If we all had to say the same thing we would all be in the same union.

Jose Maria Romero recognizes that there is a certain disenchantment in the labor movement. "We have to recognize," he finishes, "that we have not lived up to what the workers expect from us. We must be self-critical."

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